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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that any historiography that would contribute to 
theological knowledge must take into consideration, at a methodological level, 
the reality of God. This theological claim, in turn, has significant implications 
for historical knowledge and thus, historiography. The thesis moves ahead in 
five chapters. The first is an overview and description of N. T. Wright’s 
historical and theological method as they both are grounded in his critical 
realist epistemology. The second chapter argues for a particular theological 
epistemology that goes beyond Wright’s and corrects it, drawing primarily on 
the work of T. F. Torrance and Søren Kierkegaard. In the third and fourth 
chapters an ‘apocalyptic’ theological approach is defined and articulated 
according to a progression from soteriology to Christology to creation. The 
final chapter builds upon this constructive theological work by articulating an 
‘apocalyptic’ theology of history which is then used to articulate some key 
considerations for a theological approach to historiography in critical 
dialogue with Wright’s historical and theological method.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 If Ernst Troeltsch was right in saying that the intellectual revolutions of 
the 16th Century introduced a crisis for Christianity of “world-historical 
dimensions”,1 and that this crisis made the traditional historical basis of 
Christianity untenable, then the work of N. T. Wright has been a major force 
in answering that crisis with the scientific and methodological rigour needed 
to restore the historical grounding of traditional orthodox Christianity. 
Troeltsch, of course, was working within the modern problematic created by 
Lessing’s “ugly ditch”, the gap between the “contingent truths of history” and 
the “necessary truths of reason.”2 Ever since Lessing published and 
commented on Reimarus’s treatise, modern religious thinkers have produced 
a variety of attempts to overcome this gap and provide the believer with the 
appropriate conception of the relationship between historical events and the 
experience of faith. Given the total cultural influence of Christianity in Europe, 
these debates all centred around the historical question of Jesus and the 
significance his historicity could have for faith. Troeltsch asks the 
paradigmatic question as it addresses the modern crisis: “whether we possess 
enough certain knowledge about him to understand historically the 
emergence of Christianity, let alone justify attaching religious faith and 
conviction to the historical fact.”3 
 To the first of these concerns, Wright has done a significant amount of 
work, making strong historical arguments that make sense of the emergence 
of Christianity as it is inseparably linked to the Messianic event that took 
place around the historic person of Jesus of Nazareth. The first three volumes 
in his Christian Origins and the Question of God series develop a significant and 
coherent account of the historical forces that led a first-century Jew to be 
crucified and for his followers to come to the conclusion that he was indeed 
                                                
1 Ernst Troeltsch, Writings on Theology and Religion, transl. and ed. by Robert 
2 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings, transl. and 
edited by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 85. 
3 Troeltsch, Writings on Theology and Religion, 182. 
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who he claimed to be. To the second concern, Wright also directs his attention, 
raising the overall question in his series to be the very question that, 
according to Lessing, cannot be asked; that is, he raises the question of God. 
How can he, and for that matter, anybody, move from the historical questions 
to the theological question? How does Wright move from historical 
arguments to theological ones? Are his moves valid? Do they overcome the 
broad, ugly, ditch?  
 Of course it can be argued that the modern assumption behind Lessing’s 
gap is simply wrong. There is no gap. This is just how knowledge works. To a 
large extent this is the sort of move that Wright makes. He rethinks the way 
we know things historically and theologically so that the gap loses its central 
force. It remains to be seen if this attempt succeeds. The purpose of this thesis, 
then, is to examine the question of God, as Wright appropriately focuses our 
attention, but to examine it not from the historian’s side of things but rather 
from the side of the theologian. Can what theologians say about God make 
sense of both the historical question and the theological question and 
articulate them in such a way that does justice to both? At its most basic level, 
this thesis asks the question: What does the reality of God mean for historical 
knowledge? This is, after all, what theologians do best: they allow the reality 
of God to determine their method and attempt to conform their formulations 
and systems as best as they can to this reality. Of course it often works the 
other way around! Nevertheless, it makes sense to ask the historian who is 
investigating God, even “the question of God”, to do the same.  
 To make the question hinge upon the reality of God is to identify a 
theological trajectory (if not a definite tradition) that has made the reality of 
God central for the theologian’s task. This trajectory, roughly sketched, 
follows from the Protestant Reformation to Søren Kierkegaard; from 
Kierkegaard’s radical opposition to Christendom it proceeds to Karl Barth, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and more recently, to T. F. Torrance. A contemporary 
appropriation of the basic insights of Kierkegaard, Barth and Bonhoeffer are 
being brought together with a certain reading of Paul led by J. Louis Martyn 
that is now going by the name ‘apocalyptic’ theology. While remaining 
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controversial, this movement is neither ‘closed’ nor definite so that it remains 
to be seen exactly how its particular contribution will emerge and what 
difference it will have on the overall theological scene. It is from this trajectory, 
roughly termed, ‘apocalyptic’, that the question of the reality of God will be 
addressed and framed. By choosing this trajectory from which to mount a 
critique I am simply affirming that it offers a particular tradition of 
theological questioning that cannot be avoided if the aim of the thesis is to be 
accomplished. To raise these questions against the background of Wright’s 
historical method is to oblige oneself to engage this ‘apocalyptic’ trajectory. In 
this sense then, this thesis is an ‘apocalyptic’ critique of the theological and 
historical method of the work of N. T. Wright. But it engages on this critique 
not only in order to bring together two unique perspectives, but also to 
further both the understanding of the theological implications of Wright’s 
work and the development of this ‘apocalyptic’ theological trajectory.  
 The thesis moves ahead in five chapters. The first is an overview and 
description of Wright’s historical and theological method as they both are 
grounded in his critical realist epistemology. The second chapter argues for a 
particular theological epistemology that goes beyond and corrects that of 
Wright. This is where the constructive theological contribution begins. In the 
third and fourth chapters the ‘apocalyptic’ approach is defined and 
articulated according to a progression from soteriology to Christology to 
creation. Then, in the fifth chapter, this theological work is directed first to a 
theology of history and then finally to a theology of historiography which is 
presented in critical dialogue with Wright’s historical method. 
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CHAPTER 1. History and Theology According to the 
Historian: N. T. Wright’s Historical and Theological 
Method 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In one section of N. T. Wright’s Jesus and the Victory of God, the repetition 
of the phrase “serious history”4 signals one of the underlying concerns of 
Wright’s entire project, a project that aims at restoring the relationship 
between Christian theology and methodologically rigorous historical 
scholarship. This concern for renewed attention to the work of historians for 
the sake of theological discourse signals a renewed confidence in the results of 
historical scholarship to both encourage and correct orthodox Christian faith. 
This occurs through a more nuanced and careful understanding of the 
relationship between Christian theology and the historical events that gave 
rise to the Christian movement.  
 
The Christian is committed to the belief that certain things are true 
about the past….This belief will drive the Christian to history, as a 
hypothesis drives the scientist to the laboratory, not simply in search of 
legitimation, but in the search for the modifications and adaptations 
necessary if the hypothesis is to stand the test of reality. The appeal to 
history with which the Enlightenment challenged the dogmatic 
theology of the eighteenth century and after is one which can and must 
be taken on board within the mainline Christian theological 
worldview.5 
 
Here Wright makes two points that need to be foregrounded before going 
further. First, his entire project is premised upon the commitment of the 
Christian faith to the reality of the events to which it refers. This commitment, 
however, leaves the description—both historical and theological—open to be 
                                                
4 See N. T. Wright, JVG, 83-89. 
5 Wright, NTPG, 136. See also, Wright, “Whence and Whither Historical Jesus 
Studies in the Life of the Early Church?”, JPPG, 155-6. 
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informed and corrected by a proper historical method.6 Second, that the 
critical turn to rigorous history during the Enlightenment, while seemingly 
detrimental to faith, is nevertheless a necessary development if the first point 
is to be taken to be axiomatic.  
 In light of these two points, Wright’s project develops within his own 
telling of the history of the relationship between theological and biblical 
scholarship as it has been shaped by historical forces, whether political, 
philosophical, or theological. His account is at once both a declension 
narrative and a hopeful, programmatic call for a renewed commitment to 
serious history. In short, the Enlightenment’s historical project rejected the a 
priori of faith because, in the eyes of the enlightened, it skewed the results of 
historical investigation away from that which could be known as fact. It did 
this unaware that it was making just as questionable assumptions under the 
guise of freedom and objectivity. Yet even as it imported its own problematic 
set of assumptions, the Enlightenment nevertheless provided an important 
turn to the significance of scientific historical investigation and the 
importance of the historical question for the Christian faith. This is a lesson 
that the church is still struggling to learn. Without history, and the corrective 
that the discipline provides, “there is no check on Christianity’s propensity to 
remake Jesus, never mind the Christian god, in its own image.”7 The historian 
stands as an important point of contact between the past events that make up 
the source of Christianity’s confessions and the theologian’s efforts to 
articulate the significance of those events for contexts that present themselves 
ever anew. 
 In NTPG Wright identifies three movements within the history of 
Western culture that transformed the way the New Testament is read. These 
three historical movements are: 1) pre-Enlightenment; pre-critical reading; 2) 
Enlightenment/modernity; historical and theological reading; and 3) post-
modernity; post-modern reading.8 This chapter will begin by examining the 
                                                
6 See, for example, JVG, 121 and 121 n. 139. 
7 Wright, NTPG, 10. 
8 Ibid., 7. 
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way in which Wright depicts the dynamic relationship between history and 
theology as it undergoes significant philosophical, theological, and political 
pressures during each of these three periods and how this history has come to 
determine the place of history vis-à-vis theology today.9 Moving from 
Wright’s narrative to his constructive proposal, I will focus on the 
history/theology relationship that is corrected by his account of “critical 
realism” (CR). This means looking for the way he articulates the problems 
relating history and theology from the perspective of his constructive, 
critically realist, proposal. My articulation of Wright’s method will largely be 
based upon a reading of his account of the various quests for the historical 
Jesus in JVG, and his methodological reflections in the first two parts of NTPG. 
 The thesis of this chapter is that Wright’s methodological proposals are 
specifically designed to reconcile theology and history, and to do so in such a 
way that their reconciliation is philosophically justified according to a 
particular epistemological theory (CR). Wright’s version of CR is designed to 
answer the problem of history and theology, but in doing so he leaves the 
ontological and metaphysical questions unanswered. Yet it is just these 
questions that need to be addressed in order for Wright’s CR to be true to the 
unique objects of both history and theology. In support of this thesis, the 
broad task of this chapter will be to describe a) the threefold historical context 
in which Wright has set this return to the historian’s task, b) Wright’s specific 
critique of this context in his constructive account of CR, and c) an 
examination of the questions that his critical realist proposal raises for a 
continued program of reconciliation between history and theology. 
 
                                                
9 Wright names three disciplines that the study of the New Testament 
involves: literature, history, and theology. I am focusing my attention on the 
latter two, leaving the literary questions aside. This is not because they are 
unrelated, for I take it that these three disciplines are integral to one another, 
but rather for the sake of clarity and as a way of limiting the following 
discussion. In any case, Wright sees the core issue at the heart of each 
discipline to be epistemological. Cf. NTPG, 31. 
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2. The Historical Context  
 
 a. From the Pre-Critical Period to the Reformation 
 
 Wright bases his programmatic retrieval of the discipline of history for 
theology and biblical studies in a narrative that begins with the Reformation. 
When reading Wright’s work it is hard to find an ecclesial situation or 
historical moment when things were exactly right. Yet if he is telling a 
declension narrative, it is one that has its high point in the simple, pre-
Enlightenment assumption that the Bible reports actual occurrences and that 
the veracity of its stories are what we would consider today to be “historical.” 
The Bible was assumed to be speaking of real events. This is not to say that 
this assumption is without its own problems, only that the assumption that 
Christian belief is inextricably bound together with beliefs about historical 
events is the right assumption to have. Nevertheless, prior to the critical 
movements of the Enlightenment the situation of Christians vis-à-vis history 
was such that it could “today be criticized on (at least) three grounds...: it fails 
to take the text seriously historically, it fails to integrate it into the theology of 
the New Testament as a whole, and it is insufficiently critical of its own 
presuppositions and standpoint.”10 Without the safeguards of a proper 
historical discipline, these criticisms come to characterize a declension 
narrative that Wright begins in the Reformation. In JVG, Wright tells the story 
of modern historical Jesus studies by beginning with the pre-Enlightenment, 
pre-critical context of the sixteenth century Reformers. What particular shift in 
Wright’s view, did the Reformation effect that might signal a declension away 
from a more healthy—if only intuitive—union of theology and history? 
 
 i. Pro me 
 
 During the Reformation a significant shift occurred as doctrines became 
centered around the question of benefits pro me,11 or how the teachings of the 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Wright, JVG, 15. 
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Christian church were soteriologically efficacious within the current situation 
of the individual Christian living in Europe.12 This meant that the narrative 
contexts in which the Christian teachings made sense were discarded in favor 
of more propositional formulations that could be articulated in a variety of 
confessions with certainty and clarity. In the practical use of the Bible, this 
looked like a favoring of the more theologically oriented epistles over the 
more narrative based gospels.13 While this benefitted the need for doctrinal 
clarity in the face of ecclesial abuse, the negative result was that the stories 
which made sense of the doctrines and in which they found their proper 
horizon of meaning were lost precisely as the crucial hermeneutical context 
for the teaching of the church. Jesus’ death and resurrection made sense 
according to the demands of a newly reinvigorated personal soteriology, yet 
the stories that made up the bulk of the gospels, that made sense ‘historically’ 
of why Jesus was crucified (i.e. social, cultural, political, and economic 
reasons), were seen to be of lesser importance. Thus, the ecclesiological and 
political break with Rome can be seen to be analogous to the theological 
movement away from the historical particularity of Jesus and its significance 
for the pressing questions of the day.14 According to this narrative, we could 
say that the doctrinal controversies that made up the Reformation took the 
historical basis of the Christian faith for granted focusing instead on the 
sources of the tradition, the texts themselves, as the basis of the propositional 
content of Christian theology. The Bible replaced the historical events to 
which the Bible bore witness. 
 For Wright this is all quite nicely displayed in Philip Melanchthon’s 
(1497-1560) dictum, “hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia eius cognoscere”: to 
know Christ is to know his benefits. After quoting the dictum in JVG, Wright 
quotes Melanchthon’s following question, “unless one knows why Christ took 
upon himself human flesh and was crucified what advantage would accrue 
                                                
12 Ibid., 16. 
13 Ibid., 14-15. 
14 Ibid., 15. It should be noted that here Wright makes his claim based upon 
his reading of the modern heirs of the Reformation: Lutherans Martin Kähler 
and Rudolph Bultmann. 
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from having learned his life’s history?”15 In NTPG and JVG, the pro me of the 
Gospel is identified with the benefits of Christ that Melanchthon prioritizes, 
and Wright interprets these benefits against the historical question of Jesus. 
Melanchthon’s dictum stands for this rupture between Christology and the 
historical Jesus. In the context of politically charged theological disputes, in 
which rupture and discontinuity were both threat and possibility, the 
Reformation, on the side of discontinuity, set the stage theologically (and 
politically) for the major philosophical shifts that were to come with the 
Enlightenment. According to Wright, by prioritizing doctrines over history 
according to the criterion pro me the Reformers could, in principle, ignore the 
historical question and instead settle theological disputes in abstract, 
conceptual terms. Their concern to break ecclesially and politically with the 
mediaeval church in favor of continuity with Christ and the apostles in faith 
came with a similar break with the history of Jesus the first century Jew. 
“Continuity with Christ meant sitting loose to the actuality of Jesus, to his 
Jewishness, to his own aims and objectives.”16 The Jesus of history could 
easily be transposed into the abstract, conceptual, Christ. By opening this 
door, the Reformers made it possible for theology, in its movement forward 
from the Reformation into the crucible of the Enlightenment, to adapt to a 
variety of new historical claims. This in turn would give theologians an 
increased freedom to articulate theological claims regardless of changing 
historical understanding. 
 
 ii. History and Doctrine 
 
 In Wright’s account, this ‘divorce’ between history and doctrine became 
a key moment in the history of theological development. Politically, the 
question of authority was of such significance during the Reformation that 
theological innovations surrounding the source of religious authority 
determined the rise and fall of cities, states, and empires. The Reformers set 
                                                
15 Quoted in JVG, 15. Cf., NTPG, 22. 
16 Ibid. 
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the question up in terms of scripture, and answered with the doctrine of sola 
scriptura making the Bible, but especially the proclamation of its doctrines, the 
source of authority over and against the Roman Catholic Magisterium. While 
this break with the authority of Rome was based upon the Bible itself, the 
question of authority was never directed to the Bible’s historicity, but rested 
with the teaching of either “pope or preacher.”17 In Wright’s understanding 
the debates assumed the abstract Christ: “The icon was in place, and nobody 
asked whether the Christ it portrayed—and in whose name so much good 
and ill was done—was at all like the Jesus whom it claimed to represent.”18  
 
b. The Enlightenment: Idealism and Realism 
 
 The Enlightenment and the movement of Modernity, can be 
characterized according to a certain paradoxical tension between materialistic 
empiricism and subjective idealism. The Enlightenment was the era in which 
the prioritization of reason, following the Renaissance, was realized first in 
the elevation of objective scientific investigation. The remarkable scientific 
and technological successes that were transforming almost every area of life 
and inquiry were validations of the transformative power of reason. It was 
also the era of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who radically transformed 
philosophy into its modern form and made subject-oriented standards of 
universal reason and criticism dominant. In a paradoxical way, with the 
Kantian revolution, Gary Dorrien writes, “the seemingly unstoppable march 
of materialistic empiricism was stopped in its tracks.”19 The Cartesian search 
for the foundation of knowledge of the external world in the thinking subject 
turned, by means of Kant’s ‘transcendental move’, toward a subjectivism that 
tended to reject the very possibility of knowledge of external reality. And yet 
the empirical tradition continued alongside the subjective, leaving us with a 
                                                
17 JVG, 16. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Gary Dorrien, Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of 
Modern Theology (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 13. 
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Modern legacy of profoundly significant technological advancement and 
conceptually abstract philosophical systems. These two emphases uniquely 
positioned theology and biblical scholarship in such a way that the tension 
between them came to determine the next several hundred years of Christian 
intellectual effort.  
 On the one hand, there was that which in a broad sense can be termed 
‘realism’, bolstered by empiricism, which was confidently committed to the 
correspondence between what one observed and what a thing is in itself. The 
successes of the natural sciences in the rapidly expanding knowledge of the 
physical world were taken as sure evidence of this realism. On the other hand, 
and in a seemingly contrary move, was the Kantian turn to the subject, the 
emergence of various manifestations of idealism, and the critical theory which 
developed in the wake of increasing suspicion that any meaning could be 
found in an object that was not determined by the knowing subject. These two 
divergent paths, realism and idealism, become crucial to understanding 
Wright’s programmatic retrieval of the study of history for biblical studies 
and theology.20 Christian theology could take either path. The first path, that 
of ‘realism’, would move down the road of rigorous historical inquiry—and 
suffer the consequences. The second, that of ‘idealism’,21 would pick up 
Christian doctrines and take them, away from their historical rootedness and 
along multiple paths which would include subject-oriented idealism, 
existentialism, and speculative, progressive Hegelian systems. Here, the 
Hegelian approach is exemplified by D. F. Strauss22 while Rudolf Bultmann 
                                                
20 See for example, Wright’s use of both terms as he describes the alternative 
paths taken, with the path from Lessing to Bultmann describing idealism, and 
Wrede, Räisänen, and the ‘biblical theology’ school standing in for realism. Cf. 
NTPG, 21, 25. Colin Gunton, whom Wright cites positively, also makes this 
distinction using these two terms. See Gunton, Enlightenment and Alienation: 
An Essay Toward a Trinitarian Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2006 
[1985]), 46-47; cf. NTPG, 32, n. 3. 
21 Cf. NTPG, 23, for Wright’s use of “Idealism” to describe the philosophical 
context of much Protestant theology, ”happier with abstract ideas than with 
concrete history.” 
22 D. F. Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, 4th ed, transl. by George 
Eliot (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1902), 783: “In his discourse to the 
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exemplifies the Neo-Kantian trajectory within New Testament interpretation 
and theology.23 The latter does so according to modified Heideggerian 
categories.24 
 
 
 i. The Jesus of History and the Jesus of Faith 
 
 One way Wright narrates the split between ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ is 
through the telling of the story of the origins of the quest for the historical 
Jesus (in JVG). Along the first path, that of historical inquiry, the 
Enlightenment followed the lead of Reimarus (1694-1768) who in his 
posthumously published Fragments (1788) sought, according to Wright, to 
“destroy Christianity (as he knew it) at its root, by showing that it rested on 
historical distortion or fantasy.”25 Following Colin Brown, Wright claims that 
Reimarus was influenced by the anti-supernaturalism of English Deism26 and 
instigated the “Quest” for the historical Jesus “as an explicitly anti-theological, 
anti-Christian, anti-dogmatic movement.”27 Given the political climate and 
the motivation especially by the radicals of the Enlightenment (Spinoza, 
Lessing, et. al.)28 to break free from the constraints of tradition, the discovery 
                                                                                                                                       
church [the theologian] will indeed adhere to the forms of the popular 
conception, but on every opportunity he will exhibit their spiritual 
significance, which to him constitutes their sole truth, and thus prepare—
though such a result is only to be thought of as an unending progress—the 
resolution of those forms into their original ideas in the consciousness of the 
church also.” 
23 Anthony C. Thistelton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and 
Philosophical Description With Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, 
and Wittgenstein (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 205-212. 
24 Ibid., 217. Cf. Roger A. Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing: Philosophy 
and Historiography in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. Studies in the History of 
Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974). 
25 JVG, 16. 
26 Ibid., and cf. Colin Brown, Jesus in European Protestant Though, 1778-1860 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1985). 
27 JVG, 17. 
28 Cf. Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of 
Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 22 
of Reimarus by Lessing was an opportunity to further their goals. The point of 
all of this was not to provide a more accurate historical basis for the Christian 
faith, but rather to free the individual from the constraints of religion and, in 
this new-found freedom, to discover what are the eternal and universal truths 
of reason.  
 This brings us to Lessing’s “broad ugly ditch.” 29 On one side of the ditch 
are the contingent truths of history, the events that we know through sense 
perception and experience, whether in the present or in the past, and on the 
other are the necessary truths of reason, those truths that are not contingent 
because they are not based upon historical events, events which could have 
been otherwise. Lessing’s ditch essentially was a deepening of the divide 
indicated by Melanchthon’s dictum. The payoff with respect to Christian 
theology was that an abstract Christ could now be associated with the 
universal truths of reason while the historical basis of Christian faith, along 
with the ecclesiastical forms of authority that were related to it, was simply 
incidental. As Lessing wrote, “I do not deny for a moment that Christ 
performed miracles. But since…they are merely reports of miracles…I do 
deny that they can and should bind me to the least faith in the other teachings 
of Christ. I accept these other teachings for other reasons.”30 The point that 
historical investigation was after, apart from simply the desire to know the 
past, was akin to the willingness of the Reformers to break with the traditions 
of the past, to introduce a rupture in history that would free the individual 
from dogmatic claims (and old political loyalties) based upon past history. If 
that history could be put in question, then those binding claims could be 
undone and humanity would be free to live and govern according to the 
universal authority of reason. So, for the theologians following the path of 
rigorous historical investigation, the only possibility was to abandon church 
teaching in the face of a discredited historical foundation, or to abandon 
history as a foundational component of Christian identity. 
                                                
29 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings, trans. H. B. 
Nisbet, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 85-87. 
30 Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings, 86. 
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 In JVG Wright describes the work of Reimarus as “simply exploiting the 
split between history and faith implicit in the emphasis of Melanchthon’s 
dictum…. [Reimarus] claimed that the gospels were records of early Christian 
faith, not transcripts of history, and that when we study the actual history we 
discover a very different picture.”31 This emphasis on the study of history, 
while aimed at discrediting the historical foundation of the Christian faith, 
nevertheless opened the door on an important corrective to the Reformation’s 
emphasis on the abstract conceptual Christ. Wright points out the irony of the 
turn to history following Reimarus. “The fascinating thing, looking back two 
hundred years later, is that the appeal to history against history, as it were, 
has failed. History has shown itself to contain more than the idealists believed 
it could.”32 Historical investigation, it turns out, is not only essential for 
retaining the historical basis of the Christian faith, but good historical 
method—serious history—is in fact less damning of the Christian base than 
Reimarus, Lessing, Strauss, et. al., thought. The realist path, the path that 
chased down the empirical but contingent truths of history, led ever further 
into a discovery of the past apart from the authorities that had always 
predetermined what one would find at its end. 
 By using the term “idealist” in the passage just cited to refer to the 
Reformation split between history and faith Wright points us toward the 
other path from this division through the Enlightenment. While somewhat 
anachronistically used to refer to the direct intellectual heritage of the 
Reformation, Wright’s use of “idealism” first gains meaning in reference to 
the abstract conceptual nature of Christian theology as opposed to the 
concrete historical reference that Christian thought has always assumed. The 
idealist path can in this sense be traced from Melanchthon’s dictum to Lessing, 
through Kant and all the way to Bultmann and Barth. In this trajectory, if 
attention was paid to the past it was to the experience of the believing subject 
which bore theological significance and not to the historical events themselves. 
This became a major force in German theology through the modern period. 
                                                
31 JVG, 17. 
32 Ibid., 18. 
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“Bultmann in his way, and Karl Barth in his, ensured that little was done to 
advance genuine historical work on Jesus in the years between the wars. 
Attention was focused instead on early Christian faith and experience, in the 
belief that there, rather than in a dubiously reconstructed Jesus, lay the key to 
the divine revelation that was presumed to have taken place in early 
Christianity”33 The fact that historical critical work has continued alongside 
the idealist movement can be attributed to the enduring significance of 
Lessing’s ditch. These two trends, both a thoroughgoing realism in historical 
investigation and the speculative retreat into the realm of the subject, 
‘idealism’, were able to be maintained because of the assumed incompatibility 
between contingent historical events and the universal truths known to the 
rational subject. The ‘idealist’ interest in history is not to learn about reality as 
if events in themselves were meaningful, but, as Wright argues, “one looked 
at the history in order then to look elsewhere, to the other side of Lessing’s 
‘ugly ditch’, to the eternal truths of reason unsullied by the contingent facts of 
everyday events, even extraordinary ones like those of Jesus.”34 
 The intellectual context that Wright is outlining can, at this point, be 
described along the lines of a significant split between the Jesus of history and 
the Jesus of faith. The Jesus of history, the real man who lived and taught in 
Palestine is understood apart from faith and, perhaps most significantly, apart 
from the miraculous. As Murray Rae notes, the Enlightenment quest for the 
historical Jesus that Reimarus and Lessing introduced was committed, as was 
Spinoza, to the category of immanence.35 The Jesus of history is limited to 
explanations that make sense within known possibilities. The Jesus of faith, 
on the other hand, is an open possibility, a figure who can be molded and 
articulated according to various speculative schemes and ideals, and whose 
true reality may indeed be simply but powerfully, existential. So, for example, 
Albert Schweitzer’s final portrait of Jesus is described by Wright: “He thus 
                                                
33 JVG, 22.  
34 Ibid., 18. 
35 Murray Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision of the Incarnation: By Faith Transformed 
(Oxford: OUP, 1997), 85. Cf. Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley 
(London: Penguin Books, 1996), 114. 
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took upon himself the Great Affliction which was to break upon Israel and the 
world. The bridge between his historical life and Christianity is formed by his 
personality: he towers over history, and calls people to follow him in 
changing the world. The very failure of his hopes sets them free from Jewish 
shackles, to become, in their new guise, the hope of the world.”36 If we go 
back to the ruptures, ecclesial and theological, of the Reformation we can see 
the way in which doctrines, if they are to be maintained even though 
ruptured from their narratival contexts, can move in either direction. They 
can be picked up and transported into an ‘idealist’ framework, or, if historical 
foundations remain significant, doctrines can be the theological commitments 
which pre-determine our reading of history.  
 
 ii. The Dilemma for Faith 
 
 This last point is significant, because it identifies what remained for 
many the only possibility for the church if it is to maintain its commitment to 
the necessary relationship between history and theology: a commitment to the 
affirmation of biblical history even in the face of the severe dismantling of the 
historical sources of Christian faith. Those who took this path had to do so in 
faith and against increasing pressure in the opposite direction from academic 
historians. If the path of idealism is rejected and an affirmation made that the 
historicity of the Christian faith ultimately matters, then this is the only option. 
Indeed, for Wright it is the case that, “the rootedness of Christianity in history 
is nonnegotiable.”37 The temptation for orthodox Christians can be to simply 
avoid the Enlightenment critique of the historical events that gave rise to the 
Christian faith. In the case of Jesus, this often involves a prior commitment to 
the divinity of Jesus, ahead of historical investigation, and then whatever 
historical work follows must reflect this commitment. The result is a portrait 
of Jesus that is iconic, “useful for devotion, but probably unlike the original 
                                                
36 JVG, 19. 
37 NTPG, 9. 
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subject.”38 If however, we commit ourselves to rigorous historical 
investigation, leaving the question of divinity aside, there is the fear (for 
some) that “we will thereby ‘disprove’, or at least seriously undermine, 
orthodox theology.”39 This is precisely what happened for those who 
followed the trajectory represented by Reimarus. The picture that emerges in 
this telling of the relationship between Christian theology and the pressures 
of the Enlightenment, is of the difficult position in which Christian faith finds 
itself. On the one hand faith relies upon history to make sense of its very 
existence and yet historical investigation following the Enlightenment has 
been highly critical of Christianity’s historical claims.  
 If the church forsakes history for the ‘idealist’ side of the picture, 
Christian faith retreats to a subjectivism, insulated and safe from the 
pressures of historical research. Yet here it becomes unclear that what we 
have is genuine Christianity if genuine Christianity depends upon a 
particular history. The tension between realism and idealism that emerged 
during the Enlightenment forced Christian theology into the difficult position 
created by these polar forces working against each other. Wright’s theological 
dialogue partners,40 those who represent the most serious declension in his 
narrative, are primarily those who have done theology on the idealist end of 
the spectrum. These theologians have attempted to protect the Christian faith 
from the work of the historian and, like the older brother in the parable of the 
prodigal son, remain distrustful of the historian’s return to the household of 
faith.41 Wright’s project is intended to resolve this tension through a fully 
                                                
38 JVG, 8. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See the description of a “via negativa” in Jesus studies represented at the 
outset of JVG by quotations from Schweitzer, Bultmann, Barth, Lightfoot, and 
Bornkamm. JVG, 3. 
41 The parable of the prodigal son is used by Wright to describe the 
relationship between the theologian (elder brother) and the historian 
(prodigal). “The wastrel son, representing the Enlightenment, has rejected 
traditional Christian orthodoxy, and has set off for the apparently far country 
of historical skepticism. The elder brother, representing the would-be 
‘orthodox’ Christian who has never troubled much with history and has never 
abandoned traditional belief, is both angry and suspicious. But supposing the 
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committed and rigorous historical investigation and by bringing to the table 
equally rigorous theological questions, all the while maintaining the 
nonnegotiable relationship between history and theology.  
 
The underlying argument…is that the split is not warranted: that 
rigorous history (i.e. open-ended investigation of actual events in first-
century Palestine) and rigorous theology (i.e., open-ended 
investigation of what the word ‘god’, and hence the adjective ‘divine’, 
might actually refer to) belong together, and never more so than in 
discussion of Jesus.42 
 
Wright’s project, then, can be understood to be a thoroughgoing attempt to 
halt the decline in the relationship between theology and history with a 
comprehensive methodological approach that takes seriously both poles of 
the Enlightenment, ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’, and effects a kind of synthesis of 
the two that can maintain an orthodox Christian faith in an intellectually 
rigorous and philosophically credible way. 
 
c. Postmodernism 
 
 Wright’s account of the postmodern turn, while only cursory, 
emphasizes the dialectic of ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’. His account focuses on 
the world of postmodern literary criticism as a turn toward an emphasis on 
the act of reading rather than on the reality of the events to which texts refer.43 
His response to this is both appreciative and critical. The postmodern focus 
on the reader can be seen as an extension of the Enlightenment’s turn to the 
subject, where the question of external reality is only answered in terms of the 
subjectivity and not objectivity. Postmodern reading focuses on the reader’s 
                                                                                                                                       
younger brother suddenly comes home again? Supposing—even more 
shocking—that there is to be a celebration of his return?” See JVG, 9. Of 
course, there is no evidence in the parable that the younger son repented of 
his ways. The emphasis is on the Father’s acceptance, not the wayward son’s 
transformation! 
42 Ibid. 
43 NTPG, 9. 
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experience of the text. This can point to an important aspect of the 
hermeneutical enterprise that is neglected if the text is seen as a simple 
window into another world, but the opposite danger is that the text becomes 
only a mirror, reflecting only the reader to the reader’s self.44 The text as 
object, to be dealt with as external to the reader, locates the positive aspect of 
the postmodern literary turn in light of the concern for a realist account of 
reading. On the other hand, the subjective element, i.e. the focus on the reader 
and her experience in reading, points to the ‘idealist’ strand and the critical 
aspect of the hermeneutical question. Wright’s own project takes significant 
strides toward addressing these issues in the third chapter of NTPG where the 
subjects of worldview and story are taken up in detail.  
 Significantly we see Wright continuing to hold together the ‘idealist’ and 
‘realist’ strands as essential correctives to each other in a generous movement, 
welcoming the insights of the postmodern critique while retaining a sense of 
the necessary grounding of Christian thought in a reality external to the 
subject. The postmodern text is one possible open door to this ground while 
the postmodern account of the reader provides the critical distance needed for 
appropriate epistemological humility. 
 
3. From Critique to Construct 
 a. Introduction: Idealism, Realism, and Critical Realism 
 
 The previous section described the way in which N. T. Wright articulates 
the tension between history and theology by attending to the narratives he 
tells about the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and Postmodernity. In both 
JVG and NTPG we find a variety of terms that can generally be clustered 
around two intellectual trajectories from this narrative, two trajectories I have 
already begun referring to as ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’. The choice of these 
terms, as indicated by their use within scare quotes, is not meant to refer to 
their technical philosophical use, although the terms can include them, but 
                                                
44 Cf. Ibid., 54. 
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rather to indicate the twin poles of the epistemological tension between the 
knowing subject for whom the world is subjectively and rationally 
determined (‘idealism’), and the reality of the external world which presents 
itself, as it is, to the subject (‘realism’).45 This choice is suggested by Wright’s 
methodological proposal, his particular account of “critical realism” (CRw),46 
which relies upon a critique and reformulation of these two poles.47 Wright 
himself admits that at times the concepts he is working with are “deliberately 
general” and that he is using a “broad-brush” to set up the “rival theories” 
that make his methodological account necessary.48 This should be kept in 
mind, both as a restraint to quick dismissals from more nuanced perspectives 
of CR, and as an encouragement that continued work within the framework 
that Wright has offered is warranted. It is to Wright’s account of this 
framework, his CRw, that I now turn. 
 Critical realism (CRw), in Wright’s own words, “offers an account of 
how we can take full cognizance of the provisionality and partiality of all our 
perceptions while still affirming—and living our lives on the basis of—the 
reality of things external to ourselves and our minds. This method involves, 
crucially, the telling of stories within the context of communities of 
discourse.”49 The three-fold form of this description—provisionality, reality, 
communities of discourse—will guide the organization of this section, 
                                                
45 Cf. e.g., Gunton, Enlightenment and Alienation, 46-47. 
46 When referring to Wright’s version of critical realism I will use the letter “w” 
as in ‘CRw’. This is similar to the practice in the appendix of Donald L. 
Denton Jr., Historiography and Hermeneutics in Jesus Studies: An Examination of 
the Work of John Dominic Crossan and Ben F. Meyer (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 
218f. 
47 Wright explicitly juxtaposes these two terms against one another in the 
fourth chapter of NTPG, even though he also questions the distinction as 
“ultimately misleading.” Yet here the point is not that the terms can be apt 
descriptors of intellectual movements, but rather that “swings from one to the 
other are not much help in terms of an actual historical investigation such as 
ours.” As we will see, CRw is precisely a way out of this false dilemma. 
Nevertheless, the dilemma exists and use of this language can help to 
characterize the intellectual trajectories that have led to the particular conflicts 
between theologians and historians. Cf. NTPG, 96. 
48 NTPG, 32. 
49 Wright, “In Grateful Dialogue: A Response” in JRI, 245-6. 
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although I will change the order slightly. The tension between provisionality 
(‘idealism’) and reality (‘realism’) is overcome in the positive aspect of 
Wright’s methodology, namely the attention paid to the stories that constitute 
the discourse and worldviews of communities. Each of these elements will be 
dealt with in turn, beginning with ‘realism’ and ending with the synthetic 
resolution of the tension in an appropriate methodology. The purpose of this 
section, then, is to provide an account of CRw according to these terms, as the 
synthetic overcoming (Aufhebung?) of the dialectic between ‘idealism’ and 
‘realism’. Theology, since at least the Reformation, errs when it tends toward 
the idealist end of the dialectic, and history (e.g., Enlightenment 
historiography)50 errs when it is over-determined by its commitment to 
realism. The overcoming of this dialectic is facilitated by Wright’s attention to 
the contexts of human knowing, contexts which are given coherence 
according to narratives, stories, and, ultimately, worldviews. Knowledge 
occurs in the dynamic relation between reality and the conceptual make-up of 
our engagement with that reality.51 
 
b. Realism 
 
 ‘Realism’, can be associated with the intellectual trajectory from the 
Enlightenment that pushed against the traditional historical content of 
Christian teaching with a confidence in the ability of a modern historical 
method to know the truth, with varying degrees of objectivity, about the past. 
That is the historical context of ‘realism’ in Wright’s narrative. Philosophically 
understood, realism names a confidence in the independent existence of 
                                                
50 JVG, 117. 
51 It should be made clear that a dualism based on these two concepts is not, 
in Wright’s understanding, finally helpful, but rather represent a false 
separation that needs to be overcome. As we will see, CRw is presented as a 
“relational epistemology” that is meant to collapse the “hard-and-fast 
distinction between objective and subjective” (NTPG, 44-45) by integrating the 
two in such a way that a new epistemology emerges. 
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objects apart from observers.52 Historians, to the extent that they are realists 
about their subject-matter, are confident that the events which they study 
have (really) occurred in time and space and that texts and testimony do, in 
happy cases, refer to those events. This is the case regardless of whether or 
how one has access to those events. It may be the case that we cannot know 
the events, but a realist nevertheless believes that events really occurred 
which, through human intention, become objects of inquiry. Thus, realism, 
broadly conceived, implies the allowance in epistemology for the reality of 
objects external to the knower, objects which must be considered in their 
externality. 
 
c. Positivism 
 
 In the context of the Reformation, prior to the Enlightenment, ‘realism’ 
could be said to simply describe the epistemological assumptions of most 
people before coming under the Enlightenment critique. How one came to 
know a thing was not a question of the reality of the thing itself (this was not 
in question), but rather a problem of appropriate method with respect to a 
given object. Scientific method and historical method were seen to be 
epistemological developments that would aid the observer in coming to know 
an object as it really is, without regard for what the observer brings to the task 
of observing. “Positivism” names this “optimistic” epistemological position.53 
As Wright understands it, positivism is simply a position that assumes the 
ability to make claims about reality external to the observer based solely upon 
sense data. One of the problems that Wright sees on the positivistic side of 
realism is that it ignores the prejudices that always accompany observation. 
For positivist historians this looks like a “value-free and dogma-free 
historiography as though such a thing were attainable.”54 For positivist 
                                                
52 Alexander Miller, “Realism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012 
edition: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/realism/. 
53 On Wright’s account of positivism see NTPG, 32f. 
54 Ibid., 16. 
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theologians, either the biblical text is read “straight” as if they have avoided 
all presuppositions, or, “because one cannot have ‘direct access’ to the ’facts’ 
about Jesus, all that we are left with is a morass of first-century fantasy.”55 
 Another problem that Wright sees with positivism is its rejection of 
other types of knowledge, presuming them to be less secure compared to the 
direct and unmediated knowledge of empirical verification. Positivistic 
knowledge, if it is methodologically controlled through empirical testing, 
must either reject other claims to knowledge, e.g. philosophy, theology, etc., 
or these claims are generally “downgraded”56 because they are not subject to 
empirical verification. Wright notes that positivism has generally been 
rejected by philosophers after undergoing the critique leveled against it by the 
sociological study of knowledge and the reconsideration of the philosophy of 
science by philosophers such as Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn. Even so, 
positivism hangs on in popular opinion. This understanding of realism is 
pejoratively referred to as “naïve realism” by Wright and identified as a 
“common-sense level”57 of realism that, in positivistic fashion, would seek 
both an objective point of view and claim unmediated correspondence of 
perception between subject and object.58 
 
d. Phenomenalism 
 
 Phenomenalism names the realist position taken to the other extreme, 
what Wright calls, “the pessimistic side of the Enlightenment programme.”59 
“The reverse of this belief is that, where positivism cannot utter its shrill 
certainties, all that is left is subjectivity or relativity. The much-discussed 
contemporary phenomenon of cultural and theological relativism is itself in 
this sense simply the dark side of positivism.”60 This “dark side of 
                                                
55 Ibid., 33-34. 
56 Ibid., 33. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 37. 
59 Ibid., 34. 
60 Ibid. 
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positivism”—phenomenalism— is similar to the idealist/subjectivist thread 
from the Enlightenment except that rather than having its roots in the Kantian 
turn to the subject, it has its roots in the ‘realist’ side of “critical realism,” and 
specifically in the commitment to empirical observation. Phenomenalism 
begins with the humble recognition that all phenomena from an external 
world are mediated through our senses, but instead of taking that as a 
positive account of how we have knowledge of external reality, 
phenomenalism takes this as an absolute barrier to knowledge; all we can do 
is speak in terms of what we perceive rather than what really is. For Wright, 
an unchecked phenomenalism is not far along a slippery slope to solipsism, 
the “belief that I and only I exist.”61 “When I seem to be looking at a text, or at 
an author’s mind within the text, or at events of which the text seems to be 
speaking, all I am really doing is seeing the author’s view of events, or the 
text’s appearance of authorial intent, or maybe only my own thoughts in the 
presence of the text…and is it even a text?”62  
 What is rejected by Wright is the idea that external reality can be 
immediately known, i.e., unmediated, apart from larger mediating contexts of 
meaning. This gets at the heart of Wright’s critique of the Enlightenment’s 
historical method. All historical knowledge is knowledge that is mediated. By 
assuming that scientific methodologies function positivistically, any historical 
methodology that claims objectivity will simply ignore the imported a priori 
commitments and broader narrative contexts that predetermine conclusions 
about historical events. In Wright’s words, “The positivist…traditions are 
wrong to imagine that perception is prior to the grasping of larger realities.”63 
The twin problems of positivism and phenomenalism represent for Wright 
dangers of a realist epistemology that is not corrected, or checked by a 
properly critical realism. It is to this critical, and in some respects, ‘idealist’ 
end of Wright’s account of epistemology that we now turn. 
 
                                                
61 Ibid., 35. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 43. 
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e. ‘Idealism’: Two Branches 
 
 In its most basic sense, ‘idealism’ and the cluster of terms associated 
with it from NTPG, can be understood to correspond to the subjective turn of 
the Enlightenment. The term “Idealism” shows up more frequently in JVG 
than in NTPG primarily because in the former Wright is dealing with the 
particular intellectual trends that contributed to the scholarly projects 
associated with the various quests for the historical Jesus. In NTPG, Wright 
refers to “Idealism” as the philosophical context of much modern Protestant 
theology, which, when read together with the introduction of JVG, links it 
together with the historical trajectory from the Reformation to Kant and 
beyond. The extent to which Wright’s realist epistemology is critical will need 
to be articulated in contrast to the idealist trajectory of the Enlightenment in 
order to see how his constructive proposal attempts to overcome the idealist 
critique. In Wright’s account, the idealist trajectory can be demonstrated 
according to two major branches that influence the relationship between 
theology and history: conceptual abstraction and subjectivism. 
 
 i. Conceptual Abstraction 
 
 Wright’s narrative of the ‘idealist’ trajectory begins, chronologically, 
with Melanchthon’s dictum, the pro me of the Reformation, and the 
abstraction of doctrine from history that was implied. It ends with the radical 
subjectivism of postmodernity. When Wright speaks of the way in which 
theology deviates from its proper relationship with history, he does so in 
reference to this abstraction from the historical and concrete, and he uses, at 
times, the term “idealism” to draw attention to its conceptual nature. For 
example, when discussing the field of New Testament theology he comments 
that, “the philosophical context of much of this work has been Idealism, 
which has been happier with abstract ideas than with concrete history; so 
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theology, seen as a set of such ideas, attains a privileged status.”64 This has 
been a consistent emphasis within Wright’s critique of the relationship 
between theology and history and is implicit in more recent critiques of 
abstract theological categories such as “divinity” and “humanity” when they 
take precedence over more biblically rooted concepts such as the kingdom of 
God or Jesus as Messiah. 
 
In fact, one might suggest sharply that it is the mainstream dogmatic 
tradition (arguing about the “divinity and humanity” of Jesus) that has 
actually falsified the canon by screening out the Gospel’s central 
emphasis on the coming of the kingdom and by substituting for this 
the question of the divinity of Jesus, as though the point of the Gospels’ 
high incarnational Christology were something other than the claim 
that this is Israel’s God in person coming to claim the sovereignty 
promised to the Messiah.65 
 
The abstraction of theological concepts from the historical narratives is a 
mistake that has significant theological and even political ramifications. By 
locating theological doctrines in their historical contexts the Christian faith is 
necessarily rescued from its “charmed faith-based circle” so that it might “go 
out and address the world, in order to rescue the world.”66  
 
 ii. Subjectivism 
 
 The other branch of ‘idealism’ is subjectivism. Subjectivism holds that 
the only knowledge we can have of objects is of their appearances, as they 
appear to the observer, and not as they are in and of themselves.67 With 
                                                
64 NTPG, 23, cf. 21. Another example comes from JVG, 24: “This…is true to the 
reformation emphasis: The purpose of Jesus’ life was to say things, to teach 
great truths in a timeless fashion. It was also true to idealist philosophy: what 
matters ultimately is ideas, not events.” 
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Immanuel Kant’s epoch-making shift in philosophy, the idea that all reality 
actually conforms to a priori categories that belong to the mind of the human 
subject, the independent reality of objects in the world was put into question. 
In Wright’s discussion of epistemology, surprisingly little attention is paid to 
Immanuel Kant.68 Where subjectivism is mentioned it is associated with 
phenomenalism,69 the outworking in a negative direction of the trajectory of 
positivism which I have associated in Wright’s work with ‘realism’. 
Nevertheless, the Kantian turn to the subject is an essential part of the ‘idealist’ 
trajectory. The pro me and corresponding theological abstraction of the 
Reformation was followed by the turn to the subject and the radical 
subjectivism that followed. Put in question by this move was the very reality 
of the external world. What might have simply been Cartesian doubt 
regarding our knowledge of the world, knowledge in search of an external 
foundation that Descartes found in God, was now with Kant grounded in an 
account of the metaphysical priority of the human subject. This move placed 
the reality of the non-subjective world, i.e. the world of objects, into question. 
The major problem, then, with this strand of the idealistic turn for Wright’s 
project is that it makes what should be independent concrete historical events, 
completely dependent upon the subjectivity of the one interpreting history. 
All history involves interpretation but for the thoroughgoing idealist it is only 
interpretation. Kant’s description of his project as a “Copernican shift” is an 
apt metaphor for the sort of shift that occurs when the critical element 
overcomes the primacy of the reality of the external world.70 For in Kant it 
was the object that must conform to the subject, and not the other way around. 
The center of the universe has become the subject, and the universe itself is 
only understood around that center. This is exactly opposite for Wright in the 
sense that Wright is committed to the existence of external reality and that our 
knowledge ought to conform to that reality. But how does one account for 
externality if we cannot escape our subjectivity? How do we remain 
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epistemological realists while at the same time acknowledging our own 
subjective limitations? 
 
f. Wright’s Critical Realism (CRw)   
 
 CRw fits into Wright’s project as an epistemological position that 
attempts to resolve the tension between ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ in such a way 
that regains the central role of historical knowledge for theology and, at the 
same time, to justify theological inquiry as undertaken by the historian. It is 
specifically intended to overcome the rejection by theologians of the biblical 
historian’s conclusions, while at the same time it functions to expose the a 
priori commitments of the historians who reject the theological claims of their 
historical subjects. Above these polemical goals, however, CRw is meant to be 
an epistemology that conforms to the reality of the world as the good creation 
of God, and to provide a way of investigating that world free from the 
dualisms that we have seen through Wright’s narration of the intellectual 
heritage extending from the Reformation and the Enlightenment. The 
dualisms of ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, subjective/objective, 
phenomenalist/positivist, etc., are present in the split between theology and 
history.71 In Wright’s words, “the challenge is now before us to articulate new 
categories which will do justice to the relevant material without this 
damaging dualism—and without, of course, cheating by collapsing the data 
into a monism in which one ‘side’ simply disappears into the other.”72 CRw 
will be an attempt to meet these twin challenges: reject the false dualisms that 
beset Christian discourse and avoid the temptation of favoring one side or the 
other. CRw must be a new way of accounting for the reality to which the 
Christian faith must bear witness.  
 The primary dualism that provides the immediate context in which 
Wright introduces CRw is that of “positivism” and “phenomenalism”. This 
highlights the primary tension that we have been dealing with, namely the 
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tension that exists between the reality of the external world and the 
subjectivity that determines the way in which we experience it. After giving a 
brief description of CRw (to which we will come in a moment) he comments 
that “critical awareness…challenge[s] a naïve realism or a mainline 
positivism.”73 This is another way of referring to the 
phenomenalism/positivism duality. A few paragraphs later he attempts to 
preempt the conclusion that in CRw it appears that the “phenomenalists, or 
the subjectivists, have won after all.”74 It is this cluster of terms, and the 
inherent dualistic tension between what I am calling ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, 
that Wright identifies in order to set up the context in which he presents CRw. 
In Wright’s own words, CRw is a  
 
way of describing the process of ‘knowing’ that acknowledges the 
reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence 
‘realism’), while also fully acknowledging that the only access we have 
to this reality lies along the spiraling path of appropriate dialogue or 
conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence ‘critical’).75  
 
The point that needs to be made, and the key to understanding how CRw can 
avoid falling onto one side or another, is that knowledge, for Wright, is only 
achieved along this “spiraling path” described as “appropriate dialogue” or 
“conversation”. It is this “path” that holds the key to understanding what 
Wright is doing with CRw. 
 
 i. Knowledge as Contact 
 
 Against the empiricist or positivist assumption that separates the 
knower and the known into the categories of ‘subject’ and ‘object’, CRw 
prefers to understand this fundamental epistemological relationship in terms 
of ‘humans’ and ‘events’. This eliminates the distance between the knower 
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and the known by refusing to abstract each from within the social contexts or 
“frameworks” that contribute to identity and meaning.76 Rather than 
assuming a basic distance between the knower and the known, something 
that the language of subject and object do, the language of “human” and 
“event” necessarily involves the inclusion of each within stories that make 
sense of them as conversation partners. In other words, knowledge is not 
empirical verification or, in a positivistic sense, an objective comprehension of 
what a thing is in itself; rather, knowledge is fundamentally relational. CRw is 
a “relational epistemology.”77 
 Wright identifies CRw within a tradition of CR spanning several 
disciplines including theology, philosophy, science, and history. A brief look 
at two scholars from whom Wright draws for his understanding of CR will be 
helpful for understanding what “relational epistemology” means. First, 
theologian Colin Gunton’s book, Enlightenment and Alienation, argues that one 
of the problems with Enlightenment epistemology is that it operated under 
the false assumption that there exists a fundamental distance between the 
observer and the world (alienation). Drawing on the work of Michael Polanyi, 
Gunton describes the contrast between the Enlightenment assumption of 
alienation and a critical realist epistemology as the difference between two 
different metaphors of seeing. On the Enlightenment side, normal seeing is 
the primary metaphor and the observer is assumed to be at a distance from 
the object seen. On the critical realist side, seeing is likened to a blind person 
with a white cane, feeling the world through the cane. Knowing, according to 
this metaphor, is a process of learning through contact. Polanyi’s arguments, 
the source of this change of metaphor, “all circle around his central claim that 
knowledge of any kind, whether it be of mathematics, natural science, 
philosophy or literary criticism is personal and not, for example, to be 
understood on the analogy of the machine or of omniscience.”78  
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 Another of Wright’s influences, Ben F. Meyer, whose own work of 
biblical interpretation draws heavily upon the transcendental method of 
Bernard Lonergan, points to Lonergan’s Insight, for a similar rejection of the 
metaphor of seeing. “Insight demystified the conflicting epistemologies of the 
modern era (naïve realism, empiricism, idealism), tracing them to a common 
root, namely, the fallacy that knowing is like seeing, that knowing the real is, 
or would be, akin to seeing it.”79 Lonergan’s own words are helpful in 
elucidating further the epistemological position of Wright: 
 
For knowing is an organically integrated activity….To conceive 
knowing one must understand the dynamic pattern of experiencing, 
inquiring, reflecting, and such understanding is not to be reached by 
taking a look. To affirm knowing it is useless to peer inside, for the 
dynamic pattern is to be found not in this or that act, but in the 
unfolding of mathematics, empirical science, common sense, and 
philosophy; in that unfolding must be grasped the pattern of knowing 
and, if one feels inclined to doubt that that pattern really exists, then 
one can try the experiment of attempting to escape experience, to 
renounce intelligence in inquiry, to desert reasonableness in critical 
reflection.80 
 
In both Lonergan and Polanyi, knowing is a type of experience or encounter 
with the world. Knowing is coming into contact with that which is to be 
known. In this way it is a realist epistemology. In CRw, this contact with the 
real is uniquely accounted for in Wright’s account of story and worldview.  
 In Wright’s words, worldviews are, “the basic stuff of human existence, 
the lens through which the world is seen, the blueprint for how one should 
live in it, and above all the sense of identity and place which enables human 
beings to be what they are.”81 The concept of worldview is not a constructive 
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proposal of Wright’s, but is rather based in what he sees as a particular 
honesty regarding how humans engage and interact epistemologically with 
the world. By countering both the idealist and realist strands of thought what 
remains is an account of human interaction with reality that can only be 
understood in terms of a holistic vision of humanity in integrated contact with 
the world. The concept of a worldview provides a way of talking about this 
integrated nature of human contact with reality. Worldviews do this by 
providing stories that give coherence to our experience of reality. They 
answer basic questions that arise out of these stories and out of human 
experience, and the answers to these questions are always bound within 
stories. Worldviews also include cultural symbols that express the stories and 
questions that make up worldviews, and they are sustained and formed in the 
context of praxis, of particular ways of being in the world.82 This account of 
worldview is basic for CRw and provides the context which makes sense of 
the human as knowing subject, an integral part of the whole of reality. 
 One function of the role of worldview and story in CRw is to be a critical 
check on any aspirations to a positivist epistemology. This can be seen in the 
way that story and worldview function with respect to the process of 
hypothesis and verification. 
 Hypothesis and verification are the normal scientific means by which 
one comes to know things about reality external to oneself. Wright 
understands the methods of hypothesis and verification according to the 
“usual accounts of ‘scientific method’.”83 For Wright, it is important to make 
the claim that in the natural sciences, the data that we gain from our senses 
always has a prior framework of understanding, a hypothesis and theoretical 
context which makes sense of experience, and that focuses the scientist or 
historian in which direction to look and with what tools to use in their inquiry 
into an event, person, or other object of knowledge. Sense data is then 
interpreted according to an existing framework or theory that can make sense 
of it. In order to successfully inquire regarding an experience or an object, 
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“one needs a larger framework on which to draw, a larger set of stories about 
things that are likely to happen in the world.”84 In Wright’s method, it is 
worldviews that provide the frameworks within which knowledge can occur. 
There is no knowledge apart from worldviews, and it is in the interaction 
between worldviews, through the processes of hypothesis and verification 
uniquely enabled by worldviews (just as a theory or hypothesis enables data 
based on observation to gain meaning in a scientific research program), that 
knowledge can take place. In this way, knowledge is never abstracted from 
stories, and it is in the context of stories that contact with external reality takes 
place. 
 But in what sense can we speak of this as “contact” with reality? There 
are at least four explicit ways in which Wright accounts for “contact” in his 
articulation of the relationality of CRw. First, Wright articulates the 
theological and biblical claim that humans are made in the image of the 
creator and so are given responsibility within the created order. This means 
that human presence in the world is necessarily interactional and can be 
described in moral terms as “stewardship.” Wright even suggests that his 
CRw might be understood as an epistemology of love.85 This is clearly a claim 
internal to Wright’s own Christian worldview and subject to the same critique 
as any other worldview. That Wright uses this argument suggests his 
willingness to admit his own bias, an admission that is consistent with his 
understanding of the impossibility of a point of view outside of any 
worldview. Second, the dialogical nature of the epistemological process 
implies contact,86 a contact exemplified by the fact that the knower may be 
changed in the process of knowing. Third, the content of stories, the basic 
components of our knowledge about the world, are necessarily and 
“irreducibly” about the “interrelation of humans and the rest of reality.”87 
Knowledge cannot escape this inter-relationality. Fourth, and finally, stories 
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are told. It is the human act of telling stories that communicates information 
about reality; story-telling is that unique practice in which knowledge is 
passed from one community to another across time and space.  
 Stories and worldviews, then, provide the appropriate critical check to a 
realist epistemology in CRw. They do this ostensibly without risking the 
realism that is essential to Wright’s Christian commitments, preventing both 
abstraction and the subjectivism that would isolate the knower from the 
contexts which provide meaning. There can be no abstraction of knowledge 
apart from frameworks of meaning that permit knowledge to be classified as 
knowledge. “The fact that somebody, standing somewhere, with a particular 
point of view, is knowing something does not mean that the knowledge is less 
valuable: merely that it is precisely knowledge.”88 Knowledge could thus be 
defined as the appropriate fit of a fact or object within the worldview of a 
knower. This means that we can only know what an object or a fact is (any 
‘small’ piece of knowledge) if we can place it within a story, or, in another 
term Wright uses, an “event.”89 There are no isolated facts or objects. 
“Stories…are more fundamental than ‘facts’; the parts must be seen in light of 
the whole.”90 Knowledge therefore must be understood as the successful 
location of objects or facts within a true story or worldview.  
 But what makes a story true? Here Wright seems to leave us with a 
coherentist account of truth. At several points the proof of his account of CRw, 
or epistemology, is simply given over to the coherent outcome of his project: 
“and, as always, the proof of the pudding remains in the eating.”91 
“Simplicity of outline, elegance in handling the details within it, the inclusion 
of all the parts of a story, and the ability of the story to make sense beyond its 
immediate subject-matter: these are what count.”92 All external reality, if it is 
to be the subject-matter of knowledge, is necessarily story-bound. In other 
words, reality is only perceived, as an object for knowledge of the knowing 
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subject, within stories. These stories situate the object of knowledge within a 
spatial and temporal framework of meaning. Therefore reality can only be 
known in a meaningful way if we get our stories right. This means that the 
epistemological process, as a process that moves toward true stories about the 
world, will have to pay critical attention to the stories and worldviews that 
make sense of both the knower and the person or event to be known. This can 
only be done through contact with the storied existence of reality. But this 
contact is always contact between stories and worldviews. 
 In sum, CRw attempts an account of epistemology that overcomes the 
historic dualisms that have separated the knower from the known through a 
critically realist epistemology of contact. Knowledge that has traditionally 
been defined according to the subject/object distinction is redefined in CRw 
according to the categories of human and event, worldview and story. 
Knowledge is what we know to be true according to our worldview, 
according to the meaningful contact that we have with reality. The next two 
sections will look at the way in which this epistemological method is 
appropriated in the disciplines of history and theology. 
 
 ii. Historical Knowledge in CRw 
 
 Wright defines history as “the meaningful narrative of events and 
intentions.”93 If we keep in mind that in CRw there is a fundamental 
commitment to external reality, then “events and intentions” names the 
‘things’ that historians are after. History is not simply an exercise in reading 
texts, although it certainly is that, but it is looking through texts (and artifacts) 
at events and the human intentions present with those events that actually 
happened.94 Yet this realism is simultaneously complemented by the critical 
qualifier that would resist the positivist temptation to posit a factual essence, 
or bare event, free from interpretation. “What a positivist would call ‘the facts’ 
are part, and an inseparable part, of a much larger whole. The move from ‘fact’ 
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to ‘interpretation’ is not a move from the clear to the unclear: events are not 
mere billiard-balls cannoning into one another, to which different ‘meanings’ 
or ‘interpretations’ can be attached quite arbitrarily, according to which game 
is being played. Some ‘meanings’ or ‘interpretations’ will be…more 
appropriate than others.”95 The goal of the historian, through appropriate 
methodological tools (e.g. hypothesis and verification, worldview 
investigation, narrative criticism, historical critical methodology, etc.), is to 
gain “the ‘inside’ of the event.”96 That is, the historian aims at the inner logic, 
in narrative and worldview terms, of the meaning of an event according to the 
perspectives of those involved. In a later essay Wright quotes R. G. 
Collingwood with respect to this point: “The historian’s task, as seen by 
Collingwood, is ‘to ‘re-think’ or inwardly re-enact the deliberations of past 
agents, thereby rendering their behavior intelligible.’”97 In this way historical 
knowledge is unique in comparison with other scientific disciplines since it is 
not trying to discern laws or causal links that are repeatable, but rather 
investigating particular one-time events and their unique causal contexts.98 
Historical method properly moves from the event itself to the meaning of the 
event through the ‘inside’ of the event. 
 Wright indicates three aspects to this methodological movement, or 
“three levels of understanding”,99 as the historian moves between the 
historical event itself and the meaning of that event.100 The first is that a 
proper historical method makes human intentionality a necessary object of 
investigation. Human intentionality involves the aims, intentions, and 
motivations that make sense of both particular actors, but also entire 
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communities and societies.101 The next movement after the investigation of 
human intentionality is the attempted integration of events, their interiors, 
intentions, motivations, etc., according to a coherent story or narrative. The 
historian tells a story and attempts to give a harmonious account of the whole 
of historical data.102 The best way to understand this narrative aspect of 
historical method may be to understand the story as a particular community 
tells it. So looking at the inside of an event, such as the Messianic event of 
Jesus of Nazareth, would involve seeing it as the community telling the story, 
the early Christians, would see it. That means that to understand an event or 
person would require understanding them from within the resultant tradition 
rather than having to establish a position outside of it.103 Third, from telling a 
story the historian moves on to the meaning of the story, the meaning of past 
events. Meaning, in CRw, is always found within worldviews. But since CRw 
operates according to an externalist premise, any worldview cannot simply 
become an idealist or phenomenalist subjectivism, a private worldview that 
would obscure the reality of events. Events and intentions are essentially 
public.104 They are available to investigation, critique, and change. CRw 
makes sure this happens by preventing worldviews from being seen as 
private (because of the insistence on external reality) and by insisting that the 
knowledge of an event is always an interpretation of its reality and therefore 
always open to dialogue with alternative interpretations or theories.105 As I 
have shown above, this dialogical nature of CRw is essential to make sense of 
it as an epistemology of contact, rather than an epistemology of alienated 
“seeing.”  
 N. T. Wright’s historical method, understood within the context of his 
critically realist epistemology, can be summarized as follows:106 it is an 
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epistemology which acknowledges both the reality of the object of 
investigation, external to the knower, and the fact that any external reality is 
only known through a process in which the worldview of the knowing subject 
mediates knowledge of that reality.107 Following this way of knowing, 
Wright’s historical method proceeds according to the method of hypothesis 
and verification that guide normal scientific inquiry in other fields.108 Because 
knowledge itself is made possible by worldviews, all reality comes to us 
saturated with meaning, a meaningfulness determined by the worldview 
through which we perceive that which is external to us.109 Thus, the 
historian’s own worldview will always direct questions of meaning to the 
events of history that are under investigation. The questions the historian asks 
are appropriate questions of meaning, inquiring into aims, intentions, and 
motivations of historical subjects. These questions and their answers guide 
the historian to hypothesise, to formulate meaningful stories about events, 
and then to verify those meaningful stories, testing them against the historical 
data. The method is not necessarily sequential, but rather spirals110 through 
the process of hypothesis and verification in a self-critical way as stories are 
refined and unnecessary complexities resolved.111 In this way the historian 
learns to see the world through the eyes of the subjects under investigation.112 
The stories that emerge are always subject to the challenge of critique and 
falsification, but only by enduring critique do they come to be “fair and true 
statements about the past.”113  
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 With this summary of Wright’s historical method, what remains is to 
show in what way CRw as an epistemological position determines Wright’s 
theological method and the unique claims involved in the investigation of 
God.  
 
 iii. Theological Knowledge and Worldviews in CRw 
 
 At the beginning of his chapter on theological method in NTPG, Wright 
states that his aim in the chapter is to “suggest what might be involved in a 
‘theological’ reading that does not bypass the ‘literary’ or ‘historical’ readings, 
but rather enhances them; and to explore one possible model of letting this 
composite reading function as normative or authoritative.”114 Wright does 
precisely this by locating theology as a questioning discipline within his 
concept of worldview, together with literary and historical readings. He 
defines theology accordingly as the “god dimension of a worldview.”115 This 
raises questions as to the nature of theological knowledge with respect to its 
unique object, God, and God’s place within Wright’s critically realist 
epistemology.116 What can we say about the knowledge that theology gives? 
In what way does Wright claim that God can be known in and through his 
critically realist epistemology? Answering this question will involve a brief 
look at how Wright positions theology within a worldview, and then a close 
look at the type of knowledge that CRw can gain with respect to the question 
of God.  
 Wright approaches theology as a unique aspect of the sociology of 
knowledge, understandable as part of the “worldview pattern”117 that 
conditions all forms of knowledge.118 While acknowledging that theology can 
                                                
114 NTPG, 121. 
115 Ibid., 130. 
116 Wright addresses this question in NTPG, 126-137. 
117 Ibid., 126. 
118 See the quotation from Norman Petersen (ibid., 127) with regards to 
explicitly identifying worldviews, in the context of a discussion of theological 
knowledge, within the sociology of knowledge. 
 49 
be narrowly defined as “the study of gods, or a god,”119 Wright opens up his 
account of theology to pay particular attention to the way that theology 
functions according to the four points of the grid that make up his account of 
worldviews: symbol, story, questions, and praxis. Theology deals with, or 
“turns the spotlight on,” the interaction between these four aspects as it raises 
questions and answers them with respect to transcendence or to the divine.  
 As we have seen, for Wright, a worldview is the basic, foundational, and 
usually invisible, grid through which people see and interpret the world in 
which they live. People look through them, not at them.120 But, even though 
we do not usually see them, they can still be taken up and examined;121 they 
are always in process, being refined, altered, or rejected—implicitly and, at 
times, explicitly. Theology as a particular type of discourse, belongs within 
the larger comprehensive category of worldview, and should be understood 
as a crucial component of the manifold discourses that make up the way in 
which humans articulate and understand their relationship to reality. This 
final claim can be clarified by seeing how theology in Wright’s view is related 
to its subject-matter: transcendence or the divine. 
 Throughout the chapter on theological method in NTPG, Wright works 
with a particular graphic depiction to illustrate the possible epistemological 
relations between humans and god(s). The basic illustration looks like this: 
 
humans----------------------> revelation-----------------------> god(s)122 
 
The sequence of Wright’s account follows a sequence that moves from left to 
right, from humans to knowledge of god(s). Humans tell stories that speak of 
transcendence. If we are going to assume the basic nature of worldviews for 
human knowing, then the stories humans tell need to be shown to function 
according to the internal logic of the worldviews in which they operate, and 
not dismissed because they do not fit within the particular worldview that 
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determines an outsider’s way of seeing. This allows us to keep the question of 
transcendence open against the modern temptation to foreclose on its 
possibility; transcendence and the theological questions it poses are important 
regardless of the further question of actual or true reference. So the actual 
phenomenon of human language of the transcendent allows us to ask 
questions that interrogate this transcendence.123  
 Wright’s commitment to asking questions of intention is also significant 
here since what the historian is after in understanding an ancient worldview 
is the intended meaning, the thing expressed by the texts in question. To 
illustrate, an example provided by Ben F. Meyer is instructive: “Bultmann 
understood what the writer [John] meant by ‘the Word was made flesh’; 
namely, ‘a pre-existent heavenly being became man’. Over and above such a 
meaning, however, there remains the question, ‘But did a pre-existent 
heavenly being actually become man?’”124 The Johannine claim is intended to 
mean what Bultmann claimed it meant. That is a claim open to the historian, 
and even more of interest to the theologian. But how does one move from the 
interpretation of the Johannine claim to the more direct (some would say, 
first-order) claim that John was right, that “a pre-existent heavenly being 
became man”? In Wright’s account of theology the difference between the two 
claims is overcome according to an account of metaphor and story.  
 The stories humans tell that reference the transcendent signal the 
presence of “something we may as well call ‘revelation’.”125 This points us to 
the possibility of actual revelation, that is, the presence of language (or 
something else)126 that uniquely affirms transcendence.127 But instead of being 
                                                
123 This is a significant move for biblical studies, allowing the historian of the 
bible to include theological questions as part of a properly disciplined 
methodology. 
124 Meyer, The Aims of Jesus, 105. 
125 NTPG, 129. 
126 Wright acknowledges that revelation might be understood by some to 
include part or all of the following: the Bible, Christian stories, the beauty of 
Creation, human beings, or something deep inside human beings. Judging 
between them would involve detailed arguments according to the different 
worldviews involved. Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
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positivistic, direct speech about god(s), Wright argues that god language is 
fundamentally metaphorical. Metaphors are “mini-stories” and as such 
preserve the reality of the other as being greater than that which 
positivistically referring language can disclose.128 But it is also metaphorical 
language that prevents the movement along the line from revelation to god(s) 
to be a direct line of reference. This places theological language “on the same 
footing as language about anything else.”129 As “mini-stories”, metaphors, 
and in our case language about god(s), belong within larger stories and 
therefore within worldviews. CRw, since it is committed to external reality, 
and in theology to the possibility of a divine referent, must ask questions with 
regard to the possibility that revelation speaks of a real god, but it must do 
this as a question within the critical context of worldviews. If revelation 
moves from its language in reference to god(s) to actual knowledge of God by 
way of metaphorical language and story, the question can be raised of criteria. 
 What are the criteria for successful reference? Or, given that all theology 
is worldview bound, what sort of criteria might exist to evaluate God-talk as 
truthful speech about its referent? In answer to this question Wright appeals 
to the criteria present in CRw and that has already been established in the 
other three fields of discourse that his work engages: epistemology, literature 
and history.130 First, and crucially, CRw admits that theological questions and 
their answers have to do with an external reality. This is not to beg the 
question of whether or not God exists, just to clarify that the subject-matter in 
question of theological speech is a reality (or unreality) external to the knower. 
But, in order to clarify further the way in which CRw understands the criteria 
for reference, the question can be split into two even more specific questions. 
First, what are the internal criteria for a claim to successfully refer? This 
question interrogates the claim according to the internal logic of the 
worldview within which the claim is made. Second, what are the public 
criteria according to which the claim can be judged? This second question 
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interrogates the worldview itself along with its particular claims according to 
criteria from without (though not necessarily in contradiction with it) and 
always within another or overlapping worldview (there is no extra-
worldview point of view). In CRw as we have seen, the criteria for 
determining the truth of an event or a person (the subject-matter of inquiry) is 
always provisional (within and without); it never rests upon an objectively 
known foundation. So, the first question of internal criteria is answered by a 
demonstration of internal coherence, and the second is answered through 
comparison with alternative accounts of the reality in question. For example, 
in the case of the Incarnation mentioned above, the claim would be judged 
according to its own coherence within the worldview of the community 
making the claim (first century, Johannine). The second question, that of 
external criteria, is answered by way of critically evaluating the claim based 
upon other possible explanations for the Johannine worldview and the 
historical data in question. In other words, for the question of criteria, we are 
directed to ask: What larger stories, internal and external, make sense of this 
particular theological belief?  
 Theology may indeed successfully refer—its claims may truly 
correspond to the being/nature of a real god(s). This is a possibility, but as we 
have seen, it is one that can never refer in a direct, positivistic way. Rather, 
theology refers through metaphor and story, forms of speech and knowledge 
that make sense and cohere only within comprehensive, yet provisional, 
accounts of reality. For Christian theology, a “Christian critical realism,” 
stories, metaphors, and myths are the ways in which “words in relation to the 
creator and redeemer God can be truly spoken.”131 Christian theology is an 
attempt to make sense of these stories and metaphors and the way they refer 
from within a coherent worldview. All theology, Christian or otherwise, does 
this by answering the four basic questions of any worldview: “Who are we?”; 
                                                
131 Ibid., 135. Wright suggests the argument that in the Jewish and Christian 
worldview(s) human speech is in principle adequate to the task of speaking 
about God because humans are made in the image of the God of whom they 
speak. Ibid., 130. 
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“Where are we?”; “What is wrong?”; and “What is the solution?”132 In this 
way, i.e. as an essential component of a worldview, theological language is, as 
we have seen, “on the same footing as language about anything else.”133 It is 
equally provisional, equally subject to critique, and equally integral to a 
worldview. Theology drives toward knowledge of god(s) according to the 
questions that determine its worldview.  
 The claim that theological language is “on the same footing as language 
about anything else” points to the fact that theological language is public; it is 
open to investigation and critique from within and without. Worldviews do 
not protect their adherents from critique. This is precisely because of the 
realist dimension of CRw: the claim that language refers to external reality, 
means that that reality is open to investigation, to the normal scientific 
processes that include hypothesis and verification, and to the critique to 
which all worldviews are subject.  
 
It is possible…to discuss worldviews, to see how they differ, and to 
change from holding one worldview to holding another; and it is quite 
possible to discuss the claims made about god(s), to assess their 
respective merits, to tell stories about divine being and behaviour 
which subvert one another, and to discern by this means which 
possibilities are serious contenders for truth. Critical realism [CRw] can 
thus affirm the right of theological language to be regarded as an 
appropriate dimension of discourse about reality.134 
 
If theological language is integral to the task of answering the key questions 
that determine all worldviews (not excluding atheistic worldviews),135 then 
crucial to understanding any human perspective in an even remotely 
comprehensive way will include questions of a theological nature. And since 
talk about god(s) refers, we can inquire about its referent. But if we follow 
Wright’s graphic depiction of the movement of humans to knowledge of 
                                                
132 Ibid., 132-133; cf. 123. 
133 Ibid., 130. 
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god(s), the point needs to be made that it is the (possible) objects of revelation, 
namely texts and their stories, human experience, natural beauty, etc., that are 
the subject-matter of theological investigation, not god(s) directly.136  
 Christian theology, to which Wright turns after providing a more 
general account of theology, operates in this same way. “Christian theology 
only does what all other worldviews and their ancillary belief-systems do: it 
claims to be talking about reality as a whole.”137 Wright then goes on to fill 
out this picture of a Christian worldview according to the answers it provides 
to the four basic worldview questions. Furthermore, like all worldviews, the 
Christian one is a “public statement” and can therefore be brought forth, 
examined and debated.138 It is not “just a private game, in which the players 
agree on the rules while outsiders look on in perplexity, it must appeal to 
some sense of fittingness or appropriateness. There must be, as in a scientific 
theory, a sense of clean simplicity, of things fitting together and making 
sense.”139 To be absolutely clear, Christian theology according to Wright, is 
determined as a discipline according to the epistemological commitments of 
CRw, commitments which are not derived theologically. Rather, they are 
based upon an account of the general way in which humans know things. 
This does not mean that theological commitments cannot interrogate the very 
assumptions of CRw, for even CRw itself must be an epistemology subject to 
its own method of hypothesis and verification, and its criteria of coherence. 
 
If someone asks what knock-down arguments I can produce for 
showing that this theory about how humans know things is in fact true, 
it would obviously be self-contradictory to reply in essentially 
empiricist terms. The only appropriate argument is the regular one 
about puddings and eating….All epistemologies have to be, 
themselves, argued as hypotheses: they are tested not by their 
coherence with a fixed point agreed in advance, but (like other 
hypotheses, in fact) by their simplicity and their ability to make sense 
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out of a wide scope of experiences and events. I have told a story about 
how humans know things.140  
  
 In Wright’s account, then, theology is a discipline that interacts with the 
given-ness of human discourse about gods or a god and not, in a positivist 
sense, directly with gods or a god. In other words, in Wright’s account 
theology appears to be a second-order discourse since it deals with talk about 
God (“god-talk-talk”), and not, as a first order discourse, speaking directly 
about God (“God-talk”).141 Or, if Christian speech about God does directly 
refer, it is only through story and metaphor thereby qualifying and mediating 
theological speech by the critical context of worldviews. And yet it would be 
misleading to describe Wright’s position in terms of ‘first-order’ discourse 
and ‘second-order’ discourse. CRw, if interpreted consistently as an attempt 
to reject epistemological dualisms, would reject as well the distinction 
between ‘first order’ discourse and ‘second order discourse’. Claims about 
God and claims about what someone has said about God are treated in 
exactly the same way and subject to the same criteria of verification. 
Language only successfully refers after it has gone through the critical process 
described by CRw and then what counts as successful reference or knowledge 
is understood in terms of this process and not as if in a final stage of direct 
positivistic reference.142 Normative statements about God (God-talk) would 
be subject to the same sort of criteria as knowledge about anything else. Of 
course, within worldviews theological language does makes direct claims 
about God. God-talk happens. The point is that no theology can ever claim 
first-order status since it is always caught up within the complexities of 
worldviews. The desire to be able to speak in a way that would have the 
epistemological benefit of being able to be described as ‘first-order’ is a desire 
                                                
140 Ibid., 45-46. Italics added. 
141 For the use of “God-talk” and “god-talk-talk” see Alan J. Torrance, “Can 
the Truth Be Learned? Redressing the ‘Theologistic Fallacy’ in Modern 
Biblical Scholarship” in Markus Bockmuehl and Alan J. Torrance, eds. 
Scripture’s Doctrine and Theology’s Bible: How the New Testament Shapes Christian 
Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 144ff. 
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to do something that assumes a positivist epistemological commitment, 
something that CRw does not allow. The best we can do is speak of the way in 
which worldviews demand theological talk because of the questions that they 
raise with respect to matters of ultimate concern.  
 That Wright’s account of theology is an account that is primarily 
concerned with human discourse regarding human discourse (even if it is 
discourse that refers to the divine) can be seen in the way he introduces the 
problem of Christology within the “Third Quest” for the historical Jesus in 
JVG. Wright begins with the question, “Is it possible to proceed, by way of 
historical study, to a portrait of Jesus which is sufficient of itself to evoke, or at 
least legitimate, that worship which Christianity has traditionally offered to 
him?”143 The language here of “evoke” and “legitimate” is vague with respect 
to our question of criteria, but shortly after asking the above question Wright 
speaks of “three recent attempts to write about Jesus…in which history may 
be thought to lead to a positive christological conclusion.”144 It would be fair 
to conclude from these two statements that what Wright is asking about is the 
warrant for making strong theological claims about Jesus, claims such as Jesus 
is God incarnate and, therefore, worthy of worship. And, indeed, he clarifies 
this as “the attempt to move from Jesus to christology.”145 The “positive 
christological conclusion” that Wright leaves on the table is, or would be, 
warranted by proper historical method which would include the questioning 
role of theology, but within the epistemological limits of worldviews. The 
approach that Wright takes in JVG attempts to do just this, to move from Jesus, 
historically understood, to a reconsideration of the high Christology of the 
church. This is a move from history to theology according to the 
epistemological criteria of CRw that we have been describing. Part of the 
motivation of Wright’s program is to avoid the critique that would claim that 
his historical study itself is motivated by high Christological concerns, an a 
priori commitment that favors the outcome. Against this critique, and as we 
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have already seen, Wright says, “But, if we play the game properly—if, that is, 
we leave the meanings of ‘divine’ and ‘human’ as unknowns until we have 
looked at the material—then there can be no advance prediction of what the 
result may look like.”146 The result, in the last paragraph of JVG, looks like 
this: 
 
Forget the ‘titles’ of Jesus, at least for the moment; forget the pseudo-
orthodox attempts to make Jesus of Nazareth conscious of being the 
second person of the Trinity; forget the arid reductionism that is the 
mirror-image of that unthinking would-be orthodoxy. Focus, instead, 
on a young Jewish prophet telling a story about YHWH returning to 
Zion as judge and redeemer, and then embodying it by riding into the 
city in tears, symbolizing the Temple’s destruction and celebrating the 
final exodus. I propose, as a matter of history, that Jesus of Nazareth 
was conscious of a vocation; a vocation given him by the one he knew 
as ‘father’, to enact in himself what, in Israel’s scriptures, God had 
promised to accomplish all by himself. He would be the pillar of cloud 
and fire for the people of the new exodus. He would embody in 
himself the returning and redeeming action of the covenant God.147 
 
True to Wright’s epistemology, the claims in this conclusion are relegated to 
considerations of Jesus’ own aims and beliefs as a “matter of history.” There 
are no first-order claims being made with respect to God. Wright avoids the 
trap of concluding with the claim, “therefore, Jesus can be affirmed as the Son 
of God.” In the three attempts to write about Jesus that Wright mentions, 
attempts that move from Jesus to Christology, the progression away from the 
temptation to make first-order claims can be seen. Edward Schillebeeckx, 
Wright reports, “at the end of his massive work, declares that he chooses to 
say, ‘Jesus is the Son of God.”148 Anthony Harvey, moving further from this 
sort of claim, focuses his attention on the possibility that historical enquiry 
“will enable us to understand better what it might mean to claim that ‘God 
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was with’ a person of history…and become an object, not only of our endless 
and fascinated study, but of our love and worship.”149 Schillebeeckx made a 
statement of faith while Harvey hoped to be able to make the claim based on 
historical inquiry. Ben Witherington, as the third example, turns his attention 
to the way in which Jesus saw himself: “having argued in detail that Jesus 
believed himself to be Messiah, [Witherington] opts for a cautious but open-
ended possibility: that Jesus saw himself ‘not merely as a greater king than 
David but in a higher and more transcendent category.’”150 This illustrates the 
significant move from direct claims made about who Jesus was to what Jesus, 
as a historical figure, believed about himself. This latter quest limits the claims 
of historical method, but requires theology to help make these claims, since 
theology is needed to accurately interrogate the beliefs and aims of historical 
figures. Yet it is a move from history to theology that does not allow theology 
to be engaged in first-order speech about God.151 The question with regards to 
the church’s high Christology comes to the fore when we ask whether or not 
Jesus was correct in his beliefs, and whether or not the church is warranted in 
its belief that Jesus not only had these aims and beliefs (and Wright makes a 
persuasive case that he did), but that he was, indeed, Emmanuel, God with us. 
 Is theology, according to Wright, unique with respect to its object? If 
theology is considered within the field of the sociology of knowledge, then it 
appears that it must remain a sociological project, i.e. a project that is rooted 
in the social dimensions of inquiry, and not in some unique way attached to a 
transcendent object.152 The object of theology would thus be human discourse 
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151 It is important to be reminded here that Wright’s epistemology would 
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else. 
152 Along these lines, Wright claims that the New Testament texts “are written, 
in their different ways, to articulate and invite their hearers to share a new 
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and praxis with respect to the divine (or gods and/or god). If God is to be 
known within human discourse about God, then our epistemological limits 
are no different than human knowledge about anything else. They are subject 
to the same sort of criteria. This seems to be exactly what Wright is arguing.153 
Within a worldview we might be able to extend our interrogation to ask 
questions and articulate answers about God directly, but it is not clear that 
this sort of task would provide us any different epistemological 
considerations than were we to interrogate past historical events that were not 
divine. The question that this begs is precisely the question of the nature, the 
metaphysical and ontological nature, of the object of theology, namely God. 
How is God to be known, if according to the Christian worldview, God is 
“active within the world but not contained within it”?154 It is precisely this 
line of questioning that will be taken up in the following chapter. 
 
g. Wright’s Challenge to Theology 
 
 Before moving on to that discussion, however, it is important to 
conclude this chapter with a brief summary of the critical challenges that 
Wright poses for the theologian. As we have seen, Wright’s attempted 
retrieval of the historian’s role for theology is grounded in his account of the 
Reformation’s abstraction of theology and doctrine from the historical 
narratives that made sense of them. Broadly conceived, this can be called the 
problem of abstraction. Against the tendency to abstract theological concepts 
                                                                                                                                       
worldview which carries at its heart a new view of ‘god’, and even a proposal 
for a way of saying ‘God’.” Ibid., 472, italics in original. 
153 It is important not to exclude from this the consideration that Wright pays 
to the role of faith. Faith, for Wright, is not to be divorced from history. 
Considered together with history it can be epistemologically fruitful. Wright 
characterizes this sort of knowledge as personal knowledge, yet as it plays out 
in his methodology faith knowledge seems to be a component of the larger 
epistemology of worldviews. See his discussion of faith in Marcus Borg and N. 
T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions (New York, Harper Collins: 1999), 
25-27. 
154 Ibid., 135. 
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from the history in which they are based, the story that makes up the 
historian’s concern 
 
…is precisely the story of the real world, the world of space, time and 
matter, of actual events. My first real problem of not doing history 
properly is that we shrink the story of God and God’s kingdom in 
Jesus, and the story of Jesus bringing Israel’s story to it’s climax—
which two stories are not two but one—to the thin, abstract categories 
of “divinity” and “humanity.” It is much safer, less risky, to do that; 
much more in line with “the tradition” but much less like the real 
Gospels, or the real gospel.155  
  
 In Wright’s understanding, Christian doctrines are like “suitcases” that 
function as compact, portable stories and symbols that must be unpacked 
from time to time to make sure we have them in the right narrative context. 
The problem comes when they are abstracted from particular narratives and 
then replaced into other narratives to which they are not germane.156  
 Theological abstraction away from the narratives of the bible makes the 
misplacement of theological concepts a very real danger.157 Against this, the 
task of the historian is to see the story from the perspective, the worldview, of 
those who told the story in the first place; the historian seeks the intentions, 
beliefs, and aims of the characters in the story in order to understand what 
                                                
155 JPPG, 137. See also his characterization of the definition of Chalcedon 
(without rejecting it) as re-imagining divinity and humanity “within a partly 
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156 This argument is made in Wright’s essay, “Reading Paul, Thinking 
Scripture” in Scripture’s Doctrine, Theology’s Bible, ed. Alan J. Torrance and 
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Vision (Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 47. 
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they saw and how they believed. Without this attention to the aims and 
intentions of the biblical writers, the aims and intentions of the interpreters of 
scripture will tend to take over. This means that the personal and communal 
theological commitments of the writers of the bible belong together with the 
narratives that they tell and that the reality to which they refer is seen from 
the perspective of their respective and overlapping worldviews. The 
theologian who disregards the importance of the constructive contribution 
from the historian who holds together questions of reality, narrative, and 
theology will inevitably interpret the story in terms of a foreign worldview, 
importing, for example, modern metaphysical or epistemological distinctions 
into a story where they do not belong.158  
 On one hand, this is simply the problem of exegesis versus eisegesis. The 
theological development of doctrine has a long and storied history that makes 
the theological contribution to the interpretation of scripture a contribution 
that often stands on its own. Theological abstractions such as the ‘humanity’ 
and ‘divinity’ of ‘Christ’ are read into the biblical narratives and determine, 
with hermeneutical force, the supposed exegetical conclusions of 
interpretation. This presses the important question of how theological 
concepts relate to the biblical stories and to the historical data that contribute 
to, and are derived from, those stories. For Wright, these theological concepts 
are never free from their own contexts within worldviews, and these 
worldviews need to be critically examined and brought into dialogue with the 
worldviews of scripture within which the subject-matter of theology and the 
subject-matter of the historian coincide. In this view, the theological concepts 
that have made up the church’s teachings need to always be committed to the 
ideal of ecclesia catholica semper reformanda.159 The reformation of theology is to 
be guided in this case by the corrective work of the biblical historian. And 
above all, the concepts of the theologian are to be understood as subservient 
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to the story from which they are derived.160 We might say that for Wright, the 
story is the thing, not the doctrine, and that the task of exegesis is getting the 
story right, not the derivation of abstract principles found within the story.  
 The theologian, on the other hand, is a crucial aid to the scholar studying 
the biblical worldview simply because the biblical worldview contains 
theological questions. As we have seen, the theologian works within the 
context of worldviews and examines the questions of ultimate meaning that 
make worldviews what they are. The task of articulating the theological 
questions and answers of the worldview of the biblical authors is especially 
aided by theologians who are able to articulate the interrelationships between 
the various theological convictions that find expression in the text. In this way 
the theologian deals with the reality of the text and the reality of the writers of 
the text; the theologian deals with the subject-matter of scripture. This work of 
theological interpretation also benefits the critical side of CRw by directing 
attention to the theological questions and assumptions, “the presuppositions, 
aims and intentions”161 of the contemporary interpreters of scripture as well 
as the intellectual movements that have influenced interpretation.  
 Yet, beyond the emphasis on proper exegesis, the critique of abstraction 
is a more significant critique since it is connected with an account of 
epistemology that encloses theology within the purview of the 
epistemological limits defined by worldviews. If all knowledge is critically 
circumscribed within an epistemology of worldviews, and theological 
knowledge is no different from other sorts of knowledge in this respect, then 
theology is limited with respect to its subject-matter by the same limits as any 
knowledge. The air that theological concepts breathe is, as with other 
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disciplines, air that is conditioned by the hermeneutical limits of human 
knowing. There is no rarefied theological air, privileged because of its subject-
matter, but rather, theology kicks around in the dust, especially the dust of 
first-century Palestine (or at least it ought to).162  
 Wright’s critique of theology may be summed up as an extended 
argument for proper, historically grounded exegesis, following the normal 
scientific procedures of hypothesis and verification, and the limitation of 
theology to the discursive confines of worldviews with the same 
epistemological criteria as other forms of knowledge. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 With these criticisms, Wright challenges Christian theologians to pay 
close attention to the worldviews that determine their own way of seeing, and 
to pay equally close attention to the worldviews of those who were both the 
writers of the Christian story, the New Testament, and the subject-matter of 
that writing, most notably Jesus of Nazareth. It is by paying attention to the 
way in which all human knowing is caught up in ways of seeing, i.e. 
worldviews, that theologians can avoid the twin dangers inherent in an 
idealist abstraction that would lead away from the concrete reality of God’s 
involvement with history. By grounding both his historical method and 
theological method in CRw with its concomitant conception of worldview, 
Wright offers a holistic vision of human knowledge in integrated, relational 
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contact with the world. Included in this relational contact is that which 
theologians refer to as revelation, and what Christians refer to as the writings 
of scripture; the contact comes at the level of worldview. As our own 
worldviews come into contact with the worldviews of scripture we discover 
that the scriptures “are written, in their different ways, to articulate and invite 
their hearers to share a new worldview which carries at its heart a new view 
of ‘god’, and even a proposal for a way of saying ‘God’.”163  
 This suggests a way forward. If the question animating Wright’s entire 
project is the discovery of and proposal for a way of saying ‘God,’ then this 
raises the question: What bearing does the reality of God have on the critical 
realist project? If God is the object of knowledge, the subject-matter of our 
ultimate concern, how does God’s reality impinge upon and even determine 
the way in which he is known?  
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CHAPTER 2. Theology According to the Theologians: 
Critical Realism and the Object of Knowledge in 
Theology 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 The previous chapter introduced the specific contribution of N. T. 
Wright to the methodological and epistemological questions regarding the 
relationship between theology and historiography. Wright’s work, as I have 
presented it, is a case study in the contemporary allocation of theological 
questions oriented within an historiographical framework, and purposed 
toward a constructive contribution to a historically grounded theology. In 
other words, Wright is useful to look at because of his attempt to bring 
together a commitment to historical knowledge and a concern for theological 
questions. Further, Wright’s questions are the church’s questions, and his 
method is governed by his theological commitment to history. Yet his historical 
method overtakes his theological commitment by submitting both history and 
theology to the epistemological frame of CRw. Fundamental to both history 
and theology is his account of human knowing. Theology is ordered 
according to human questions regarding ultimate meaning and revelation is 
present in the world as an object of knowledge in the same way as other 
objects of knowledge are present in the world. One way of clarifying this 
would be to say that Wright’s formal account of epistemology relies upon the 
material content of human questions regarding ultimate meaning; it starts 
with the questioning subject. In this way, his epistemology has a 
transcendental structure, one that gains knowledge according to the rational 
answers to human questioning, even if that questioning is regarding 
revelation.164 As we will see, the theological approach I will describe in this 
                                                
164 That Wright’s epistemology has a transcendental structure is further 
suggested by his close reliance on the work of Ben F. Meyer and Meyer’s 
account of critical realism. In The Aims of Jesus, Meyer, discussing the 
relationship between theology and history, endorses in his approach the 
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chapter begins with the material content of revelation and orders an 
epistemology around that content, especially the divine object of 
knowledge.165 What this looks like is the task of this chapter. 
 This chapter and the next aim to reverse the direction of Wright’s 
epistemology in order to see theology from the perspective of the theologian. 
Following these chapters we will then look at history from this newly 
articulated theological perspective. What does theology, with its 
methodological assumptions and commitments, have to say about the 
historian’s work? By letting Wright have the first word in the present chapter, 
the following discussion intends to be shaped by his critically realist concerns, 
and so begins by asking the following very specific question: What is the 
epistemological significance of the object of knowledge if the object of 
knowledge is God?  
                                                                                                                                       
“’transcendental method’” of Bernard Lonergan (Ben F. Meyer, The Aims of 
Jesus, vol. 48, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Eugene, OR: Pickwick 
Publications, 2002), 280 n. 30.). Meyer articulates this according to a “morality 
of knowledge” at work in a “pre-critical” way: “it is the confident supposition 
that human intelligence intends the real and attains it….By this route [i.e. 
questioning] it brings to light the realized conditions of the possibility of 
attaining the real by intelligence, thereby disclosing the further possibility 
that men should be ‘hearers of the word’….” (Ibid., 108-09). The purpose of 
Meyer’s comments in this section of Aims is to move from the skeptical 
hermeneutics of Cartesian criticism to the positive and engaged hermeneutics 
of a pre-critical approach in full faithfulness with the creedal tradition of the 
church. This positive assessment of history (and a quick dismissal and 
mischaracterization of Barth; p. 107) is theoretically bound to a deeper 
epistemological commitment to the transcendental Thomism of Lonergan. In 
nuce, as Robert Sokolowski writes, “Lonergan infers from the complete 
intelligibility of being to the affirmation that God exists” (Robert Sokolowski, 
The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 109. The account of 
theological epistemology that I will provide in this chapter overcomes 
Meyer’s dichotomy between critical and pre-critical, rejecting any hint of a 
transcendental methodology, by moving deeper into the space opened up by 
Karl Barth’s theology, here represented by T. F. Torrance. 
165 Wright is suspect of words like “divine” to the extent that they force into 
the abstract an ideal concept of the very historical and particular God 
revealed in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. Here and elsewhere where I 
use such language I am mindful of the problem, but have been unable to find 
a less awkward alternative. 
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 A brief look again to Wright will be followed by a clarification of the 
subject-object distinction in modern theology and philosophy, and then our 
attention will be turned toward two theologians, T. F. Torrance and Søren 
Kierkegaard, both of whom deal in depth with the concepts of objectivity and 
subjectivity, respectively. Torrance, perhaps more than any other theologian, 
has emphasised the objectivity of God in the theological enterprise; and 
Kierkegaard, through his pseudonymous works by Johannes Climacus, 
powerfully turns objectivity into a radical subjectivity. The goal of this 
chapter, then, is to begin to articulate the relationship between the object of 
knowledge and the human subject’s relationship to that object if that object is 
the God revealed in the Bible.  
 
2. CRw and the Object of Knowledge 
 
 As we saw in his methodological proposal, Wright gives theological 
knowledge the same epistemological status as knowledge about anything else. 
But are all objects of knowledge the same? In Wright’s articulation of a 
Christian worldview he describes God as “active within the world but not 
contained within it.”166 If this is the case, what does this unique ontological 
category “active but not contained” with respect to the world mean and in 
what way does an external reality of this sort effect the way in which it can be 
known? In order to answer this question we will pursue a further 
examination of the way in which CRw is positioned as an epistemology with 
respect to ontological and metaphysical questions. To do this, I will first show 
how CRw compares with some other forms of CR and suggest that what 
needs expansion in Wright’s account are particularly the metaphysical and 
ontological questions that bear upon the status of the ‘real’ in CRw. This claim 
will be deepened with a close examination of the nature of the object in 
theology and its bearing on the subject-object relationship.  
                                                
166 NTPG, 135. 
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 Realism is the determinative epistemological commitment for Wright. 
The problem of historical method is how we can know this past reality and 
know it in a meaningful way. Wright’s solution, as we have seen, depends 
upon redefining knowledge itself within the complex structure of a 
conceptualized account of worldviews. But to speak of the knowledge of 
reality begs the question of the ontological status of the reality in question. 
For Wright, CRw is exclusively concerned with epistemological questions and 
leaves open the question of the nature of reality, even though it is committed 
to a realist ontology. By doing so, Wright leaves open a significant point at 
which a corrective to his method can be introduced. In his book, Critical 
Scientific Realism, Ilkka Niiniluoto identifies “six different problems of realism” 
which include the problems of ontology, semantics, epistemology, axiology, 
methodology, and ethics.167 He includes the following table to clarify each 
sort of problem:168  
 
 Ontological: Which entities are real? Is there a mind-     
  independent world?         (OR) 
 Semantical: Is truth an objective language-world relation?  (SR) 
 Epistemological: Is knowledge about the world possible?  (ER) 
 Axiological: Is truth one of the aims of enquiry?   (AR) 
 Methodological: What are the best methods for pursuing  
  knowledge?          (MR) 
 Ethical: Do moral values exist in reality?     (VR) 
 
Wright’s methodological contribution, CRw, if we were to classify it 
according to Niiniluoto’s categories, lines up nicely with the middle four 
questions but leaves aside the first (OR) and the last (VR). The premise that 
Wright assumes at the outset, namely that external reality exists, is clearly a 
claim regarding OR but the philosophical arguments that would fill in that 
claim are left for others. He does mention the problem of an “undiscussed 
                                                
167 Ilkka Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism (Oxford, OUP, 1999), 2. 
168 Ibid. 
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metaphysic” if attention is not paid to “presuppositional matters”,169 however 
the ontological status of reality external to the knower is left largely 
untouched. His program works if we grant his limited foundational claim that 
there is an external reality and that it exists independently of the knower. In 
this way he does pay attention to this aspect of his presupposition but the 
ontological content of this metaphysical assumption is left for others. All three 
areas of concern that he is addressing—history, theology, and literature—
include ontological and metaphysical assumptions that require articulation if 
the epistemology of each is going to be adequately defended. Wright 
understands this: “If this means we end up needing a new metaphysic, so be 
it. It would be pleasant if, for once, the historians and the theologians could 
set the agenda for the philosophers, instead of vice versa.”170 For now it should 
be clear that Wright is attempting to address an epistemological question 
while allowing the vague term “external reality” to hold the place of a yet-to-
be-articulated ontology and metaphysics. 
 It could be argued that ontological questions are beside the point if CRw 
is concerned primarily with the sociology of knowledge. That is, if an 
understanding of how people know things is understandable apart from the 
things themselves; if questions of correspondence are never asked, then 
ontology can be pushed aside in favor of pragmatic concerns regarding the 
usefulness of beliefs for the present.171 In some ways Wright’s method has 
similarities to this aspect of pragmatism. He is concerned with questions of 
method that are not foundational, but rather reflect the way in which humans 
know things, a way of knowing that is discovered a posteriori, as a belief is 
shown to fit into a worldview. But his commitment to reality as externally real 
                                                
169 NTPG, 31. 
170 JVG, 8. With this offhand comment it seems there is reason to suggest that 
Wright and Barth would be sympathetic regarding the primacy of theology 
over philosophy. It also serves to highlight the question to which this thesis is 
directed, namely the relationship between history and theology. In what way 
can both contribute to a new metaphysics? 
171 On a pragmatic historiography, see the programmatic essay by Colin 
Koopman, “Historicism in Pragmatism: Lessons in Historiography and 
Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy Vo. 41, No. 5 (October, 2010), 696-703. 
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and knowable as such (properly nuanced), as that with which worldviews 
interact, makes his critical realism distinct from pragmatism.172  
 But neither is Wright’s realism committed to a presuppositional account 
of reality that requires certain philosophical or theological commitments a 
priori in order for humans to know things. His account of critical realism is an 
observational account of what counts as human knowledge while arguing 
that such an account is normative on the grounds that this is simply how it 
works. Description precedes prescription. One could move from there to a 
pragmatic refusal to argue for a normative account of human inquiry or 
epistemological method, but to do so would require disregard for the 
question of the reality of the external world. Wright, as we have seen, is 
fundamentally committed to the external reality of the subject-matter of 
inquiry, and it is this question of reality that animates his historical and 
theological quests. Since, in Wright’s view, we cannot escape worldviews, our 
account of reality must necessarily acknowledge this as a determining factor 
in what makes knowledge count as knowledge.  
 Therefore, if Wright’s method is not purely pragmatic, but rather is 
committed to realism in both theology and history, then the question of the 
ontological status of the reality in question will be important precisely 
because of the way the ‘real’ functions in critical realism. As we have seen, in 
his most concise statement of critical realism, Wright points to an interaction, 
a “conversation between the knower and the thing known.”173 It is this 
conversation that provides the “critical” aspect of CRw in a way that Wright 
describes as “passive”: “‘realism subject to critique’.”174 The object of 
knowledge, by virtue of its reality and the possibility of a certain qualified 
contact by the subject with that reality, is itself a limiting factor in the 
epistemological process. Another way of saying this is that the object of 
                                                
172 For a pragmatist discussion on the difference between Christian worldview 
philosophy and pragmatism, see J. Wesley Robbins, “Christian World View 
Philosophy and Pragmatism,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 
56, No. 3 (Autumn, 1988), 529-543. 
173 NTPG, 35. 
174 Ibid., n. 12. 
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knowledge is assumed as real (passive) but comes under critique as critique 
becomes necessary; knowledge of its reality (that it exists) is not the end result 
of a process of rational criticism. But the important question with respect to 
God as the object of knowledge, as the real, is whether or not God relates to 
the knower in a way that upsets the “conversation” of CRw. Can God, as an 
object of knowledge, be known in the same way as any other object, or does 
his unique ontological identity—unique with respect to every other object 
available for knowledge—demand a new, or modified, account of human 
knowing for just this object? 
 
a. The Subject-Object Relationship 
 
 A realist perspective, at the most basic level, requires that the normal 
epistemological distinction is maintained between the knowing subject and 
the object of knowledge. Reality external to the knower is distinct from the 
knower. Retaining the language of “subject” and “object” maintains this 
distinction between the knower and the known and preserves the 
commitment to the reality of the world external to the knower as something 
truly other, as object. In various ways this distinction has been assumed thus 
far by referring to the “knower” and the “known,” or the “knowing subject” 
and the “subject-matter” or “object of knowledge” as we have examined the 
epistemological and methodological position of Wright. Wright’s own 
definition of CRw depends upon these two poles, subject and object, as it 
“acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the 
knower.”175 Since the critical philosophy of Kant, the language of subject and 
object has accrued a long history of nuanced articulations, not the least of 
which is the assumption of an epistemological dualism, pre-dating Kant, that 
assumes an epistemological gulf between the knower and the thing known. 
This gulf can be described as, “the Cartesian assumption that the nature or 
reality of everything outside a person is fixed and can neither be known 
                                                
175 NTPG, 35. Italics added. 
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directly by the person nor influenced by the person’s interpretation of it.”176 
The difference here between the knower and the known becomes a problem, 
the gulf becomes another “ugly ditch” and the problem of epistemology is set 
up as the problem of overcoming that ditch.  
 The normal epistemological pressure, before Kant, was directed from the 
external world to the knowing subject. Objects in the world were known as 
they impinged upon the senses, were interpreted by the knower and given 
identifying signs through language. With Kant the direction was reversed and 
the epistemological pressure was placed within the knowing subject177 (the 
linguistic turn would come later). Kant was, in part, responding to the 
perceived scepticism of David Hume regarding the possibility of reason to 
secure universals that could be the basis for metaphysics, “concepts that 
would extend our cognition.”178 Because of the gulf between subject and 
object, the experiences of the external world could not be shown to have any 
bearing whatsoever—no causal connections—on metaphysics. Kant wanted, 
instead, to establish metaphysics based purely upon thinking, to show how 
the subject could be the basis for a limited metaphysics that established what 
it could regarding objects “before they are given to us.” At the risk of 
oversimplification, Kant was trying to make sense of the way we experience 
the world not by looking at the nature of the world, but first by looking at the 
nature of the subject and what the subject brought to the world, according to 
which the world might make (limited) metaphysical sense. In this way, “any 
given phenomenon…becomes a clear and definite object only in and through 
the act of thought itself.”179 
                                                
176 This helpful description comes from Roland Daniel Zimany, Vehicle for God: 
The Metaphorical Theology of Eberhard Jüngel (Macon, GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1994), 50. 
177 And, as James Brown points out, the very terminology of ‘Subject’ and 
‘Object’ and the way those terms are used in English today are dependent 
upon the use Kant made of them in his first critique (and Coleridge’s 
introduction of them to England). Subject and Object in Modern Theology 
(London: SCM Press, 1955), 19-21. 
178 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. and ed. by Paul Guyer and 
Alan W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 110. 
179 Roger A. Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing, 43. 
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 Turning from this to the epistemology of T. F. Torrance one might have 
the initial impression that he simply reverses the Kantian move by reverting 
to the assumption that “all our cognition must conform to the object.” If the 
subject-object distinction remains, as it does in the work of Torrance, it 
remains without the epistemological gulf assumed by Kant. Discussing the 
work of John Macmurray, Torrance writes,  
 
If…we start off with pure thought, we at once abstract from action, and 
so isolate our knowledge from that which sustains it, isolating the self 
from existence as a purely logical subject concerned only with idea, that 
is, with the non-existent. It is precisely this radical dualism falsely 
posited between thinking and existence, knowledge and action, that 
lies behind so many of our modern problems, and therefore it must be 
rejected in order that ‘a new logical form of personal activity’ may be 
developed in which the theory of knowledge occupies a subordinate 
place within actual knowledge, and in which verification involves 
commitment in action.180 
 
The removal of this epistemological gulf occurs as the relationship between 
subject and object is defined by subjective action as Macmurray suggests, and 
by contact between subject and object. The subject in this account is not 
abstract “cognition” or the “mind” but rather the existing subject who is not 
abstracted from the material world. As James Brown argues, Kant’s subject, 
even if it is closer to this material conception because of the attention he pays 
to the “skeleton” of the mind with his articulation of the manifold of a priori 
categories to which objects conform in the process of knowing, is nevertheless 
still a “means to an end” of “necessary knowledge,” something which is of 
greater interest than the subject itself.181 This, Brown argues, is due in large 
part to Kant’s interest in a more narrow kind of knowledge; knowledge that is 
true ‘knowledge’ is modeled according to the empiricism of the natural 
sciences and Kant’s account of the self is ordered to this end. However, there 
are other objects of knowledge in other areas of inquiry that do not lend 
                                                
180 T. F. Torrance, Theological Science (London: OUP, 1969), 4. 
181 James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology, 25-26. 
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themselves so readily to the sharp division between subject and object. Art, 
morality, and religion are three of these areas, each of which has an objectivity 
unique to their area of discourse.182 This points out the fact that the subject-
object distinction on its own is not sufficient to make metaphysical claims; 
rather each area of knowledge brings with it its own unique metaphysical 
assumptions.  
 
In Kant’s own system, from which the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
take their modern origin, the scales seem heavily weighted in favour of 
scientific naturalism….But this is semblance only. Kant is sure of the 
moral law within his breast as equally self-authenticating in its majestic 
and even numinous splendour with the starry heavens above. If he 
seems to rest assurance of God, freedom and immortality on the 
inferior testimony of faith rather than knowledge, we may see in this 
the effects of a ready-made metaphysics which he brought to his task, 
which presupposed that knowledge is of phenomena only. What is this 
but to say that he held without argument to the existence of noumenal 
reality?…The entire scheme of things is not explicable in terms of 
natural science, nor is final truth bound by [natural science’s] 
conception of objectivity.183 
 
The subject-object distinction solves no ontological problems. These problems 
are assumed into the subject-object relation based upon other arguments, 
arguments that are determined according to the nature of the variety of 
particular objects of knowledge. 
 The point here is to clarify an account of the subject in the subject-object 
relation that is not an abstraction into the realm of the ideal, but rather 
remains, for lack of a better word, ‘embodied’. If there is an epistemological 
gulf, it is one that has been created by the attempt to establish an idealistic 
basis for it, abstracted from the realm of objects. If knowledge is to be freed 
from epistemological dualism, it must be freed from the idealism that would 
posit the subject as proximally separate or isolated from the object of 
knowledge. Instead, the self must be understood not as a concept derived 
                                                
182 Ibid., 29. 
183 Ibid., 31. 
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from the abstraction of thought, but rather from the unity of experience as the 
unity of the self. In this way the theory of knowledge is replaced by an 
account of “actual knowledge” in which the self is understood in relation to 
the world and not in abstraction from it.184 At this point the similarity with 
Wright’s account should be apparent.  
 But, the object of theological knowledge is God and not simply “external 
reality.” What sort of “object” might God be said to be, and what does the 
subject-object distinction look like if we place God as one of the pair? If the 
epistemological gulf is overcome through an epistemology of contact, then we 
cannot abstract ‘god’ from the God, say, of Israel.  
 We must simply reinforce the point made earlier, that we already begin 
in a knowing relationship to the God under question. The God we are seeking 
to know is the God of the Bible, the God of Israel, and the God who has 
revealed himself as Jesus the Messiah, and has done this and continues to do 
so in the church for the world.185 We, as subjects, are proximal to this God. For 
Christian theology it is this relationship we are investigating and no other. 
Therefore the question of the knowledge of this God is not going to be 
abstracted either from the history of his relationship to his people or the 
world, and it is not going to be abstracted from the dogmatic content of 
Christian teaching or proclamation.186 If we are going to avoid a radical 
epistemological dualism between subject and object, then the resolution to 
our question regarding the relationship between theological knowledge and 
historical knowledge will need to follow Torrance when he writes that, “How 
God can be known must be determined from first to last by the way in which 
He actually is known.”187 It is this actuality of the knowledge relationship 
between the human subject and God who is the object of knowledge that 
                                                
184 John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1962), 82. 
185 This is similar in many respects to Wright’s acknowledgement of the 
Christian worldview that he assumes in NTPG, 131-4. 
186 Cf. T. F. Torrance: “What is offered in this discussion presupposes the full 
content of theological knowledge, and is the attempt to set forth the way of 
proper theological knowledge in accordance with that content….” Theological 
Science, 10-11. 
187 Torrance, Theological Science, 9. 
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determines the nature of the subject-object relationship in Christian theology. 
I take this to be fully consistent so far with Wright’s epistemology.  
 
b. The Object of Knowledge in Theology 
 
 i. The Knowledge of ‘god’ in NTW 
 
 In NTPG the knowledge of God is treated no different than the 
knowledge of reality external to the knower in general. Wright’s epistemology 
subsumes God (“god”), de facto, within the ‘class’ of objects for our purview, 
i.e., all those objects external to the knowing subject. In the chapter in which 
he introduces CRw, Wright claims that this epistemology “can be put to wider 
uses in the study of literature, history, and theology.”188 That Wright is 
committed to this epistemology with respect to the question of God is 
suggested by the purposeful yet idiosyncratic use of the lower case when 
writing “god.” Conversely, using the capital letter “would be begging the 
question” and “follow[ing] a usage which seemed to imply that the answer 
was known in advance.”189 CRw is an epistemological method that 
approaches the knowledge of God in the same way as knowledge of history. 
In fact, this seems to be a significant characteristic of Wright’s entire project. 
In an autobiographical passage, written in a book he co-authored with Marcus 
Borg, Wright describes his personal liberation through an interweaving of 
faith and history free from a “split-level” world of faith divorced from 
history.190 In rebellion against the “tyrannical thought-forms in whose split-
level world I had grown up,” he describes how his study of first century 
Judaism “led me, at length, out into fresh epistemological air, and the new, 
risky choices of a single world with multiple interlocking dimensions.”191 
Presumably, this “single world” is the single context in which knowledge of 
God and of history are of one kind, our knowledge of which can be described 
                                                
188 Ibid., 32. 
189 NTPG, xv. I will not follow Wright’s convention in this thesis. 
190 N. T. Wright and Marcus Borg, The Meaning of Jesus, 16. 
191 Ibid. 
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according to the process of CRw. This metaphysical framework leaves 
significant questions, and demands further clarity. The question remains: Is 
the epistemological process of CRw adequate to the metaphysical and 
ontological demands of a proper epistemology in both areas of knowledge—
history and theology?192 Can theology be treated within this “single world” 
with “interlocking dimensions”? And, what is a ‘proper epistemology’ if God 
is the object, or subject-matter, under investigation?  
 The argument to be pursued here is that the relationship between 
epistemology and history in Wright’s method, theologically understood, 
ought to begin with a theological epistemology determined by the object of 
knowledge. Historical knowledge, to the extent that it is focused on the 
knowledge of God (or “god”), must grapple with the nature of this unique 
object. Therefore a prior examination of theological epistemology will set the 
proper context in which to open up a subsequent examination of the 
epistemological and theological issues inherent in the historical knowledge of 
God and his acts. This will, in turn, set up an opportunity to articulate a 
constructive proposal for a theology of history in dialogue with the one that 
Wright has offered. This chapter begins the epistemological task by reading 
together T. F. Torrance and Søren Kierkegaard.  
 
 ii. T. F. Torrance’s Theological Science: Knowledge in Relation 
 
 Theology is concerned with the knowledge of God so the question of the 
adequacy of CRw to the object of theological discourse is the question of the 
adequacy of an account of epistemology to the subject-matter of theology. In 
                                                
192 Wright’s comments on the resurrection being the “starting-point for a 
Christian epistemology” are an interesting case that suggests that the weight 
of the demands that the resurrection makes upon historical methodology 
have been taken into consideration. Nevertheless, he uses the resurrection as a 
validation of his epistemological method rather than something that might 
call it into question. This point will be taken up later in the discussion. See 
Wright, “Resurrection: From Theology to Music and Back Again” in J. Begbie, 
ed., Sounding the Depths: Theology Through the Arts (London: SCM Press, 2002), 
206ff. 
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T. F. Torrance’s Theological Science, the knowledge of God is approached in a 
way that is in fundamental agreement with the formal shape of Wright’s 
epistemology; Torrance begins with what we already know, that is, he begins 
within the knowledge relation itself. Similarly, Wright begins with the 
understanding that when we articulate an epistemology we find that we are 
already in a relation to the thing known193, what I have described as an 
understanding of knowledge as ‘contact’. Torrance, drawing on philosophers 
as diverse as Husserl, Macmurray and Kierkegaard, begins his account of the 
knowledge of God with the claim that, “in any branch of knowledge we begin 
within the knowledge relation where we actually are, and seek to move 
forward by clarifying and testing what we already know and by seeking to 
deepen and enlarge its content.”194 For both Wright and Torrance then, the 
actual relationship between the knower and the known is prior to the 
epistemological task. As Torrance goes on to say, in the epistemological task 
we “seek to move forward by clarifying and testing what we already know 
and by seeking to deepen and enlarge its content. To do this we are forced at 
some time to raise questions as to the ground and reality of this 
knowledge.”195 This is the principle that Torrance then goes on to elaborate in 
more detail, moving beyond the mere formal structure of knowledge in 
general to the material content of a specifically theological knowledge.  
 For theology, this means that theological knowledge begins with an 
already existing relation between the knower and the one known. Theology 
investigates this relation a posteriori, and therefore is determined externally by 
the unique dynamic in actuality of the relationship between God and the 
subject who knows God. Torrance defines theology that begins this way as 
“scientific theology,” in which “we begin with the actual knowledge of God, 
and seek to test and clarify this knowledge by inquiring carefully into the 
relation between our knowing of God and God Himself in His being and 
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194 T. F. Torrance, Theological Science, 2. 
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nature.”196 What this suggests is that the way forward, if we are to stay 
centred on the concerns of Wright’s methodological proposals in 
epistemology, theology and history, must interrogate the nature of the existing 
relationship between the knower and the God who is known.  
 Expounding in more depth the nature of the knowledge of God and its 
implications, and drawing heavily on Karl Barth’s theological epistemology in 
CD II/1, Torrance sets his epistemological task so as 
 
to focus our attention on the area where God is actually know, and to 
seek to understand that knowledge in its concrete happening, out of its 
own proper ground, and in its own proper reference to objective 
reality…. It would be uncontrolled and unscientific procedure to run 
ahead of the object and prescribe just how it shall or can be known 
before we actually know it, or to withdraw ourselves from actually 
knowing and then in detachment from the object lay down the 
conditions upon which valid knowledge is possible.197 
 
This means that an account of theological epistemology will be derived from 
the material content of theology, from the actuality of God’s self-revelation, 
rather than according to the ontological implications of a formal epistemology. 
Torrance develops this line of thinking according to three aspects of the 
knowledge of God, understood from within the actual divine-human 
knowing relationship.  
 
 a) Actuality of Knowledge 
 
 First, as we have described above, Torrance begins with the actuality of 
the knowledge of God. This means that the knowledge of God takes place 
within time, space, and history, in Jesus Christ.198 “We do not therefore begin 
with ourselves or our questions, nor indeed can we choose where to begin; we 
can only begin with the facts prescribed for us by the actuality of the object 
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positively known.”199 This means that the knowledge of God begins with 
what is given from beyond knowledge, from its external (to us) source in God. 
Even though we experience the knowledge of God within the complexities of 
human experience and the given-ness of human consciousness, the 
knowledge of God and the subject-matter of theology cannot be reduced to 
the given-ness of human experience or consciousness, but must remain “that 
stubborn element in them which cannot be reduced to anything else and 
which we cannot reproduce at will, the ultimately hard objective reality 
without which we would have no such knowledge and which we must 
distinguish from our knowing of it.”200 While this has the formal 
characteristics of scientific objectivity, the material content must be the reality 
of God who reveals himself. In this way, theological epistemology must 
confess that its object is a God who is “not a mute fact.”201 Rather, the object of 
theology is the living God who is personal, speaking to us in person (Deus 
loquens in persona)202 through and in and as his Word. But because of this, we 
have to learn to hear the speaking as something distinct from our 
“interpretative processes in which we engage in receiving and understanding 
it.”203 Theological knowledge begins already knowing this particular, acting, 
and self-communicating God. Theological epistemology is therefore an a 
posteriori reflection on the nature of this relationship in its concreteness and 
historical reality; and it is “empirical, thinking out of real experience of God 
determined by God.”204  
 
 b) Objectivity of Knowledge 
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 The second aspect of theological knowledge that Torrance draws our 
attention to is that theological knowledge is properly termed “objective” as it 
is “devoted to and bound up with….its own proper object.”205 This he 
described further as the essential rationality of theology which loosens its 
hold on all other presuppositions not determined by its object.206 Objectivity is 
understood by Torrance not in terms of detachment from the object of 
knowledge as it might be according to the common use of the term, but rather 
as attachment to the object and detachment from all other a priori commitments. 
“To be actively attached to the object and therefore free from preconceptions, 
to be detached from the bondage of preconceptions and therefore free to 
submit to the object, is the aim of scientific objectivity. And it is also the 
concern of theology.”207 While the possibility of this sort of objectivity may be 
doubted, Torrance at this point is emphasising the realism that determines 
theology; that even though the knowing subject is bound up within his or her 
way of seeing the world, nevertheless the reality of the object, God, by virtue 
of his reality external to the knower, is always concretely active over and 
against the preconceptions brought to the subject-object relation. The point, 
then, is that theology is concerned not with a detachment from its object in the 
interest of a false objectivity, but rather commits to an attachment to its object 
so that its rationality might conform itself to the reality of the object and it 
might learn to think along with the object as the object, by virtue of its 
externality, requires. 
 Torrance goes on to list seven factors that need to be considered 
regarding the objectivity of God, some of which repeat things already said, 
but two of which bear recounting here because of their importance for what 
will follow. The first is that God is to be known objectively according to his 
action toward us in grace in our own historical existence. We do not discover 
God according to our own efforts of investigation as we might discover 
objects in the natural world. He objectifies himself for us, but he does this 
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“within the movement of time where we have our being and our knowing, so 
that we cannot know Him by seeking to step outside of this historical 
existence, or by seeking to abstract knowledge from that movement or 
relationship in time and turn it into timeless ideas or propositions that have 
their truth timelessly.”208 Theological knowledge is not idealism. Second, 
God’s action in history is purposive so its truth is “teleological truth.”209 That 
means that “we cannot truly know God without being reconciled and 
renewed in Jesus Christ. Thus the objectivity of our theological knowledge is 
immutably soteriological in nature.”210 It is this final point that gets at the 
heart of the material content of theological epistemology according to 
Torrance, and suggests the next aspect of theological knowledge to be 
considered from within the knowledge relationship. 
 
 c) Possibility of Knowledge 
 
 The third aspect that Torrance articulates concerns the possibility of 
theological knowledge. By beginning in the actual knowledge relation, the 
possibility of knowing God is only given according to its actuality and not 
from some standpoint outside of that relation. The importance of the question 
of the possibility of knowing God lies in the nature of theological knowledge 
as objective, i.e. the knowledge of God is dependent upon the nature of God 
himself who makes possible his own knowledge. This is important to 
acknowledge because the possibility of our knowing God lies outside of us, is 
given to us in grace, and is given in such a way that it can be said to save us 
(hence, “soteriological”).  
 The importance of this aspect has an impact on how we understand 
method. There is no method for knowing God that does not derive from God 
himself. There is no outside criteria according to which we can judge our 
knowledge of God and its possibility apart from its actuality, and its actuality 
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is wholly determined by the “fact that God has given himself to be known by 
us in Jesus Christ.”211 This focuses Torrance’s account of the possibility of 
knowledge of God into the following two questions: “(a) How does God give 
Himself to be known?” and “(b) How does [one] truly receive and know what 
is given?"212 Taken in the light of Christology, the material centre of 
theological epistemology, this movement is entirely fulfilled according to 
“three ‘moments’ in the realisation of our knowledge of God in Jesus 
Christ.”213 In sum, it is Jesus Christ who in himself fulfills the ‘how’ of both 
sides of the question. God gives himself as Jesus Christ to us, and Jesus Christ, 
as fully human, truly and faithfully receives what is given.  
 
He is, in Himself, not only God objectifying Himself for man but man 
adapted and conformed to that objectification, not only the complete 
revelation of God to man but the appropriate correspondence on the 
part of man to that revelation, not only the Word of God to man but 
man obediently hearing and answering that Word. In short Jesus 
Christ is Himself both the Word of God as spoken by God to man and 
that same Word as heard and received by man, Himself both the Truth 
of God given to man and that very Truth understood and actualized in 
man. He is that divine and human Truth in His one Person.214 
  
 The possibility of theological knowledge for human beings is realised in 
the person of Jesus Christ. Thus the possibility of knowledge of God for 
humanity is understood in terms of participation in the knowing relationship 
between the Father and the Son. The Incarnation itself reveals to us that we 
stand outside of “that relation with God in which true knowledge of Him is 
actualized.”215 We are outside of the “closed polarity” which, remaining 
within the language of the subject-object relation, is determined on one side 
by God who reveals himself (as object) and on the other side by the human 
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knower, the subject.216 Yet this relationship is only truly realised (in this sense, 
“closed”) in the knowing relationship between the Father and Son (the 
“polarity”).217 The human situation into which the Son comes is determined 
by human sinfulness which, in terms of the subject-object relation, 
characterises the natural relationships of objectivity humans have with the 
world. That means that as subjects we objectify that with which we come into 
contact in natural knowing relationships, seeking to “subjugat[e] the external 
world to the processes of our thought in order to give us power and control 
over them so that we may use them to reassure and establish ourselves in the 
world….”218 It is into this context, into the context of the sphere of our own 
self alienation from him, that the Son comes in a movement of God’s own self-
objectification. The polarity of human sinfulness is a subjectivity that is closed 
in on itself. “In Jesus Christ God has broken into the closed circle of our 
inability and inadequacy, and estrangement and self-will, and within our 
alien condition has achieved and established real knowledge of Himself.”219  
 It is important to note here that Torrance draws our attention to the 
brokenness of the natural subject-object relationship with respect to God, so 
that when God does come to us it is into a broken and sinful context; his 
coming is described as a ‘breaking-in’ to the human sphere of knowing. More 
than just a faulty epistemology made so by the natural limitations of human 
finitude, the problem with humans knowing God is a problem of sinfulness. 
There are two dynamics at work here: the natural limitation of human 
finitude and the unnatural limitation of human sin. It is important to clarify 
which is at work and how each is overcome.  
 The epistemological barrier between humans and God that is present 
simply because of human creatureliness means that God ‘condescends’, and 
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communicates himself to us in our finite, creaturely language and human 
ways of knowing. Human sinfulness, on the other hand, means that this 
condescension must be salvific. The fact that human knowledge of God is 
known in the reconciled relationship between God and humanity means that 
the natural barrier that exists by virtue of our creatureliness remains a barrier 
revealed only from the a posteriori perspective of actual reconciliation. The 
solution cannot then be a resolution of the merely human barriers to 
knowledge, as if solving the formal problem of epistemology will help. In 
other words, a sociology of knowledge that articulates clearly the way 
humans know things in general is of no help with respect to the knowledge of 
God, since the very question of knowledge of God implies at the same time 
the answer.220 Rather, the problem is material; knowledge of God confronts a 
very real and concrete barrier in human sinful alienation and rebellion that 
can only be resolved from outside.  
 Since we have distinguished between human creatureliness and human 
sinfulness and given priority to the problem of sinfulness, the metaphorical 
use of ‘outside’ (and also ‘above’ and ‘below’ metaphors) signals a 
soteriological barrier rather than a metaphysical/cosmic dualism. Because our 
human limitation vis-à-vis God is understood in the context of our 
accomplished reconciliation with God, that means that we are permitted, 
methodologically, to understand the ontological distinction between the 
creature and the creator in the context of the richness of Christian doctrine. 
Knowing this God means that we understand him according to the full 
content of his revelation of himself. The pressure of interpretation moves from 
justification to metaphysics, and not in the other direction.  
 For now the primary epistemological problem is represented by the 
Christian doctrine of the fall. The problem is that “our ideas and conceptions 
and analogies and words are twisted in untruth and are resistant to the Truth, 
so that we are prevented by the whole cast of our natural mind from 
apprehending God without exchanging His glory for that of a creature or 
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turning His Truth into a lie.”221 We can see here that human knowing does 
not just run into the limits set for it by creation, but that human knowing 
apart from the soteriological dimension is actively rebellious and idolatrous. 
This human alienation from the knowledge of God means that when he 
comes he must bring to us a way of reconciliation, the possibility and 
actuality of a renewed mind. As God breaks in to the sphere of human 
knowing, he does not come in any other way than as an object for us to know, 
i.e. he does not disturb the natural way of knowing given to humans as part 
of God’s creation, the rationality that makes human knowing possible. What 
God must do in response to human sin is to demand repentance (meta/noia).222 
“But,” Torrance asks, “how can we repent like that? How can we expel the 
untruth that distorts our reason and falsifies the habits of our knowing unless 
we receive the Truth into our minds, and yet how can we receive the Truth 
into our minds unless the whole shape of our mind has been altered so that it 
can recognize it, and unless we are made appropriate to receive it?”223 This 
question contains strong echoes of Johannes Climacus’ argument in 
Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, to which we now turn.  
 
3. The Condition: Søren Kierkegaard 
 
 If T. F. Torrance provides us with a scientific account of divine 
objectivity articulated in dogmatic terms according to a soteriological model 
of God as object, Søren Kierkegaard provides an account of divine objectivity 
from the perspective of subjectivity, with focused attention on subjectivity as 
it characterises the knowledge of God. This is no less an account of God’s 
objectivity, as we will see, but it is an account from the prior perspective 
determined by the human subject. For this account of Kierkegaard we will 
limit our investigation to the Philosophical Fragments and its companion 
volume, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, each written under the 
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pseudonym Johannes Climacus. The Fragments offers Kierkegaard’s most 
succinct framing of the epistemological question,224 and the Postscript his 
account of subjectivity. Climacus himself is a more or less agnostic character 
who performs a thought experiment guided by the opening question in the 
Fragments which sets the program for the entire work: “Can the truth be 
learned?” The answer to the question posed by the thought experiment 
addresses the epistemological issue, but it does so most significantly by 
exploring and clarifying the relationship between the metaphysical question 
and the question of sin: To what extent is the epistemological problem 
determined by the ontological distinction between creator and creature and 
the moral distance between humanity and the truth? It does this by 
‘discovering’ the condition that must be given to the knowing subject, a 
condition that reveals and overcomes both the metaphysical and the moral 
distance between the knower and the truth. This section will explore 
Climacus’ question and his answer as a way of deepening Torrance’s account 
of the implications of God’s objectivity for theological knowledge. The 
argument that will be advanced, using these two texts from Kierkegaard, is 
that the God of Christian revelation, as an object of knowledge, determines 
the knowing subject both in terms of the rationality necessary to know God 
and also in terms of the subject’s metaphysical relationship to God. What is 
determined is that the knowing subject is relationally dependent upon God’s 
ongoing revelation of himself as subject. This latter determination is what 
Kierkegaard identifies as the “condition”.  
 
a. Familiar Ground 
 
 At the outset it ought to be noted that with Kierkegaard, we are again on 
familiar ground regarding two basic epistemological perspectives. First, if 
Climacus can be said to have a commitment a priori for his epistemological 
questioning, then it would be a commitment to the priority of the existence of 
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the knowing relationship in a way similar to what we have seen first in 
Wright and then in Torrance. Climacus writes, “I never reason in conclusion 
to existence, but I reason in conclusion from existence. For example, I do not 
demonstrate that a stone exists but that something that exists is a stone. The 
court of law does not demonstrate that a criminal exists but that the accused, 
who does indeed exist, is a criminal.”225 Second, the similarity of 
Kierkegaard’s concerns to those of Wright can be seen in the rejection of the 
idealist priority in favor of realism in the existential commitment to the 
actuality of the object of faith.  
 
The object of faith is the actuality of another person; its relation is an 
infinite interestedness. The object of faith is not a doctrine, for then the 
relation is intellectual, and the point is not to bungle it but to reach the 
maximum of the intellectual relation. The object of faith is not a teacher 
who has a doctrine, for when a teacher has a doctrine, then the doctrine 
is eo ipso more important than the teacher, and the relation is 
intellectual….But the object of faith is the actuality of the teacher, that 
the teacher actually exists.226 
 
How the object of faith is an object for historical knowledge will be addressed 
in a later chapter, but for now it should be clear that for both Wright and 
Kierkegaard the ground of realism in epistemology is, at a basic level, 
common ground.227 The point at issue here, as it was with Torrance, is to 
further interrogate the knower’s relation to the object of knowledge if the 
object of knowledge is the God of Christian confession.  
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b. Subjectivity and Objectivity 
 
 It might seem misplaced to include Kierkegaard in a discussion of divine 
objectivity for the very reason that he is often associated with aggressive 
polemics against objectivity while advocating (through Climacus) that “truth 
is subjectivity.”228 In this vein Kierkegaard is often understood as advocating 
subjectivity with respect to truth that amounts to an epistemological 
relativism;229 a commitment to subjective determination of objective truth that 
is, therefore, a contradiction to the very objectivity and realism emphasised by 
Wright and Torrance, an emphasis in which the external reality of the object is 
distinguished from the subject. Yet, read in the light of Kierkegaard’s polemic 
against Hegelian systematising and idealism, we can see that Kierkegaard 
was resisting the absorption of the subject into the absolute by inserting a 
radical break between the subject and the truth. If Wright and Torrance 
emphasise realism at the objective end of a subject-object continuum, 
Climacus emphasises it at the subjective end. In order to see this in Climacus’ 
pseudonymous authorship, we will start with a brief look at the object of 
knowledge, “truth,” and how it is defined and understood by Climacus, 
before moving on to a more involved discussion of the relationship between 
subjectivity and objectivity in these works. 
 The truth in question is not truth in general which would include the 
world of immanent and mundane facts,230 but the truth that Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous project is dealing with is “essential truth, or the truth that is 
related essentially to existence.”231 The knowledge of the truth that is of 
concern here is the sort of knowledge that makes one human, that “is an 
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ethical and religious [truth], the fulfillment of the pupil’s being as human.”232 
For Climacus, the knowledge of God is the example and the focus of the 
question regarding the truth, and because of this it goes beyond what might 
be termed “objective knowledge” or knowledge ‘about’ something. In 
Climacus’ terms, objective knowledge falls under the category of answering 
the question, “what?”233 and as such, “goes along leisurely on the long road of 
approximation.” But, “to subjective knowledge every delay is a deadly peril 
and the decision so infinitely important that it is immediately urgent.”234 In 
the Postscript, the knowledge in question is this “subjective” knowledge, 
knowledge that is concerned with the question, “how” in the sense that the 
very existence of the knower is at stake in the answer to the question. The 
difference between the two is expressed in the following quotation: 
 
When the question about the truth is asked objectively, truth is 
reflected upon objectively as an object to which the knower relates 
himself. What is reflected upon is not the relation but that what he 
relates himself to is the truth, the true….When the question about truth 
is asked subjectively, the individual’s relation is reflected upon 
subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the individual is 
in truth, even if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth.235  
 
When the knowledge of God is the example, as it is immediately following 
this passage, the subjectivity of knowledge is described in terms of 
relationality, “the individual relates himself to a something in such a way that 
his relation is in truth a God-relation.”236 The way in which one is involved 
with the truth makes all the difference. 
 
Now, if the problem is to calculate where there is more truth…whether 
on the side of the person who only objectively seeks the true God and 
the approximating truth of the God-idea or on the side of the person 
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who is infinitely concerned that he in truth relate himself to God with 
infinite passion of need—then there can be no doubt about the answer 
for anyone who is not totally botched by scholarship and science.237 
 
The truth is the sort of truth that engages one’s entire being. Regarding the 
present question of objectivity in the knowledge of God, Climacus’ 
subjectivity is just the sort of way one must know an object if that object is 
God. Therefore, subjective knowledge of this sort is the right and proper 
concern of a theological epistemology if theology is to be faithful to its object. 
In other words, what Climacus is telling us is that the truth is not knowable 
without it making an existential difference upon the knower, or learner. Truth, 
then, is not an objective concern for detached knowing, but rather something 
which must become a condition of the learner, in order for the learner to be 
fulfilled as a human subject.  
 Truth, in this case, is the truth about existence, not mundane facts about 
the world; it is the truth about God. This allows for ‘scientific’ objectivity as a 
way of reasoning determined by the object (Torrance), but Kierkegaard’s 
reflections on this sort of objectivity force his own epistemology into a radical 
subjectivity. What was written a few paragraphs above, that for Climacus 
knowledge of the truth “goes beyond” objective knowledge, needs to be 
restated. Rather, knowledge begins in subjectivity and only after the subject is 
made subject with respect to the object of truth can we ask the question of 
objectivity. For Climacus, it is objective knowledge of God that goes beyond 
the subjective knowledge of the truth. For existence is in concreto and the truth 
about existence engages the subject and is engaged by the subject in his or her 
concrete existence, which is in subjectivity. Objectivity is the abstraction of 
concreteness into the realm of the ideal. In other words, existence is interested 
in existence, not essence.238 It is how the truth can be known to existence, in 
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actuality, that is the interest of the subject and not abstract essences, the latter 
being the interest of objectivity.  
 Objectivity, as Climacus conceives it, is a movement away from 
subjectivity which means that it is a movement away from existence. This can 
happen either in the movement toward the abstract ideal (in which existence 
is replaced by essence), or in the movement toward objective knowledge to 
the diminution of the subjective (the opposite of inwardness). Brown writes, 
“All the errors of Hegel, according to Kierkegaard, arise in the end—or rather, 
in the beginning—from ignoring the fact that thought implies a thinker, a 
concrete, individual, existing thinker, having his being in time, i.e. in 
‘becoming’….Hegel has not incorporated existence into his system, contends 
Kierkegaard, but only the idea of existence.”239 Against this idealism, 
Kierkegaard asserts the existence of the subject. Again, Brown clarifies,  
 
The Subject in Kierkegaard is neither an abstract logical presupposition 
of knowledge and experience, nor a noumenal mystery inevitably 
conceived after the analogy of material substance. It is neither a 
mathematical point without surface or qualities, nor yet a block of 
being sculptured in metaphysical marble or psychological mind-stuff. 
It is a living, active, self-making, self-choosing, self-renewing energy, 
genuinely set in time, process and becoming, with its life in ethics, 
religion and knowledge vitally affected thereby.240 
 
The objectivity of the truth is such that it cannot be objectified but can only 
present itself as subject to subjectivity.241 This means that the person who 
would come to know the truth can only do so in his or her concrete existence 
with actual concrete concern—passion and infinite interest. This is not to deny 
objectivity or objective existence—far from it— but only to assert that the 
“how” of the question of knowledge (how one knows the truth) is of ultimate 
and prior importance. Compared to how objectivity has been described in 
Torrance, Climacus’ focus on subjectivity can be described in objective terms: 
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how one knows the truth is determined by the nature of the truth that is known. 
When the truth is God, Climacus is right to offer such an account of 
subjectivity. What Climacus adds by way of emphasis, is that the nature of the 
truth is never known except in subjectivity. 
 
c. The Thought Experiment 
 
 By turning our attention to Climacus’ thought experiment, we will be 
able to see in what way theological subjectivity is realised for the individual, 
or in other words, how God brings about the unique subjectivity that is the 
necessary condition for knowledge of himself. The question that Climacus 
asks, “Can the truth be learned?” is a more basic form of Torrance’s question 
with which we ended the previous section: Torrance asks, “How can we expel 
the untruth that distorts our reason and falsifies the habits of our knowing 
unless we receive the Truth into our minds, and yet how can we receive the 
Truth into our minds unless the whole shape of our mind has been altered so 
that it can recognize it, and unless we are made appropriate to receive it?”242 
Specifically, with respect to repentance, the question might be rephrased, 
How are we to repent if we cannot know that toward which we are to turn? 
Or, How can we repent and turn if the very sin that blinds us, blinds us 
toward that which is the standard for repentance? As Climacus poses the 
problem on the opening page of the Philosophical Fragments’ “Thought-
Project”, “a person cannot possibly seek what he knows, and just as 
impossibly, he cannot seek what he does not know, for what he knows he 
cannot seek, since he knows it, and what he does not know he cannot seek, 
because, after all, he does not even know what he is supposed to seek.”243 
Torrance’s question, read together with Kierkegaard’s Climacus, is simply 
following the pattern of thought present in Plato’s presentation of the 
problem of knowledge in the Meno, a problem Socrates goes on to resolve by 
appealing to the preexistence of souls and the claim that all knowledge is, 
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therefore, recollection.244 Climacus’ response is to work out a thought 
experiment to resolve the problem in a way that is not Socratic, by supposing 
that knowledge is not recollection, but rather must come from outside the 
learner: a teacher must bring the truth. Climacus identifies the event which 
brings the truth as that which he calls the “moment.” With Socrates, the 
moment is simply the temporal point of departure for recollection brought 
forth by questioning. But since it is recollection, the moment is “nothing, 
because in the same moment I discover that I have known the truth from 
eternity without knowing it, in the same instant that moment is hidden in the 
eternal” and for Climacus this means that the moment of recollection 
disappears into an “ubique et nusquam [everywhere and nowhere].”245 The 
thought experiment is intended to explore the implications if the moment is of 
decisive significance, if in the moment “the eternal, previously non-existent, 
came into existence [blev til] in that moment.”246 If the teacher must bring the 
truth in the moment, the truth must be something that is not available to the 
learner otherwise.  
 Because the truth is given in the moment, and in order to avoid the 
Socratic situation in which the truth is recognised as something always 
already known, it comes to the learner as a true novelty. There is something 
about the truth that is contradictory to the reasoning of the learner so that the 
truth is not a rational possibility for the learner apart from the teacher’s act of 
revealing the truth. In this way, the truth comes to the learner as a paradox. 
But the paradoxical nature of the truth means that the learner, if she is to truly 
learn, must be given the condition to receive the truth, even to recognise the 
truth as paradox.247 Once given the condition, however, the truth is no longer 
paradoxical since it brings with it, in the condition, its own rationality.248 The 
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object of knowledge is operative in this thought experiment in a 
determinative way as it was in Torrance’s Theological Science, determining the 
rationality appropriate to the apprehension of the object.  
 But this presents a problem for Climacus’ method. As Jacob Howland 
observes, “Climacus claims that we have learned through divine revelation 
that we need divine revelation in order to learn the truth, yet he must be 
aware that his alleged demonstration has fatal flaws.”249 Citing Anthony 
Rudd, Howland suggests that Climacus’ thought experiment is itself evidence 
that the “absurd” of Christianity is entirely possible as a human invention. On 
one hand this seems to be an obvious problem, since Climacus appears to be 
outside of the condition himself and yet ‘discovers’ the absurd through a 
thought experiment. Yet the issue is more complicated than that. C. Stephen 
Evans points to the fact that Kierkegaard himself was writing in the context of 
Christendom in which the Christian story of the Incarnation was common 
fare for every child who grew up in Sunday school250 (“what any child 
knows”).251 Climacus is thus pointing out that what has become common and 
ordinary is, in fact, a very real offence. This suggests that the source for 
Climacus’ imaginings is not his own, but is somehow dependent upon the 
god having made himself known. If this is the case, the presence of the poem 
is, in fact, pointing to a hidden premise, a rhetorical enthymeme according to 
which the reader is meant to supply the intended response: “This story that is 
                                                                                                                                       
less an absolute or neutral one, but must rather be understood as a tool, very 
likely among others, which makes possible the heuristic functioning of a 
particular paradigm…Reason is constrained by the paradigm in which it 
operates and cannot be the means by which that same paradigm is 
undermined and replaced.” Murray Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision of the Incarnation: 
By Faith Transformed (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 113, 124. Cf. also Sylvia Walsh, 
“Echoes of Absurdity: The Offended Consciousness and the Absolute 
Paradox in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments” in ed. Robert L. Perkins, 
International Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical Fragments and Johannes 
Climacus (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1994), 33-46. 
249 Jacob Howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates, 52. 
250 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s 
Philosophical Fragments (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 
56-57. 
251 Kierkegaard, Fragments, 35. 
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so familiar is the great paradox and the proof of the god’s presence with us!” 
Climacus betrays the source of his thought-experiment and responds in 
wonder to this poetical venture in which the god is the agent who writes the 
poem, poeticising himself in the likeness of a man: an event which Climacus 
can only plagiarise.252 If this is the case, then Climacus is fully consistent since 
he is not the source of the poem—and yet he has the poem, which must mean 
that the god has revealed himself in this way. Climacus’ poem, it turns out, is 
not Socratically gained, but rather has come from the god himself, even if it 
has become domesticated.253 
 This points to an important distinction that must be made (again) with 
respect to theological claims. If we take Climacus at his word that all he is 
doing is performing a thought experiment, then with him we can, indeed, 
make discoveries of the rationality necessary to understand Christian 
proclamation vis-à-vis the Socratic. That is, we can understand how the object 
of knowledge, the god, will determine the rationality necessary for making 
theological claims. Accordingly, we may be able to discover the necessity for 
divine revelation.254 Nevertheless, Climacus cannot make first-order 
theological claims (God-talk), only second order, ‘experimental’ claims (God-
talk-talk). Were Climacus to venture into the area of first-order claims about 
God he would immediately find that his claims were suspect, since they 
would be thrust back upon Socratic, immanent reasoning. Anyone can 
recognise that we are in untruth—the one thing we can know in Socratic 
fashion255—and this presses us on, passionately, to discover the truth, but 
unless the condition is given to us, from the truth itself, we only move further 
into untruth. To know one is in the untruth, then, is not necessarily to know 
                                                
252 Ibid., 36. 
253 Cf. Torrance’s comment regarding the natural tendency of humans to 
objectify and thus control the objects of their knowing. 
254 It is debatable, I think, that Climacus claims precisely what Howland says 
he claims, namely that divine revelation is necessary for us to know that 
divine revelation is necessary. The entire thought project is an exercise in 
understanding what the alternative to the Socratic is, finding absolute 
epistemological significance in the moment. Revelation through the teacher is 
the assumption, not the result of revelation. 
255 Kierkegaard, Fragments, 14. 
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anything about the truth. This is why the project of the Philosophical Fragments 
can only be a thought experiment. A thought experiment can only approach 
the truth as object, and therefore can never arrive at the truth, for objective 
knowledge is always only an approximation, it never finally arrives. If we 
were to build a dogmatic theology upon a thought experiment, or objectivity, 
the result could only be untruth. This is significant when thinking about the 
deliverances of historical knowledge for theology. Without the condition, the 
positive deliverances, however seemingly congruent with the revelation of 
Christianity, must nevertheless be considered, from this epistemological 
perspective with respect to theological claims, suspect and without the 
requisite subjective condition from God, and therefore in error.  
 Yet, Climacus is not so simple as to ignore this implication. As we saw 
above, the “poem” that animates his thought experiment turns out to be a sort 
of revelational ‘deposit’ in the cultural Christendom of Denmark, explainable 
only on revelational terms. If this is so, then Climacus occupies the position of 
theological plagiarist—a title he is willing to claim—and so is, himself, 
beginning within the knowing relationship of the object of knowledge. How 
does the condition required for knowledge of God relate to the presence in 
history of the “poem”? The question that must finally be addressed is whether 
or not this “poem” of the Incarnation, the paradox of the god becoming a man, 
is something that can become part of our immanent knowing so that it can be 
understood as historical fact, as any historical fact can be known. If the 
Incarnation can become an immanent deposit, knowable as the Incarnation of 
the god, then the knowledge of such an historical object is given to objective 
knowledge as opposed to subjective knowledge. It can be held at a distance, 
and remain closed to the appropriate rationality determined by the object 
itself. If the Incarnation is historical reality, and objectively so, then it can only 
be truly known subjectively in accord with its true object. Since this 
knowledge is given to subjectivity, it continues to depend on the presence and 
action of the teacher, the god himself, who continues to make himself 
known—as subject. “Even when the learner has most fully put on the 
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condition and then, by doing so, has become immersed in the truth, he still 
can never forget that teacher or allow him to disappear Socratically.”256  
 The condition is absolutely necessary for knowing the truth and for 
being a human subject who is in the truth. What then is this condition? We 
have already seen that this condition is related, epistemologically, to 
subjectivity. For Climacus, the condition is that state of the understanding in 
which the learner is given the truth regarding the absolute. “We shall call it 
faith. This passion, then, must be that above-mentioned condition that the 
paradox provides.”257  
 What has been said thus far regarding the paradox has focused on its 
epistemological implications, but now it is necessary to briefly go further and 
say something about the paradox itself, since the paradox is not simply a 
concept or an idea, but an actuality, an objective historical reality—or it must 
be so if Climacus’ thought experiment is to succeed. The paradox must be the 
god, the only one who is able to provide the condition. The obvious model for 
this paradox is the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The God who 
becomes a man. He does this in order to give the condition, to restore the 
relationship of knowledge between himself and humanity. Because of the 
infinite, qualitative distance between the creator and the creation, and 
because—here following Socrates—the only way for there to be true 
understanding for the human is through equality,258 the god must enter into 
the lowliness of human creature-hood in order to bestow the condition, which 
is a restored relation to himself, on the creature. The infinitely other has 
become known in this paradox of equality. “But that which makes 
understanding so difficult is precisely this: that he [the learner] becomes 
nothing and is yet not annihilated; that he owes him [the teacher, the god] 
everything and yet is not annihilated; that he owes him everything and yet 
becomes boldly confident; that he understands the truth, but the truth makes 
him free; that he grasps the guilt of untruth, and then again bold confidence 
                                                
256 Ibid., 18. 
257 Ibid., 59. 
258 Ibid., 25. 
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triumphs in the truth.” Climacus goes on to assert that this paradox must be 
overcome by the act of the god, “whose love is procreative.”259 We might say 
that the god, in order to return the human to the place of knowledge, must do, 
or bring about, something new and creative. “Whereas the Greek pathos 
focuses on recollection, the pathos of our project focuses on the moment, and 
no wonder, for is it not an exceedingly pathos-filled matter to come into 
existence from the state of ‘not to be’?”260 
 The condition, then, is not in the nature of the learner, i.e. a condition 
that is possessed as a fundamental ontological aspect of being human, but 
rather must be given by the teacher.261 It is a gift. “For if the learner were 
himself the condition for understanding the truth, then he merely needs to 
recollect, because the condition for understanding the truth is like being able 
to ask about it—the condition and the question contain the condition and the 
answer. (If this is not the case, then the moment is to be understood only 
Socratically.)”262 And yet the condition is distinctly connected to an 
anthropological account of the learner. “Now, inasmuch as the learner exists 
[er til], he is indeed created, and, accordingly, God must have given him the 
condition for understanding the truth (for otherwise he previously would 
have been merely animal, and that teacher who gave him the condition along 
with the truth would make him a human being for the first time).”263 The 
condition belongs to the creation of humanity as a gift given and, in some 
way is maintained as a predicate of what it means to be human. Yet the 
condition is lost or forsaken. In metaphysical terms what stands between the 
learner and the condition is the ontological distinction between creature and 
creator. The condition is the knowledge of the creator, the “understanding of 
                                                
259 Ibid., 35. 
260 Ibid., 21. 
261 Here we can see a precursor to Barth’s rejection of Brunner’s 
“Offenbarungsmächtigkeit” or “capacity for revelation.” See Emil Brunner and 
Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising “Nature and Grace” by Professor Dr. 
Emil Brunner and the Reply “No!” by Dr. Karl Barth, trans. Peter Fraenkel 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 91-94. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid., 15. 
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the eternal”264 that can only be had as a gift, and yet is an essential component 
of what it is to be human. In other words, the anthropological concern here is 
to maintain that persons without the condition are not any less human, 
having once been given the condition, but the condition is still proper to 
anthropology. We might say that the condition is anthropological in a 
protological and teleological way since it is both the original state and the 
proper telos of humanity. It belongs, then, to humanity as that relationship 
with God that is God’s loving intent for humanity.265 The problem is, of 
course, that humanity is not in receipt of the condition—a situation that, as 
with Torrance, can be attributed to two important but distinct issues. This 
distinction can be seen in the difference between the metaphysical distance 
between the creator and the creature and the moral distance between the two, 
the sin that keeps the learner in the untruth.  
 
d. Metaphysical and Moral Distance 
 
 Kierkegaard is well known for his assertion that “there is in fact an 
infinite, a qualitative difference betw. God and the hum. being.”266 This 
statement, made infamous by Karl Barth’s Der Römerbrief,267 is explained in 
the opening to the journal entry of Nov. 20th 1847, from which the first 
quotation came: “The whole basic confusion of modern times (which reaches 
into logic, metaphysics, dogmatics, and the age’s whole way of life) rlly 
consists in this: that the qualitative yawning chasm has been removed from 
the difference between God and hum.”268 This distinction makes sense of the 
need for the condition to be given to the human since an infinite qualitative 
difference between God and humanity can only be overcome by God granting 
                                                
264 Ibid., 64. 
265 God’s motivation by love is a theme of the Fragments that must be 
recognised but, because of space, set aside. 
266 Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, Vol 4, Journals NB-
NB5, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011), 252. 
267 Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief, 2nd ed. (Zürich: TVZ: 2005), XX. 
268 Kierkegaard, Journals, 250. Abbreviations in original. 
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himself to be known. Presumably, based on the logic of the Fragments, this 
distinction is necessary as a metaphysical assumption that makes the moment 
to be of decisive significance. There must be an other, a radical transcendent 
difference, that contains within itself, apart from the human, the possibility of 
overcoming the qualitative difference. Only such a metaphysic could allow 
there to be something other than the Socratic way of knowing. Only such a 
metaphysic could make sense of the moment. This means two things. First, it 
means that the human qua human is not in possession of the condition. 
Humanity must be qualitatively and therefore ontologically distinct from the 
creator. The inequality inherent in this distinction makes the knowledge of 
God as object impossible unless God himself becomes subject269 in an act of 
equality or unity.270 Second, it means that the condition is something that has 
been lost. This point takes us to the moral aspect of the problem.  
 Climacus makes it clear that the loss of the condition is due to its willful 
rejection, so that its loss is neither accidental nor due to an act of the god, but 
remains an actual and perpetual state. By this is meant that the learner exists 
in an actual state of existence without the necessary condition to know the 
truth and that beyond this the learner is, in fact, actively “polemical against 
the truth.”271 Climacus calls this sin.272 On the first of these aspects Climacus, 
in a textual note, cites several parables to help elucidate the situation of the 
person without the condition, culminating in this citation of Aristotle: “The 
depraved person and the virtuous person presumably do not have power 
over their moral condition, but in the beginning they did have the power to 
become one or the other, just as the person who throws a stone has power 
                                                
269 Cf. Kierkegaard, Postscript, 199-200. 
270 Kierkegaard, Fragments, 25: “Out of love, therefore, the god must be 
eternally resolved in this way, but just as his love is the basis, so also must 
love be the goal, for it would indeed be a contradiction for the god to have a 
basis of movement and a goal that did not correspond to this. The love, then, 
must be for the learner, and the goal must be to win him, for only in love is 
the different made equal, and only in equality or in unity is there 
understanding.” 
271 Kierkegaard, Fragments, 15. 
272 Ibid. 
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over it before he throws it but not when he has thrown it”273 The problem that 
humanity finds itself in is that of actively pursuing untruth by virtue of 
having lost the condition and being unable to restore the condition for the 
very reason that the condition itself is a gift completely dependent upon the 
god to grant. Only the god can overcome the creator/creature distinction.  
 When the god overcomes both of these barriers, what we might settle 
into calling the metaphysical and the moral barriers, the god is understood as 
more than simply a teacher; the god must be seen as a saviour, deliverer, 
reconciler, and judge.274 All of which are qualities attributable to the person of 
the teacher in response to the situation of the learner, estranged from the truth. 
If the truth (e.g. the knowledge of God in a knowing relationship with him) is 
that which the god brings to the human learner, and that knowledge must 
come with the condition, then the condition is occasioned by the god himself, 
which is to say that the god communicates himself to the learner. In this way 
the moment is that point at which the eternal enters time and space; the 
moment at which the transcendent enters into the world of created 
immanence.275 “Let us call it,” says Climacus, “the fullness of time.”276 And so 
Kierkegaard brings the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation into focus in 
Climacus’ thought experiment. “The presence of the god in human form—
indeed, in the lowly form of a servant—is precisely the teaching, and the god 
himself must provide the condition.”277 That means, in Climacus’ terms, that 
the moment has a historical point of departure focused as it is on an actual 
historical occurrence, the Incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ.  
                                                
273 Ibid., 17, n. From Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 5, 114a. ET of 
Kierkegaard’s translation of which the editors comment, “a free but 
substantially correct rendering of Aristotle.” Ibid., 280, n. 33. 
274 Ibid., 15-16. 
275 Hong and Hong note that “the Danish blev til…refers to temporal and 
spatial modes of becoming and being. The eternal as timeless being does not 
come into being but comes into time and space as a specific embodiment of 
the eternal. The moment, therefore is an atom of eternity and has a 
significance qualitatively different from that of transient instants of time.” 
Ibid., 280, n. 25. 
276 Ibid., 18. Italics in original. 
277 Ibid., 55-56. 
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 The theological import for our question of the objectivity of God, in the 
thought experiment of Climacus, can be summarised along the following lines. 
God as an object of knowledge is only available as such to the learner, the 
subject, who is the recipient of the condition that restores the knowing 
relationship between God and humans. This restoration is possible only as an 
act of God and brings about a distinct and particular novel relation that has 
no immanent precedent. This condition is called faith and comes to the 
learner as a gift. This gift is not germane to humanity, there is no ontological 
point of contact, but is an original gracious relation between God and 
humanity that has been lost. God as an object of knowledge is not known 
objectively, as a detached objective reason would have it, but subjectively as 
passionate knowledge of a real person who makes himself known, not finally 
as object, but rather as subject.  
 It is important to remember that the thought experiment, as I have tried 
to show above, is dependent (parasitic?) upon the narrative of the New 
Testament. It is out of that narrative that it turns out the thought experiment 
grows, and like Torrance, the effort is not to abstract from the narrative, but 
rather to go deeper into the subjective involvement of the believer in the inner 
workings of the narrative and its particularly located logic.278 The answer to 
the question that the thought experiment poses addresses the epistemological 
issue but it also explores and clarifies the relationship between the 
metaphysical question and the question of sin: to what extent is the 
epistemological problem determined by the ontological distinction between 
creator and creature and the moral distance caused by human sin? It does this 
by ‘discovering’ the “condition” that must be given to the knowing subject, a 
condition that reveals and overcomes both the metaphysical and the moral 
distance between the knower and the truth. It is a condition that is, in the final 
analysis, relational and not essential, of real existence and not abstract essence. 
                                                
278 This deeper penetration into the narrative, rather than an abstraction away 
from it, is described in-depth by Torrance in T. F. Torrance, The Christian 
Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 73-111.  
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 The objectivity of the truth, once run through the critique of Kierkegaard, 
demands an appreciation of the personal involvement of the subject in the 
apprehension of the truth. Knowledge of the truth—knowledge of God—
must fundamentally change the subject so that both the metaphysical and 
moral distance between the subject and the object are overcome. But such 
knowledge is gained neither through ascent nor descent (as recollection), but 
only as a gift from the object as subject, from the personal God himself. What 
Kierkegaard adds to the argument (begun with Torrance’s claim regarding 
God’s objectivity), is the observation that God’s objectivity, if taken seriously, 
must be rooted in his subjectivity. This is an acknowledgement that God can 
never be an object to our knowledge without first being subject given to us in 
our subjectivity. His objectivity is only an objectivity looking back from the 
perspective of faith. It cannot be seen from the other vantage point. It is an 
analogical move, but one that runs from the reality of God to the rationality of 
human knowing and not the other way around. But as the Subject given to 
subjectivity, God is revealed in time and space, in the concrete reality of 
human existence, as a king, incognito, loving a humble maiden. It cannot be 
otherwise. This is the God who is known as he gives himself to be known to 
the individual in faith. 
 
4. John 3.1-21  
 
 In biblical terms what Kierkegaard has labeled the condition, the Bible 
calls, “newness of life,”279 being “born anew,”280 being “raised with Christ,”281 
being “in Christ,”282 and a “new creation.”283 Perhaps the most explicit biblical 
text to draw from is that of John 3.1-21, Jesus’ visit with Nicodemus. This 
                                                
279 Rom. 6.4. 
280 Jn. 3.3,7. gennhqh|= a!nwqen, alternatively, “born from above.” N. T. Wright 
prefers this translation. See N. T. Wright, The Kingdom New Testament: A 
Contemporary Translation (New York: Harper One, 2011), 176. 
281 Col. 3.1; Eph. 2.6. 
282 Citations are too numerous to list, but cf. e.g., 2 Cor. 5.17. 
283 Again, cf. 2 Cor. 5.17 among others. 
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Pharisee and ruler of Israel affirms Jesus in the cover of night, “Rabbi, we 
know that you are a teacher who has come from God; for no one can do these 
signs that you do, apart from the presence of God” (Jn. 3. 2-3, NRSV). Jesus 
answers him, “Very truly, I tell you, no one can see the kingdom of God 
without being born from above.” The NRSV has changed the translation of 
gennhqh|= a!nwqen from “born anew” (RSV) to “born from above.” Wright 
appears to favor the same translation, rendering the verse, “Let me tell you 
the solemn truth…..Unless someone has been born from above, they won’t be 
able to see God’s kingdom.”284 It is clear that the words can be translated in 
both ways,285 but it should also be clear from the context that Nicodemus’s 
response makes sense only if Jesus has said the more surprising thing, that 
one must be born anew, even “born again” (NIV).286 Whether we are to find 
the source of the misunderstanding in what Jesus said or in how Nicodemus 
understood it, Nicodemus’s “misunderstanding” in the direction of physical 
birth nevertheless does not miss the rhetorical force of what Jesus is saying, 
but rather heightens the sense of rupture that Jesus, with his response in verse 
5, takes in a new direction.287 This new direction is literally carried in the 
construct, gennhqh|= a!nwqen, yet needs further elucidation if Nicodemus is to 
understand what Jesus is saying. This interaction illustrates the point that 
Jesus is making: you see one thing, but you need me to tell you (a)mh/n a)mh/n) 
what really is the case. But the claim, “You must be born anew/from above” 
(v.5) is a requirement in order for there to be knowledge of the kingdom of 
                                                
284 Ibid. 
285 Cf. the entry “a1nwqen” in Frederick William Danker, ed. A Greek-English 
Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 92. 
286 “At the level of the text, Jesus could not have said “unless one be born from 
above” because this could not have led Nicodemus to think he meant reentry 
into the maternal womb. Johannine misunderstanding is based on misplaced 
literalness in interpreting what is said, not on a failure to understand the 
actual words.” Sandra M. Schneiders, “Born Anew,” Theology Today 44, no. 2 
(1987), 191-92. 
287 C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St John: An Introduction With 
Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text (London: SPCK, 1962). In Barrett’s 
words, the “misunderstanding…provide[s] a step on which the discourse 
mounts to a further stage.” 
 106 
God. So Marianne Meye Thompson writes, “But in order to recognize this 
One as God’s Messiah—to see, enter, and understand the kingdom that is 
genuinely God’s kingdom (3:3, 5; 18:36)—the work of the Spirit of God is 
required.”288 The recognition of the kingdom is not just seeing, as in verse 3, 
but also a reality into which one must enter. This discourse suggests that these 
belong together: one sees the reality of the kingdom only when one is in that 
reality, and that reality is only known through a new kind of birth. In terms 
used previously, one knows the kingdom from within the knowing relation. 
Those who are in this reality are like the wind, born of the Spirit, and their 
source and destiny are unseen except by those who are, in Climacus’ term, 
given the “condition.” In Edwyn Hoskyns’s words,  
  
 Knowledge, true theological knowledge and apprehension, capacity to 
 see the dominion of God, is not secured by acquiring more and more 
 information. Nicodemus already possessed quite sufficient information, 
 both acquired and hereditary. The knowledge of God demands a re-
 orientation, a new creative beginning, so ultimate and fundamental that 
 the initial fact of birth provides the only proper analogy; the only proper 
 analogy, in the sense that all other analogies depend on it.289 
 
 It is worth pointing out that several tropes are at play in the interaction 
of John 3 between Jesus and Nicodemus. Nicodemus comes to Jesus in the 
dark, at night (v. 2) bringing to mind the important Johannine distinction 
between those who are in the light and those who walk in darkness (1.5, 8, 9; 
3.19-21; 12.35). Verse 19 ends the conversation with a judgement on those who 
love the darkness more than the light and verse 20 continues this with an 
appraisal of those who do what is true: they come to the light and it is seen 
that their deeds have been wrought by God. Another trope John draws on in 
this pericope is that of the two ages, the present age and the eschatological 
age to come. This can be seen in the promise of “eternal life” to those that 
                                                
288 Marianne Meye Thompson, “Word of God, Messiah of Israel, Savior of the 
World: Learning the Identity of Jesus From the Gospel of John,” in Seeking the 
Identity of Jesus: A Pilgrimage, ed. Beverly Roberts Gaventa, and Richard B. 
Hays (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 171. 
289 Edwyn C. Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), 203. 
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believe. Eternal life (zwh) ai0w&nion) is best understood as “the age to come” 
and is in contrast with the “present evil age” that Paul mentions in Gal. 1.4.290 
The third trope is, of course, that of birth. Whether we hear Jesus say, “new 
birth” or “birth from above,” either way what is encountered is that 
knowledge of God’s kingdom requires the beginning of a new qualitative 
state in the human so that what enables one to both see and live within the 
kingdom is an act of God knowable only from the new state. With birth, this 
sense of discontinuity is the strongest precisely because birth is an absolute 
beginning. It makes no sense to compare an “unborn” state with that of the 
“born” since there is no “state” for the unborn to be in. They simply are not.291 
One can only know the reality of birth a posteriori. Paul’s words to the 
Corinthians express this clearly in the terms of new creation: “So if anyone is 
in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, 
everything has become new!” (2 Cor. 5.17, NRSV).  
 In John’s gospel we have already seen this in the one, above all, we 
might expect to have recognized Jesus on his own: John the Baptist.292 
However, we are told twice in the first chapter that John did not know him 
(1.31, 33) until he saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove and, he 
claimed, “I myself did not know him; but the one who sent me to baptize with 
                                                
290 N. T Wright, How God Became King: The Forgotten Story of the Gospels (New 
York: Harper One, 2012), 44-45. In this case Wright is making the point that 
our common reading of “eternal life” tends to imply a future heavenly 
existence away from the reality of this world. Instead he argues that what is 
being assumed here is the eschatological/apocalyptic understanding of the 
two ages that characterize the one reality of this present cosmos. Cf. also 
NTPG, 252-56, in which Wright cites Gerhard von Rad’s discussion in 
Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology: The Theology of Israel’s Prophetic 
Traditions, trans. D. M. G. Stalker, vol. 2 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1965), 
301ff. 
291 Of course, this is not to say anything about the biological state of the fetus! 
That is a wholly different conversation. 
292 Kierkegaard draws attention to this as well when arguing that the “child-
conception of Christ” is essentially a pagan conception compared with the 
paradox, the form of a servant, that characterises God with us incognito. Cf. 
Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 
trans. Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, vol. 1, Kierkegaard’s Writings, 
Xii.1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 599f. 
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water said to me, ‘He on whom you see the Spirit descend and remain is the 
one who baptizes with the Holy Spirit. And I myself have seen and testified 
that this is the Son of God” (1.33-34, NRSV). In John 3 we are told that one 
cannot see the kingdom of God without being born anew/from above, a birth 
occasioned by the Spirit (3.6), and this reflects what we see here in John 1. We 
are not given insight into the occasion of transformation in John, the new 
birth is not seen in a specific moment, nor is it to be read into the text that 
there at the Jordan John was “born again” or “born of the Spirit” before he 
could recognise Jesus as the Lamb of God, but what we do have is the 
epistemological priority of God’s act of revelation in the recognition of the 
Messiah, even at the individual level. And this recognition is clearly the act of 
God as divine subject, making John subject in the true knowledge relationship 
in which Jesus as Lamb of God becomes an object of knowledge. John 3 brings 
this epistemological event to the light, referring to it as a new birth.293  
 Each of the images in John 3 require a basic and fundamental transition 
from a present state (darkness, present age, unbirth/non-existence) to a new 
and previously unknowable state (light, age to come, birth, existence). Each 
transition suggests different degrees of continuity between the previous state 
and the state within the kingdom of God. To anticipate the conclusion of this 
chapter, the motifs of light, darkness and new birth are the controlling motifs 
that determine the historical/eschatological motif of the present age/age to 
come. Our epistemological arguments are determinative for how history is 
understood. The rationale for this argument follows from the core of the John 
3 text and the hermeneutical centrality of the baptismal motif there (cf. v. 5) 
representing new birth or birth from above, and then in the theology of Paul 
as it comes to be centred around the death and resurrection of Jesus.294 
Baptism with water and the Spirit is the event of new birth, birth from above, 
that in the church’s later practice of baptism comes to be associated with the 
                                                
293 Cf. 1 Peter 1.3b: “By his great mercy he has given us a new birth into a 
living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead 
294 For a helpful discussion of the baptismal context of John 3.5, see Everett 
Ferguson, Baptism in the Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First 
Five Centuries (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 142-45. 
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death and resurrection of Jesus. The biblical motif of death and resurrection, 
founded upon the actuality of the death and resurrection of Jesus, will be 
articulated as the grammar that controls our understanding of the condition 
since it is the predominant grammar of the Christian rite of ecclesial initiation 
as well as the grammar for the birth from above that allows the believer to see. 
At the centre, then, of Christian theological epistemology, is the cross and 
resurrection.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter began by asking in what way N. T. Wright’s account of 
epistemology took into consideration the object of knowledge if that object is 
God. More specifically, it was asked if ontological and metaphysical 
considerations were determinative for his epistemology or if all possible 
objects were known in the same way. If Wright’s method assumes the latter 
(even if in his theological commitments he does not subscribe to a certain 
univocity of being with respect to God and the world) then there is a need to 
examine what it would mean for his methodological commitment to external 
reality if that commitment were to conform to the rationality required by the 
theological object. If God is an ontologically unique object of knowledge, then 
it would make sense to inquire into the way theological knowledge is unique 
with respect to its object. As it stands, the only metaphysical category that 
determines Wright’s epistemology is that of “external reality.” Clearly, more 
metaphysical nuance needs to be brought to Wright’s epistemological picture, 
something Wright himself seems to encourage. It is toward this end that T. F. 
Torrance’s Theological Science was brought into the conversation. 
 CRw is in fundamental agreement with Torrance’s epistemological 
commitment: let the object of knowledge (its reality) determine the method of 
knowing from within the reality of the subject-object relationship. This means 
that material content is already given to this relationship before 
epistemological questions arise: one knows first, and only then inquires into 
the nature of that knowledge, as it were, a posteriori. The implications of 
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Torrance’s arguments are significant with respect to Wright’s method since 
what we find with respect to God as an object is a theological method that is 
subject to the uniqueness of the nature of God as object in a way that upsets 
the unified ground on which Wright’s method rests. That is, Wright’s method 
assumes a unified ground of being that treats the knowledge of God as the 
same kind of knowledge as knowledge about anything else. The nuance that 
Torrance’s account brings is to differentiate between the means of knowing 
and the content of that knowing. Content determines means: the way that we 
know is determined by the object of knowledge, not the knowing subject. This 
way of knowing is limited to the basic observations that a) knowledge takes 
place within the knowing relationship, a posteriori, and b) the rationality 
required must conform to the object itself. The task of this chapter has been to 
articulate a theological analysis of the epistemological subject-object 
relationship, pressing the question of the uniqueness of the divine object and 
what that means for human knowing. At this point we can summarise the 
conclusions of this chapter as follows. 
 First, we have seen that for Wright, Torrance, and Climacus, the 
actuality of the knowing relationship is the starting point for knowledge, 
especially the knowledge of God. In Wright, this is demonstrated by his 
acknowledgement of the way in which knowledge is always contact between 
the knower and the world, and that contact precedes epistemological analysis. 
In Torrance, the reality of revelation is the place from which epistemological 
work is done in theology, just as the reality of light is the starting point for 
physical analysis of light. In Climacus, it is Plato who introduces us to the 
philosophical problem of starting the search for the truth if one does not even 
know what one is looking for. 
 The theological implications of this starting point are manifold. For 
Christian theology this means that soteriology is the context in which we 
know God, making all the considerations of God’s prior act of salvation 
present to the epistemological question. The subject-object relationship is 
determined first by the moral difference between God and humanity—
humans in their sin encounter a God who saves them from this sin. In this 
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encounter humans learn who God is, that he is other than the world, but that 
he becomes present to the world as subject within his own creation, and that 
this is definitively known in the Incarnation of the Son, the Messiah of Israel.  
 Second, if Torrance gives preference to the objectivity of God in his 
epistemology, then Kierkegaard, through Climacus, pushes this objectivity to 
its necessary conclusion in the priority of the subjectivity of human 
knowledge of God. Climacus forces us to see that the objectivity that 
characterises our knowledge of God is, in fact, grounded on a prior 
subjectivity. This subjectivity is not a human creation, but is rather a new 
creation of God as God gives the gift of faith, a restored but new relation 
between the knower and the known. The movement of subjectivity and 
objectivity in the knowledge of God can be summarised like this: God as 
subject, makes the individual subject in a relationship between subjects. This 
relationship of subject to subject is realised in the paradoxical equality of the 
Incarnation. Yet in being made subject, God gives himself to us as object to be 
known, as an object distinct from us—as external reality. It is this final step 
that ushers in Torrance’s account of the objectivity of theological knowledge. 
But with Climacus what we have is a transgression of the boundary between 
subject and object; the gulf is overcome in the gift of the actual relation of God 
to the individual. This is the condition, the subjectivity required for knowing 
the truth. Again, this roots theological epistemology in the saving, gracious 
work of God in Jesus Christ. 
 Third, stepping back to Torrance, of crucial importance is the theological 
account of the knowing relationship that happens between the Father and the 
Son according to the empowering work of the Spirit. In this picture the Son is 
the human knower, the human subject who truly knows the Father in a way 
that must be the only proper way of knowing God. It is into this relationship 
that we are called to participate, making participation in the epistemological 
dynamic between the Father and Son the theological grounding for all 
subsequent Christian theology and removing the possibility that Christian 
knowledge can ever be a possession. This also means that Christian knowing 
is based in an actualism of God’s self-revelation and self-knowing, since in the 
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Trinitarian activity of revealing and being known God is continually active, 
free and sovereign over the human subject who knows God through the work 
of the Spirit in participation. This account of participation can be seen as the 
dogmatic counterpart to Climacus’ poetic venture and, if this is the case, 
makes Torrance’s account of objectivity compatible with Climacus’ account of 
subjectivity. 
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CHAPTER 3. ‘Apocalyptic’, Continuity, and 
Discontinuity: Soteriological Implications for a Theology 
of History 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The previous chapter argued that a truly theological epistemology must 
take the objectivity of God seriously as that unique external reality that 
constitutes its own methodological point of departure. This means that 
theology begins with the already-received knowledge of God. If God’s 
objectivity is determinative for theology, and if we are to keep from thinking 
‘god’ in the abstract or ideal, then God must be said to be an object of our 
knowledge only as the result of his activity as subject, active in his revealing, 
reconciling and saving work, making human beings subjects in the divine-
human knowing relation. Human knowledge of God is thus, from an 
anthropological perspective, grounded in our own subjectivity; but that 
subjectivity is not ours as a possession as if it were given to humanity qua 
humanity, but is ours as a gift, ever dependent upon the continuing activity of 
God who gives us knowledge of himself by making us subject to the 
knowledge of God as object. This act of “making us subject” is the gift of the 
“condition.” Up until now this condition has been presented in theological 
and philosophical terms, derived from the material content of dogmatic 
theology, its relation to modern epistemological questions, and some 
scriptural reflection. While I have argued that this approach is not, as Wright 
might suggest, an abstraction from the biblical narratives,295 it still needs to be 
                                                
295 “Theological activity…is not concerned merely with biblical exegesis or 
with a biblical theology that builds up what this or that author in the New 
Testament taught about the Faith; it is concerned with the Truth at a deeper 
level, in the necessary and coherent thinking of the Apostles as they mediated 
the divine revelation in Jesus Christ to the world of historical understanding 
and communication.” T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCM 
Press, 1965), 40. This “deeper level” is explained in Torrance’s account of the 
stratification of knowledge as the “theological level” where the “concern…is 
not primarily with the organic body of theological knowledge, but with 
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seen what role both the scriptures and the material content of Christian 
theology play with respect to the condition necessary for true theological 
knowledge.  
 The present chapter attempts to go deeper in this direction through the 
consideration of an ‘apocalyptic’ theology.296 By making this move, I can 
integrate the epistemological arguments that have already been advanced 
together with a theological approach to history and continue my constructive 
critique of Wright from within a developing contemporary movement of 
theological critique (‘apocalyptic theology’).  
 The present chapter will proceed first with an argument for a theological 
hermeneutic that is intrinsically ‘apocalyptic’. This will require a brief 
statement on the implications for a theology of scripture if God is a reality 
already known in the gift of subjectivity. It will also require a clarification of 
the way in which I will be using the term ‘apocalyptic’. Having thus cleared 
some ground in the first section, the following two sections will begin the 
constructive dogmatic work which needs to follow the epistemological and 
hermeneutical arguments. This constructive work is the articulation of an 
irruptive ‘apocalyptic’ logic which, in this chapter, traces a dogmatic 
movement from soteriology to Christology. I begin this movement in the 
second section, building on Kierkegaard, by arguing that the actuality of 
God’s self-revelation is necessarily soteriological. This soteriological starting 
point introduces the question of continuity and discontinuity with respect 
both to the subject and to history. In the following chapter it will be shown 
how this soteriological starting point determines a particular account of 
Christology, an account for which we will return to the work of T. F. Torrance, 
and the ‘irruptive, apocalyptic logic’ will then be extended to the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                       
penetrating through to apprehend more fully the economic and ontological 
and trinitarian structure of God’s revealing and saving acts in Jesus Christ as 
they are presented to us in the Gospel.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 
91. 
296 The use of scare quotes is intended to acknowledge the distinctiveness of a 
particular use of the term, given its contested status. Where “apocalyptic” 
appears without scare quotes it should be understood to be used in the 
literary sense of the term—referring to a specific literary genre. 
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creation and, in the final chapter, a theology of history. This soteriology—
Christology—creation—history sequence will then be brought back into 
dialogue with N. T. Wright, setting the stage for a concluding section on 
historical method.  
 In its simplest form, the argument of this and the following chapter is 
that an ‘apocalyptic’ theology is a truly theological commitment to the reality 
of God for theology. And this reality affects every discipline related to 
theology. For hermeneutics, this means that revelation contextualises us. For 
epistemology, this means locating theological knowledge in the historical 
event of Jesus the Messiah, an event that is soteriologically defined and so 
known only in the actuality of reconciliation. For history and anthropology, 
this means that Jesus’ ongoing historical subjectivity and his enhypostatic 
union with humanity in his one human identity is central and determining. 
For the individual who would know God, for the human who would be 
subject, the reality of God is only given to us as we participate in Christ’s 
knowledge, his humanity, and his history, in and through the Spirit; and this 
can all be seen and known in terms of the Christian act of baptism.  
 
2. A Rupture in Understanding: A Properly Theological Hermeneutic 
is ‘Apocalyptic’ 
 
a. Scripture and the God Who is Already Known 
 
 If the preceding arguments regarding epistemology are correct then we 
should be able to read the Bible accordingly, not seeing it as a text co-opted to 
support philosophical arguments, but rather as a text that presents us with an 
account of the objectivity of God to which, in our thinking, we must conform 
our way of thinking in order to understand. But even this is not primary. The 
Bible is not primarily a book about an object, but is itself a witness to God-as-
object within the economy of the self-giving of God. God is the unique active 
subject who gives new life and subjectivity to those who would find God as 
object in the scripture. In other words, God as “an” object for human 
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knowledge is given in scripture only according to the grace that makes us 
subjects to that knowledge.297 This means that reading scripture is a human 
act determined, not by general hermeneutical theory or rules of reading, but 
rather by the reality of the God who speaks in and through the scriptures. 
John Webster may help to clarify this point: 
 
It is important at the beginning to register that…in discussing the 
nature of reading: we do not move away from operative language 
about God, shifting into territory more effectively mapped by a 
psychology of interpretation, a theory of virtue or, perhaps, a general 
account of rational acts. Language about the merciful self-presence of 
the triune God has as much work to do when we are talking about 
readers as it does when we are talking about revelation and its textual 
servants.298 
 
Because of the unique object of Christian faith and knowing, Christian 
hermeneutics is a discipline that must be considered within the economy of 
salvation, and not as an exercise originating outside according to a general 
theory of language or reading. This does not mean that such theories are 
irrelevant, but that they, like knowing in general, are determinatively 
conditioned by the object of knowledge or, in the case of scripture, the object 
of witness. Webster continues, 
 
The act of reading scripture—because it is the act of reading Scripture, 
the herald of the viva vox Dei—is not an instance of something else, but 
an act which, though it is analogous to other acts, is in its deepest 
reaches sui generis. For as with all Christian acts, its substance is in the 
last analysis determined not out of its similarities to the acts of other 
agents who do not share the Christian confession, but by the formative 
economy of salvation in which it has its origin and end. In that 
formative economy, the act of reading partakes of the basic structure of 
                                                
297 On the graciousness of God’s “being-as-object” cf. Eberhard Jüngel, God’s 
Being is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth. A 
Paraphrase, trans. John Webster (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 61. 
298 John Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch, Current Issues in Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 69-70. 
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Christian existence, namely its active passivity or passive activity. Like 
other acts of Christian existence it is a human activity whose substance 
lies in its reference to and self-renunciation before the presence and 
action of God.299 
 
This preference for a hermeneutic of “passivity” before the active voice of 
God is just the thing scripture itself assumes.  
 
For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven, and do not 
return there until they have watered the earth, making it bring forth 
and sprout, giving seed to the sower and bread to the eater, so shall my 
word be that goes out from my mouth; it shall not return to me empty, 
but it shall accomplish that which I purpose, and succeed in the thing 
for which I sent it. (Is. 55.10-11, NRSV) 
 
This text from Isaiah is echoed in the letter to the Hebrews: “Indeed the word 
of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing until 
it divides soul from spirit, joints from marrow; it is able to judge the thoughts 
and intentions of the heart” (Heb. 4.12; NRSV).300 The act of God is 
significantly diminished when hermeneutics become determinative for 
hearing; when the voice of God becomes subject to cultural linguistic 
frameworks or horizons of meaning. The problem cannot be resolved, 
however, according to a naïve realist hermeneutic, or a doctrine of the 
perspicuity of scripture apart from the priority of the divine act. Where then 
are we to stand? How do we read scripture and hear the voice of God if we 
are given no method for which to do so? How do we know God, if God 
himself cannot be known apart from his act of revelation? If we turn to 
scripture we find that scripture itself participates in the economy of God’s self 
revealing act and therefore cannot be an escape from the hermeneutic and 
epistemic grounding that can only be had in the dynamic of revelation. As 
difficult as this is, the confrontation of this problematic is demanded by the 
reality of the God who is already known. This means that God’s reality is 
                                                
299 Ibid., 72. 
300 These scriptures are cited in support of a similar argument in Ibid., 16. 
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known (we are not confronted here with the problem of a transcendental 
method) and this has simply been claimed; this claim has, in turn, been 
articulated according to an epistemology of contact. The only way of 
describing this in hermeneutical language is to work backward from God’s 
self-revelation to an understanding of what reading scripture entails in the 
light of this act of revelation. In this way theological hermeneutics works from 
a particular centre; it looks backward—and forward—from the centre that is 
the fullness of God’s self-revelation. 
 
b. Defining “Apocalyptic” and its Implication for Hermeneutics 
 
 As we approach the question of hermeneutics, it is necessary to address 
confusion over the word ‘apocalyptic’ since this disputed term can be a 
stumbling block even before the conversation can begin.301 Is the “apocalypse” 
of Jesus Christ (e.g. Gal. 1.12: a)pokalu/yeov I)hsou= Xristou=) to be understood 
according to the apocalyptic worldview of the first century, a worldview out 
of which were written the various apocalyptic texts that have given rise to the 
modern understanding of the genre that goes by the name “apocalyptic”?302 Is 
there “a genuine ‘apocalyptic’ such as might be recognised in the first century” 
or can ‘apocalyptic’ be appropriated to refer to one event that is the 
apocalypse? Can apocalyptic be construed apart from the genre, with respect 
to an actual happening in history that is, to whatever degree, revelatory? If 
the latter route is taken, as it is by the ‘apocalyptic’ theologians, then the 
biblical scholars who have been carefully working on defining the genre and 
the worldview that makes such literature possible, or who have been working 
on understanding the cultural and literary imaginations of Second Temple 
Judaism, find themselves either utterly confused or standing, once again, on 
shifting sands. 
                                                
301 “…this term has proved so slippery and many-sided in scholarly discourse 
that one is often tempted to declare a moratorium on it all together.” N. T. 
Wright, Paul: In Fresh Perspective (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 41. 
302 See John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish 
Apocalyptic Literature, 2 ed., (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998). 
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 Douglas A. Campbell’s comments on apocalyptic, can help to order an 
understanding of the term’s use with respect to the issues of epistemology 
and history that concern us. Campbell is candid with respect to the limits of 
the word “apocalyptic” and its particular usefulness given the variety of 
meanings it has in a wide range of differing apocalyptic discourses.303 
Nevertheless, for Campbell “apocalyptic” helpfully locates us within a 
particular interpretative trajectory: 
 
The signifier “apocalyptic” is a useful label at an introductory level of 
discussion when broad loyalties and orientations are being sketched in 
relation to different basic approaches to Paul; it denotes fairly that an 
approach to Paul is being pursued that ultimately aligns with the 
concerns and readings of—in this context in particular—Lou Martyn, 
and that therefore is in sympathy with the alternative texts and 
soteriological paradigm that he endorses, and sensitive to the tensions 
that he detects between that paradigm and justification concerns.304 
 
Yet, if ‘apocalyptic’ identifies this broad theological reading given by Martyn 
(and Käsemann) it has been taken up in recent contemporary theology, 
following Martyn, and given more particular theological content, Campbell’s 
work notwithstanding. If Martyn’s work energizes an “interpretative 
trajectory” then the ‘apocalyptic’ hermeneutic that he offers can be given 
more content then simply its use in denoting a particular school of thought. 
At its most basic level, Martyn’s Pauline ‘apocalyptic’ is articulated in 
Campbell’s words: 
 
When Martyn speaks of Paul’s apocalyptic gospel, he generally means 
to signal certain interrelated concerns: the gospel is visited upon Paul 
and his churches essentially unconditionally, by grace and by 
revelation. All Paul’s reasoning is conditioned in the light of this initial 
                                                
303 Douglas A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of 
Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009).Ibid., 190-191, 978n.41. 
304 Ibid., 191. 
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disclosure and hence proceeds “backward”…; the apostle’s 
epistemology is emphatically retrospective.305 
 
 In terms of hermeneutics, the issue can be framed according to the 
question of where the gospel finds its contextual home. Does it rely on a prior 
understanding of a story, a narrative or worldview, that makes sense of it; or 
does its novelty sweep every story and context off the table and start all over 
again? Is such a thing even possible? From a hermeneutical perspective, the 
latter option seems like nonsense. Axiomatic for hermeneutics is that nothing 
is ever known apart from context. When apocalyptic is appealed to as 
hermeneutic, it must, necessarily, be understood in full contextual terms, as a 
semantic world into which an event comes or out of which an understanding 
is generated. As such, when theologians or biblical scholars use the term 
“apocalyptic” it is taken to be a descriptor that points to a worldview or prior 
context that provides the cultural and linguistic grounding for interpretation 
and understanding of whatever is described as “apocalyptic.” The difference 
to which the ‘apocalyptic’ theologians point is that, for them, ‘apocalyptic’ 
names a unique event which brings with it its own self-determining context. 
This does not make sense hermeneutically unless the context is at once the 
condition, the gift of subjectivity to the knower, upon which the revelation is 
dependent. So, for example, when Nathan Kerr writes that “God’s 
interruption of history…precludes any perspective on reality, any worldview, 
historical system”306 etc., the verb “precludes” is a theological distinction, not 
sociological or hermeneutical. ‘Apocalyptic’ theology denies, on theological 
grounds, the contextual axiom of hermeneutics. 
 For example, the way in which this “anti-hermeneutic” ‘apocalyptic’ 
works can be seen, if somewhat cryptically, in a footnote in Martyn’s 
commentary on Galatians, where, describing a Jewish Christian rectification 
tradition, he reverses the assumed noetic structure of Pauline thinking that 
                                                
305 Ibid., 189-90. “Backward” is attributed by Campbell to E. P. Sanders. Italics 
in original. 
306 Nathan Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission, 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009), 13. 
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moves from plight to solution307 to a solution—plight structure. Here Martyn 
brings Karl Barth into the conversation: 
 
…one recalls that K. Barth was an exegete as well as a systematic 
theologian; for over a considerable period of time he correctly 
emphasized that Paul saw Adam in the light of Christ, sin in the light 
of grace, and so on. Note, for example, the comments “…it is only by 
grace that the lack of grace can be recognized as such” (Church 
Dogmatics, 2.2, 92); “…the doctrine of election…defines grace as the 
starting-point for all reflection and utterance…” (93).308 
 
This footnote is referenced by Wright in an article surveying “Paul in Current 
Anglophone Scholarship,” calling it evidence of Martyn’s “Barthian a priori.” 
Wright characterises it thus: “Everything must now be known, and can only 
be known, through the fresh revelation in Christ.”309 This comment brings to 
the fore the problem and the confusion. Barth’s theology is not a 
hermeneutical theology. It is a theology of revelation. But, if read within a 
hermeneutical framework, it appears arbitrary and fideistic. Of course there is 
a context into which revelation comes and of course this context is the cultural 
and linguistic source for the articulation of revelation. This is not denied by 
the Barthian approach. Jüngel summarises this approach: 
  
 If, according to Barth, God’s being-as-object for the person who knows 
 God  can only be perceived and conceived in the objectivity of a medium 
 which witnesses to God’s being-as-object, a medium taken from the 
 created reality which surrounds man, then we must follow Barth in 
 making a clear distinction between God’s being-as-object as such and the 
 creaturely objectivity which witnesses to God’s being-as-object.310 
                                                
307 Cf. Frank Thielman, From Plight to Solution: A Jewish Framework Fro 
Understanding Paul’s View of the Law in Galatians and Romans, vol. 61, 
Supplements to Novum Testamentum (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989). 
308 J. Louis Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation With Introduction and 
Commentary, vol. 33A, The Anchor Yale Bible (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1997), 266 n.163. 
309 N T Wright, “Paul in Current Anglophone Scholarship,” The Expository 
Times 123, no. 8 (2012), 373. 
310 Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming, 62. 
 122 
 
The distinction between God’s being-as-object and the creaturely objectivity 
that witnesses to this being-as-object is of crucial importance. A hermeneutical 
approach limits the knower to the creaturely objectivity—and rightly so. 
However, if this hermeneutical perspective is taken to be co-extensive with 
the limits of theological epistemology then a confusion is introduced that 
obscures the priority of God’s being-as-object before the creaturely objectivity 
given to human observation. In all of this what remains determinative is the 
priority of the act of God to reveal himself. The claim of fideism denies the 
priority of God’s activity, and therefore his reality, focusing instead on the 
“leap of faith” from the human side.  
 Furthermore, the context into which revelation comes remains in need of 
redemption, especially to the extent that this context is known as a history, or 
any sort of cultural framework or social ideology. Therefore a ‘solution—
plight’ structure is a necessary theological structure precisely because of the 
soteriological dimension of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The solution 
is such that it relativizes all that went before.  
 In Wright’s Climax of the Covenant he, too, rejects Thielman’s plight—
solution structuring of Paul’s thought in favor of a more nuanced Plight (1)—
Solution—Plight (2) structure.311 In this interpretation, Paul’s understanding 
of the problem that needed a solution is reinterpreted in light of the solution. 
This happens “with eyes now unveiled.”312 This “unveiling” (itself within the 
family of apocalyptic terms) in Wright’s description of Paul’s new status as 
Christian theologian, is a result of events (his conversion and subsequent 
experience) and his reflection on those events as they related to his 
understanding of God and God’s purposes. In Wright’s work what we see is 
an account of Paul’s epistemology according to the ‘apocalyptic’ theology 
                                                
311 Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology, 
261. Cf. N T Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 4, Christian Origins 
and the Question of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013), 9.113ff. Cf. 
John M. G. Barclay, “Paul, the Gift and the Battle Over Gentile Circumcision: 
Revisiting the Logic of Galatians,” Australian Biblical Review 58 (2010), 38-39. 
312 Wright, The Climax of the Covenant, 262.  
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being sketched out here,313 but that retains the hermeneutical perspective 
characteristic of CRw. Specifically, Wright maintains that, for Paul there is a 
“double epistemological shift” that takes both the “One God and…the new 
creation ushered in by the risen Messiah” as the critical transformational 
points.314 Wright’s objection to the way ‘apocalyptic’ is used by Martyn’s 
school is grounded in the assumption that there is an apocalyptic worldview 
that must make sense of Paul’s theology.315 So he has argued against certain 
dualistic configurations of apocalyptic and offered a carefully nuanced 
version in NTPG so that we can all get apocalyptic right. The problem is that 
this obscures the premise of Martyn, et. al. (and perhaps contrary to 
Käsemann) that no apocalyptic worldview exists or has existed that makes 
sense of the apocalypse of Jesus Christ since in Jesus all other worldviews are 
relativized. The perspective no longer follows a historical narrative of forward 
progression, but rather looks both backward and forward from the central 
perspective of the unique event of God’s revelation in Jesus of Nazareth.  
 Now, we need to be absolutely clear at this point. This does not mean 
that we somehow know Jesus apart from history, or outside of any cultural or 
linguistic context, or even worldview. And, it does not mean that we must 
somehow speak of Jesus apart from his historical context—as if it makes sense 
to call Jesus, “Christ” apart from the history of Israel. What it does mean is 
that this history is powerless to provide the context for understanding Jesus 
apart from the positive act of God unveiling himself and providing the 
condition of reconciled subjectivity to see and to know that unveiling. This is 
warranted by the fact that for the reconciled understanding, Jesus is known to 
be fully God and fully human, and God remains active in that knowledge. 
Apart from God’s act of self-revelation we cannot know him as he truly is, the 
God-man, because such knowledge cannot be had on the basis of historical or 
other forms of finite human knowing.  
                                                
313 See especially the chapter 14 of PFG. 
314 PFG, 1195. 
315 See Wright's depiction of the problem in, Paul, 41-42. 
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  ‘Apocalyptic’ theology simply points out that if we let the hermeneutical 
perspective take theological precedence, then we over-determine the revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ and subject him to a human construct. If, however, we 
prioritise the theological sense of ‘apocalyptic’, then we (methodologically?) 
subject all worldviews and contexts to the freedom of God’s sovereignty over 
his own self-revelation. This event of self-revelation is the apocalypse, in 
subjectivity and objectivity, of Jesus Christ. 
 Perhaps the crux of the issue is that ‘apocalyptic’ theology rejects the very 
contextualisation that apocalyptic literature requires. So, if Paul is an 
apocalyptic theologian that means that he has been shaped by an apocalyptic 
worldview which stands as the framework within which revelation makes 
sense. The worldview, even if it is transformed to some degree by the 
revelatory experience, nevertheless contextualises that experience.316 The 
‘apocalyptic’ theologians, however, see in this the same sort of 
Offenbarungsmächtigkeit, or “capacity for revelation” that Karl Barth rejected so 
forcefully in his interaction with Emil Brunner.317 The confusion between the 
two is not helped by the fact that those who advocate an ‘apocalyptic’ 
theology draw for their inspiration, and understanding of apocalyptic, upon 
biblical scholars and theologians who are also working with the genre of 
apocalyptic literature.318 Even with the muddling of the two types of 
understanding of apocalyptic (and there are, of course, more than two), the 
biblical scholars being sourced for ‘apocalyptic’ theology can be shown to 
support an ‘apocalyptic’ perspective that is not dependent upon their 
particular and nuanced re-creation of an apocalyptic worldview.319 In fact, the 
                                                
316 I am indebted to a conversation with Jamie Davies that helped me see this 
distinction. 
317 Emil Brunner, and Karl Barth, Natural Theology. 
318 Here we think of J. Louis Martyn, Ernst Käsemann, Martinus C. deBoer, 
and Douglas Campbell. 
319 Doug Harink’s essay “Partakers of the Divine Apocalypse: Hermeneutics, 
History, and Human Agency after Martyn” in Joshua B. Davis, and Douglas 
Harink, eds. Apocalyptic and the Future of Theology: With and Beyond J. Louis 
Martyn (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 73-95. makes this point regarding 
Martyn: “Unquestionably, as a commentator Martyn stands with Paul in the 
singular apocalyptic reality in which Paul claims to be standing” p. 77 (italics 
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actuality of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ in the ‘apocalyptic’ 
understanding, far from being contextualised by a suitable worldview or 
appropriate language game, is what requires the ‘apocalyptic’ theologians to 
point out that it is we who are contextualised by this ‘apocalypse.’  
 The language of “contextualisation” is used in this way by Walter Lowe 
to address the modern need for an ‘apocalyptic’ theology. “The accustomed 
business of the mind is to place or contextualise things, to label and handle 
them. But occasionally it happens that we ourselves are contextualised—
placed in an unfamiliar setting that exceeds and relativises us. It is this event 
that I propose to call contextualisation.”320 Regarding much of the popular 
level discourse regarding apocalyptic, Lowe writes, “[t]he problem with many 
who use the language of apocalyptic is that they seem all too certain of the 
ground under their feet.”321 This same critique can be leveled against those 
who insist that apocalyptic must be understandable in terms of an already 
present worldview that gives apocalyptic its contextual ground. It is the reality 
of the unique ‘apocalyptic’ event as an event that comes from God that 
transfigures the contexts into which it comes. Donald MacKinnon puts it like 
this, speaking of the transcendent in such a way as I am speaking of the 
‘apocalypse’ of Jesus Christ: 
 
I am tempted to suggest that if one is a realist in philosophy of religion, 
one is not inclined to the view that supposed reference to the 
transcendent is to be regarded simply as the preliminary condition of 
the believer’s life, and that which gives that life its form. The 
transcendent is not a notion which emerges in that life nor one that 
finds in that life its proper context. Rather it is manifested by its 
intrusive presence as something continually demanding that we 
transform our understanding of its content more and more rigorously, 
                                                                                                                                       
in original). Regardless of Martyn’s success in reading the Galatian context, a 
reading that is highly contested, not the least by Wright, his theological 
approach is self-consciously ‘apocalyptic’ in the sense of ‘apocalyptic’ I am 
describing. 
320 Walter Lowe, “Why We Need Apocalyptic,” Scottish Journal of Theology 63, 
no. 1 (2010), 48. 
321 Ibid., 49. 
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as if every articulation of that content were precarious and necessarily 
incomplete, in order that we may begin to grasp what we seek to refer 
to.322 
  
 This brings us back to the point that this has to do with the actuality of 
the ‘apocalypse’ of Jesus Christ and that it does so reminds us of the realism 
that is essential to the epistemological question. The reality in question, if it is 
the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, brings with it the particular dynamic 
appropriate to the objectivity of the knowledge of God. To this dynamic, with 
respect to hermeneutics, we now turn. 
 
c. ‘Apocalyptic’ and the Question of Method  
 
 If hermeneutical theory is concerned with the way in which humans 
understand the world323 or, in the language we have been using, external 
reality, then theological hermeneutics will ask in what way God can be the 
reality that is given for humans to understand. Hermeneutics brings the 
epistemological questions of human knowledge to the applied processes of 
interpretation and understanding with respect to objects that carry or suggest 
meaning (even if the meaning is only located in the interpretative 
communities): texts, cultures, performances, images, etc.. By describing 
‘apocalyptic’ theology according to a retrospective hermeneutic and in terms 
of passive contextualisation, I am arguing that an apocalyptic event is central 
for theological hermeneutics. 
 Therefore the particular significance of ‘apocalyptic’ for the present 
discussion is that it articulates the conviction that Christian theology, biblical 
                                                
322 Donald MacKinnon, Explorations in Theology 5 (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 
1979), 157. 
323 James M. Robinson describes the move from “explanation” to 
“understanding” as “the first move toward the new hermeneutic.” James M. 
Robinson, “Hermeneutic Since Barth,” in The New Hermeneutic, ed. James M. 
Robinson, and John B. Cobb Jr., New Frontiers in Theology: Discussions 
among Continental and American Theologians (New York: Harper & Row, 
1964), 20. 
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studies, and historiography, must each be understood, in Webster’s terms, as 
“a human activity whose substance lies in its reference to and self-
renunciation before the presence and action of God.”324 That is, the reality and 
actuality of God is the determining methodological factor.325 What might this 
method look like? When Karl Barth wrote the second edition of his Romans 
commentary, he wrote against critics “by asking quite simply whether, if the 
Epistle is to be treated seriously at all, it is reasonable to approach it with any 
other assumption than that God is God.”326 This statement follows a lengthy 
polemic against the tendency of modern commentators who neglect to 
struggle with the subject-matter of the text. If, for Paul, the subject-matter 
(and here we think of our arguments regarding the object of knowledge) is 
the “permanent KRISIS of the relationship between time and eternity”327 then 
such a subject-matter is left out of modern commentaries, making them 
simply prolegomena to the sort of exegesis Barth is talking about.  
 In Barth’s theology this permanent “KRISIS” is given according to the 
formula, “God is God.”328 For our purposes this enigmatic statement need not 
trouble us beyond the point that Barth is making by it, namely, that God’s 
being (and knowledge of his being) is wholly determined by God. God cannot 
be known in reference to anything other than himself. There is no other 
acceptable predicate of God that does not have this tautology preceding it. If 
God is the object of Paul’s writing, then God may be encountered therein, and 
the reader confronted with a crisis. Barth goes on to say, “Paul knows of God 
what most of us do not know; and his Epistles enable us to know what he 
                                                
324 Webster, Holy Scripture, 72. 
325 I suspect that this aspect of the relationship between the interpreter and 
text, namely the reality and actuality of God, is what is bypassed in 
Robinson’s essay describing the “new hermeneutic” as he passes from Barth 
to Gadamer. Gadamer is, after all, concerned with the fusion of the twin 
horizons of interpreter and interpreted. Barth, on the other hand, is concerned 
also with a third horizon, that of the living and active God. Cf. Robinson, 
“Hermeneutic Since Barth,” 22-27. 
326 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, 6th ed., 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 11. 
327 Ibid., 10-11. 
328 Ibid., 11. 
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knew. It is this conviction that Paul ‘knows’ that my critics choose to name my 
‘system’, or my ‘dogmatic presupposition’, or my Alexandrianism’, and so on 
and so forth. I have, however, found this assumption to be the best 
presupposition, even from the point of view of historical criticism.”329 It is just 
this sort of crisis that J. Louis Martyn identifies in his writings on Paul, and 
which form the ‘methodological’ basis for ‘apocalyptic’ theology. Based on his 
commentary of Galatians, we might say that Martyn, like Barth, assumes that 
Paul is writing “through Jesus Christ” (dia\ I)hsou= Xristou=, Gal. 1.1) vis-à-vis 
the “apocalypse of Jesus Christ” (di 0 a)pokalu/yewj I)hsou= Xristou=, Gal. 1.12) 
and therefore Paul is to be read with the expectation that the reader might 
encounter a third horizon: God may, indeed, speak. The reality and actuality 
of God ‘in’ the text is encountered as the event of God’s self-disclosure.  
 Douglas Harink has made this point with respect to Martyn and Barth 
on several occasions, most recently in his contribution to the collections of 
essays, Apocalyptic and the Future of Theology. Here his language is especially 
vivid: 
 
Martyn presents us not in the first place with an incremental exegetical 
“advance” toward an apocalyptic “perspective,” but rather with a 
fundamental shift of hermeneutical stance; that is, exegesis is standing 
in the midst of the theological earthquake of the gospel, of which 
Paul’s letter is a powerful shockwave, giving an account of what is 
going on while the quake is still happening.330  
 
Harink points out that Martyn, like Barth, worked according to the 
assumption of a self-involving hermeneutical perspective, one that attempts, 
as far as possible, to come under the authority of the true subject-matter of 
scripture. This is all to say that ‘apocalyptic’ names a movement in 
biblical/theological hermeneutics that gives absolute priority to God as the 
object of knowledge whose freedom and activity are determinative for the 
subject’s interpretation. 
                                                
329 Barth, Romans, 11. 
330 Davis and Harink, Apocalyptic and the Future of Theology, 79. 
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 To clarify this point, consider Donald A. Hagner’s summary of exegesis: 
 
The goal of exegesis is a severely restricted one: to arrive at the 
meaning of the passage intended by the original author, as that author 
meant the original readers to understand it. The exegete seeks nothing 
less, nothing more and nothing other than this….If we are to achieve 
our goal we must enter into the world of our author and addressees to 
the fullest possible degree….In short we must do everything we can to 
recreate the entire situation that confronted writer and readers. Insofar 
as it is possible, we must stand in their shoes, feel as they felt, think as 
they thought, perceive as they perceived, dream as they dreamt.331 
 
The question that ‘apocalyptic’ theology raises is whether or not this includes 
an encounter with the living God, who is the subject-matter of the Bible. Can 
we walk in Paul’s shoes if we hold an encounter with the risen Jesus at arm’s 
length and not allow it the force of the existential and “epistemological 
crisis”332 that it was for Paul? Can we hear what Paul is saying if we limit 
ourselves to the twin horizons of interpreter and text? God-talk requires that 
this crisis has taken place with the result that a qualitatively new subjectivity 
has been given, a subjectivity that no longer knows kata\ sa/rka (2 Cor 5.16) 
but that has been given the eyes to see with “doxastic immediacy.”333 
Theological reflection is grounded in the immediacy of the event of revelation 
and only as such becomes God-talk. Without this crisis theology can be no 
more than God-talk-talk, an inadequate basis for theology since it is not true 
to its object. This “epistemological crisis” as Martyn calls it, is not only present 
as Paul’s own worldview, but to the extent that we would read with Paul, and 
understand him, it must, by God’s grace, become the theologian’s crisis too.334 
                                                
331 Donald A. Hagner, New Testament Exegesis and Research: A Guide for 
Seminarians (Pasadena, CA: Fuller Seminary Press, 1999), 29. 
332 Cf. Martyn, Galatians, 104, 132, 142. and J. Louis Martyn, Theological Issues 
in the Letters of Paul, Studies of the New Testament and Its World (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1997), 89-110.. 
333 Cf. Alan J. Torrance, “Analytic Theology and the Reconciled Mind: The 
Significance of History,” Journal of Analytic Theology Vol 1, no. 1 (2013), 40.  
334 See Martyn, Galatians, 104, 132, 142. and Martyn, Theological Issues, 89-110. 
It is important to point out that for Martyn the “epistemological crisis” is not 
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‘Apocalyptic’ theology, rather than stopping with the hermeneutical 
question—which would be a way of avoiding true presence with Paul and his 
subject-matter—takes the ‘apocalyptic’ motif into the realms of theology, 
ontology, metaphysics, politics, and mission. Because the object of knowledge 
is God, the subject who is made subject in that knowing relationship is 
entirely determined by the God who has acted and continues to act. The point 
is to use this dialogue with ‘apocalyptic’ to further a constructive claim that 
will show how epistemology and history are mutually determined, providing 
a way of reading history ‘apocalyptically’ and ‘covenantally’ so that 
‘apocalyptic’ discontinuity is held together with historic continuity, all the 
while being true to the unique objectivity of God. 
 
3. ‘Apocalyptic’ and Soteriology: Beginning with the New Beginning 
 
 At the beginning of this chapter it was proposed that an irruptive 
‘apocalyptic’ logic would be the appropriate corrective to Wright’s type of 
historical method. Now that the concept of ‘apocalyptic’ has been introduced, 
the heart of this logic can be articulated constructively. By using the word 
‘logic’ I simply mean to follow an orderly progression determined by the two 
subject-matters under discussion: the knowledge of God and the practice of 
historiography. This present section begins this logical progression with the 
doctrine of reconciliation. 
  
a. Revelation is Reconciliation, Reconciliation is History 
 
                                                                                                                                       
an existential option open to the inquisitive seeker, but rather it “can be seen 
only by the new eyes granted at the juncture of the ages.” In Martyn’s work, 
however, this is not a condition in abstracto, but occasioned by the crisis that is 
presented kata stauron, a way of knowing that is occasioned by the in-breaking 
of the new age. Cf. ibid., 108 n. 52. That Martyn emphasises the externality of 
this event (the coming of the new age) does not, however, mean that the “eyes 
to see” are somehow available as an option apart from what I am calling, with 
Kierkegaard, the “condition.” 
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 The historical nature of the ‘apocalypse’ of Jesus Christ is inextricably 
bound up with the doctrine of reconciliation. ‘Apocalyptic’, as I am arguing, 
helpfully names the New Testament understanding of the actuality of the 
revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth, an actuality that is present in and for 
history. By ‘actuality’ I mean to point both to the external reality of the event 
of Jesus Christ, its unique objectivity, and to the nature of that event as 
revelatory in itself. “Most simply stated,” writes Douglas Harink,  
 
 ‘apocalypse’ is shorthand for Jesus Christ. In the New Testament, in 
 particular for Paul, all apocalyptic reflection and hope comes to this, that 
 God has acted critically, decisively, and finally for Israel, all the peoples 
 of the earth, and the entire cosmos, in the life, death, resurrection, and 
 coming again of Jesus, in such a way that God’s purpose for Israel, all 
 humanity, and all creation is critically, decisively, and finally disclosed 
 and effected in  the history of Jesus Christ.”335  
 
The actuality of ‘apocalyptic’ is a historical event, bringing together the 
historical and the theological, conscientiously holding these together in such a 
way that the nature of the particular apocalyptic event—the ‘apocalypse’ of 
Jesus Christ—determines both. The relationship between the unique, singular 
history of Jesus and the way in which God’s action is described are 
inextricably linked. If God has acted in a unique and decisive way in Jesus of 
Nazareth, then that event contains within it the revelation of God himself in 
his act.  
 What is revealed in this act is not just an object for historical knowledge, 
but also an active Subject, one who cannot be objectified. By ‘objectification’ is 
meant the act of constraining an object within one’s own categories of 
understanding and so restricting an object’s freedom to be a subject. Abraham 
Lincoln can be objectified as an historical figure because he ceases to be 
subject with respect to his own historical existence. Jesus, however, remains 
                                                
335 Douglas Harink, Paul Among the Postliberals: Pauline Theology Beyond 
Christendom and Modernity (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2003), 68. 
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subject by virtue of the unique content of his revelation—resurrection and 
ascension. Jesus remains as active, personal subject. Jesus cannot be objectified 
because to do so would negate his subjectivity, a subjectivity that is human, 
but is also, and fully, divine. The two natures of the one Son of God make the 
question of the knowledge of the ‘apocalypse’ of Jesus Christ—as a unique, 
but nevertheless historical, event—epistemologically and theologically 
complex.  
 So, if ‘apocalyptic’ refers to Jesus Christ’s history, it also refers to the 
way in which that history is bound up with soteriology. For if what is 
revealed in his history is not just a historical figure, but, as Käsemann says, 
the righteousness of God,336 then the history of Jesus, in its revelatory mode, is 
also reconciliatory. As Philip G. Ziegler writes, “revelation itself is an event 
that initiates, even as it discloses, a new state of affairs; not simply ‘a making 
known’, revelation is also ‘a making way for,’ involving God’s conclusive 
‘activity and movement, an invasion of the world below from heaven above.’ 
The event in which God is made known as Saviour—the coming of Christ—is 
the very event that saves. Revelation thus is reconciliation.”337 The language 
of “above” and “below” and its metaphysical implications, will be examined 
below according to a doctrine of creation, but for now it is significant that we 
understand that the objectivity of God’s revelation, the ‘apocalypse’ of Jesus 
Christ, is never given over to objectivity except as it comes together with the 
reconciliation that it effects. God’s act in history is inseparable from the 
actuality of reconciliation. We are again back to Kierkegaard’s account of 
subjectivity. God has acted to make us subjects in his Self-revelation as 
object—this is true in our own subjectivity and in history. Revelation is, 
therefore, reconciliation. Or, ‘apocalyptic’ theology, construed from the 
standpoint of the knowing subject, begins with soteriology. If we begin with 
the question of revelation and human knowledge of that revelation, then we 
                                                
336 Käsemann, Commentary on Romans, 30. 
337 Philip G. Ziegler, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer--an Ethics of God’s Apocalypse?,” 
Modern Theology 23, no. 4 (2007), 581. Internal quotations are from Martinus C. 
de Boer, “Paul, Theologian of God’s Apocalypse,” Interpretation 56, no. 1 
(2002), 25. 
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are obliged by the nature of that revelation to begin with soteriology. More on 
this needs to be said now with respect to the question of the relationship 
between soteriology and Christology. 
 The actuality of reconciliation in the event of revelation is, as we have 
seen in T. F. Torrance, located in the person of Jesus Christ. An analysis of this 
actuality belongs to the theological sub-disciplines of Christology and 
soteriology. Because Christology is grounded in the actuality of Jesus of 
Nazareth, God’s self-revelation, both doctrines look for their content in the 
historical event of atonement, what Karl Barth identifies as the history of Jesus 
Christ.338 This Christological history de-centres both our subjective experience 
of history, and the way we approach the knowledge of history. It forces us to 
understand history from an altogether new perspective, a perspective which 
is given to us in the event of reconciliation but which is then located outside 
of our subjectivity in the subjectivity of Jesus Christ. The relationship between 
Christology and soteriology is therefore complementary if the epistemological 
question is raised, i.e., if the knowing subject is to be included in the dogmatic 
formulation.  
 In the event of revelation, Christ becomes the new subjective centre of 
history; his subjectivity becomes determinative for human subjectivity. 
Therefore the person of Jesus Christ is the beginning point for a theology of 
history on both soteriological and Christological grounds. In the actuality of 
reconciliation, the subject experiences the interruption of the history in which 
she understands herself and is given the new mind to be able to see history 
reoriented around the event of God’s Self-revelation. In this way, history and 
subjectivity are taken together to make sense of the continuity of both in light 
of the irruptive nature of revelation.  
 
b. Revelation is Irruptive: The Question of the Novum 
 
                                                
338 See CD IV.1, 157. 
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 This Christocentric, reconciliatory ‘apocalyptic’ is articulated by Nathan 
Kerr as “God’s interruption of history” which “precludes any perspective on 
reality, any worldview, historical system or mythical framework, any 
principle, or idea, or metaphysic, which evades or abstracts from the concrete 
flesh-and-blood reality of that crucified Jewish peasant of Nazareth.”339 This 
section begins the task of reconfiguring history in Christological terms, but 
does so by beginning with the knowing subject, and therefore with 
soteriology.340 Soteriology is an interruption in two ways: as an interruption 
of the continuity of the subject who is being saved, and as an interruption of 
the continuity of history from ‘without’, as it were. In the sense that the event 
that saves and interrupts comes from ‘outside’, i.e. it is external to immanent 
psychological, intellectual, world-historical, forces, it can be described as 
“irruptive.” Revelation is, in its salvific and historical dimensions, irruptive. It 
follows from this that at the heart of Christian theology is an event that is 
truly new; Christian theology is in response to this novum.  
 Christian theology, for the knowing subject, begins in reconciliation. 
This reconciliation is accomplished in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, in a 
real historical event. This event is grounded, however, not in a historical 
trajectory, but in the freedom of God’s act of revelation. This creates a tension 
between the historical nature of God’s revelation, and the transcendent nature 
of God with respect to the immanence of historical forces. This tension is 
worked out by Barth in the Church Dogmatics (CD), IV.1.  
                                                
339 Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic, 13. 
340 Following from the argument in the previous section, in a brief and 
preliminary way this ordering can also be defended on historiographical 
grounds. First, as we have seen, Wright begins his series on the question of 
God in the New Testament with a methodological discussion that grounds his 
theological and historical work in a particular epistemological approach. By 
beginning with soteriology I am attempting to directly engage with his 
starting point. Second, if historiography is a human discipline that is engaged 
in interpretation and representation, and if as such it is a subjective discipline 
(although in a critically realist way), then the question of the subject is where 
we ought to start when engaging in a dialogue with historiography. 
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 Barth begins the section of CD titled, “The Obedience of the Son of God” 
with the simple statement: “The atonement is history.”341 Yet, rather than 
making this claim an entry point for a particular historical way of knowing,342 
the claim is developed further so that Barth goes on to say that, “the 
atonement takes precedence over all other history”343 because this “is the very 
special history of God with man, the very special history of man with God. As 
such it has a particular character and demands particular attention. As such it 
underlies and includes, not only in principle and virtually but also actually, 
the most basic history of every man.”344 The history that is the atonement is, 
then, an absolutely unique history and functions as the historical reference 
point for all other history.345  
 According to Barth, the New Testament lifts the man Jesus Christ, “right 
out of the list of other men, and as against this list (including Moses and the 
prophets, not to mention all the rest) it places Him at the side of God.”346 
Furthermore, “There is no discernible stratum of the New Testament in 
which—always presupposing His genuine humanity—Jesus is in practice 
seen in any other way or—whatever terms may be used—judged in any other 
way than as the One who is qualitatively different and stands in indissoluble 
antithesis to His disciples and all other men, indeed to the whole cosmos.”347 
Because of this, Barth goes on to say, the human judgment that Jesus is 
worthy of praise as the one who is equated with the majesty of God, is not a 
judgment that a human being could make on her own, but only possible 
because God himself had made such a judgment possible. From the 
                                                
341 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, transl. G. W. Bromiley et al., ed. G. W. 
Bromiley, and T. F. Torrance. 14 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1969), IV.1, 157. 
Hereafter I will follow the conventional citation form: e.g., CD IV.1, 157.  
342 See the interaction between Richard Hays and Wright in which Hays 
suggests this passage in CD to Wright and Wright correctly recognizes that 
what he and Barth acknowledge as “history,” beyond the external reality of 
the events in question, might very well be different things. JPPG, 58-59, 64-65. 
343 CD IV.1, p.157. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Here is the starting point for a proper, Christologically oriented, theology 
of history. 
346 Ibid., 160. 
347 Ibid., 161. 
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perspective of the continuity of human history, any worldview that makes 
sense of that continuity is incapable of knowing this one man who is equated 
with the majesty of God. This is because of the epistemological priority of his 
own history. Because of the immediacy or ‘contact’ required for knowledge of 
Jesus as very God, that knowledge necessarily involves individual human 
lives in the history of Jesus of Nazareth.348 Human judgment separates and 
judges, dividing the known from the knower. Theological epistemology 
brings them together, reconciling the knower in the gift of the known. “[The 
Apostles’] estimation and judgment of Jesus is as such something secondary, 
a necessary consequence. It is not itself their theme, the subject-matter of their 
preaching. They are occupied with Jesus Himself. They aim to be His 
witnesses. They answer His question. They give an account of His existence. 
He has placed them in this attitude.”349 
 What this means is that God gives the human knower the gift of 
subjectivity and so contextualises the knower according to Jesus Christ’s own 
history, which becomes the truth of the knower’s existence.350 “…[T]he fact 
that He is [the Word of God] can be known only as He Himself reveals it, only 
by His Holy Spirit.”351 This is, indeed, a rupture of the continuity of the 
knower’s own existence, which has been reconciled and given a new 
understanding of the meaning of human existence, “the most basic history of 
every man.”  
 The context for understanding, for knowing the truth as this history, this 
event, must come with the event itself. This is what makes the history of Jesus 
an absolutely new kind of history. Even though we affirm that it occurs ‘in 
history’, in order to know the theological and existential import of this history, 
the history of God with us, this history must bring with it the very condition 
for knowing it for what it is. 
                                                
348 See the discussion of the historicity of Jesus in Kerr, Christ, History and 
Apocalyptic, 90-93; 130-133 
349 CD IV.1, 162. 
350 Ibid., 158. 
351 Ibid., 163. 
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 In the words of the gospel of John, the subject must be “born anew” 
(gennhqh|= a!nwqen, John 3.3). This new birth is understood soteriologically, as 
the reconciliation of the human with God, in such a way that a new status of 
subjectivity obtains for the subject that is essential for truly knowing the event 
of reconciliation. In this section of the Church Dogmatics, Barth describes this 
in relationship to the “particular character” of the history of God together 
with humanity in the atonement. This particular character has absolute 
existential import: “everyone who knows it as truth knows in it the truth of 
his own existence.”352 In other words, humans know who they are in and 
through this event and not as they interpret this event according to a previous 
knowledge of their existence. The event of truth at once disrupts the context 
and provides an entirely new condition in the subject so that the event can be 
seen accordingly. The event is the reconciliation of God and humanity. 
 If this rupture characterises the human subject that knows Jesus as Lord, 
‘apocalyptic’ theology begins to tell the story of this Lord as a disruptive 
event. This event is the parousia of God’s Son. Truth, for ‘apocalyptic’ theology, 
is grounded in this event. The event of God’s coming interrupts the 
subjectivity of the individual as it interrupts the continuity of history.353 Yet, 
by describing the revelation of God as an interruption, or through the various 
cognates of “rupture’, we introduce a variety of conceptual problems.  
 
 i. Problems With the Concept of the Novum 
 
 One problem is that when, as an event in history, God’s revelation is 
said to be a rupture to that history, a contradiction appears to be introduced 
because rupture only makes sense, i.e. it can only be interpreted, according to 
an account of historical continuity in order to provide context to it as rupture. 
How can there be something new which is only known in terms of what is 
                                                
352 Ibid., 158. 
353 This is why subjectivity and history are inextricably bound together. 
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old?354 One answer to this contradiction involves a description of rupture that 
makes it perpetual—a perpetual irruption from outside that is never 
possessed or knowable in terms of the continuity into which it comes. For the 
subject, this means that the subjective condition in which knowledge of God is 
obtained is never a possession of the individual subject, but rather continues 
to depend on the active irruption of God. In this way the event is not 
dependent upon the existing context, but brings its own context. This is 
similar to the thought experiment of the Philosophical Fragments: “can the truth 
be learned?” The contextual challenge to the novelty of the truth event—the 
apocalyptic event—comes under the same criticism as does the Socratic in the 
Fragments.  
 For history, this means that the event, while being in and given to 
history, never becomes an event of that history as if the history to which it 
comes already contains the truth, but becomes an event according to its own 
stability or continuity (from ‘outside’, as it were) that disrupts and 
destabilises any other source of the continuity of history. This stability ‘from 
outside’ is given to history in the atonement, but only seen as such, or known, 
in the gift of the condition necessary to see it.  
 For the subject, the irruptive event that disrupts the subject’s identity 
within the context of the continuity of history can be said to be ‘perpetual’ to 
the extent that the irruptive event is an event of personal engagement. If we 
were to characterise the event in terms that limited it to simply an event that 
takes place, a fact of history such as the crucifixion or even the resurrection, 
such a fact would simply become a part of the past and take its place as a 
point of reference within history for the subject, but never maintain the 
continuing irruptive force needed to prevent such an event from being 
abstracted into a principle or simply a part of history; it would easily become 
a ‘possession’ of the subject. If, on the other hand, the event is, at its core, 
personal, then the event remains determined by the freedom of the person who 
acts. For theology this is the freedom of the person of Jesus Christ, and the 
                                                
354 E.g., Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, transl. by 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 22. 
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freedom of Christ is maintained in his person and appropriated to the 
individual through the gift of the Spirit. The Spirit, like the person of the Son, 
can never be a possession; rather, he gives himself in his charismata, as un-
possessed gift. Again, it is by virtue of his personhood that the Spirit cannot 
be possessed. This perpetuity of the irruptive, clarified according to the reality 
of the person who interrupts human existence through personal and salvific 
encounter, Jesus Christ, and appropriated through the charismatic gifting 
through the person of the Spirit, is actualised in history in the obedience of 
the subject’s response to the personal call to discipleship. This actualisation 
remains bound to the personal initiative of the divine call.  
 
Discipleship is a commitment to Christ. Because Christ exists, he must 
be followed. An idea about Christ, a doctrinal system, a general 
religious recognition of grace or forgiveness of sins does not require 
discipleship. In truth, it even excludes discipleship; it is inimical to 
it….Christianity without the living Jesus Christ remains necessarily a 
Christianity without discipleship; and a Christianity without 
discipleship is always a Christianity without Jesus Christ.355 
   
 Another problem with the concept of the novum is that the danger of a 
Marcionite exclusion of the history of Israel lurks in a misappropriation of the 
language of interruption. Surely there is a history to which the Son of God 
comes that is hermeneutically significant for the proper understanding of that 
event. How does the language of the novum relate to the history of Israel? This 
question is absolutely central to addressing Wright’s concerns with 
‘apocalyptic’ as well as avoiding a supersessionist reading of the New 
Testament. For this we return to Barth. 
 
 ii. Barth For and Against the Novum 
 
 a) For 
 
                                                
355 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, vol. 4, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 59. 
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 If the event contextualises us, rather than being contextualised by us, 
then we can say that it is something new, since its origin is ‘outside’ of us and 
has the nature of an ‘event.’356 When Barth, early in the Church Dogmatics, uses 
the term novum in a positive manner, he does so to make just this point.  
 
God’s revelation in its objective reality is the person of Jesus Christ. In 
establishing this we have not explained revelation, or made it obvious, 
or brought it into the series of the other objects of our knowledge. On 
the contrary, in establishing this and looking back at it we have 
described and designate it a mystery, and not only a mystery but the 
prime mystery. In other words, it becomes the object of our knowledge; 
it finds a way of becoming the content of our experience and our 
thought; it gives itself to be apprehended by our contemplation and 
our categories. But it does that beyond the range of what we regard as 
possible for our contemplation and perception, beyond the confines of 
our experience and thought. It comes to us as a Novum which, when it 
becomes an object for us, we cannot incorporate in the series of our 
other objects, cannot compare with them, cannot deduce from their 
context, cannot regard as analogous with them. It comes to us as a 
datum with no point of connexion with any other previous datum.357 
 
But this novum is operative on us as subjects, not on the context itself. “It 
comes to us as a Novum.” Given new eyes to see and ears to hear, we see what 
has always been the case. This is the epistemological effect of God’s saving 
work. The context that we thought would interpret the event, turns out to be 
entirely new—from the perspective of the one reconciled. The context as 
determined according to the logic that is immanent to history is completely 
incapable of contextualising the unique event, that history that Barth calls 
“atonement.”  
 From the vantage point of reconciliation we see that this event is an 
event that comes from “outside.” Now that we have seen with some level of 
nuance the way in which the attempt to contextualise the event according to 
                                                
356 This takes us back to the force of Climacus’ question, “Can the truth be 
learned?”, i.e. what does it mean if the truth comes from outside of us? 
357 CD I.2, 172. 
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any particular worldview fails with respect to this event, the notion of an 
outside makes sense. Barth describes this as, 
 
the aspect of the grace of God in Jesus Christ in which it comes to man 
as the (sinful) creature of God freely, without any merit or deserving, 
and therefore from outside, from above—which is to say, from God’s 
standpoint, the aspect of His grace in which He does something 
unnecessary and extravagant, binding and limiting and compromising 
and offering Himself in relation to man by having dealings with him 
and making Himself his God.358 
 
But the condition that makes humans see the event of truth is not the end, for 
the event itself is the movement of God into the far country. Barth continues, 
 
In the fact that God is gracious to man, all the limitations of man are 
God’s limitations, all his weaknesses, and more, all his perversities are 
His. In being gracious to man in Jesus Christ, God acknowledges man; 
He accepts responsibility for his being and nature. He remains himself. 
He does not cease to be God. But He does not hold aloof. In being 
gracious to man in Jesus Christ, He also goes into the far country, into 
the evil society of this being which is not God and against God.359 
 
Still speaking in terms of the rupture, the ‘apocalypse’ of Jesus Christ, we can 
see that it is God’s movement into the sinful, “evil society” that constitutes the 
interruptive nature of the event of truth. But, and here is the surprise, he does 
not defeat the evil powers by opposing them with force, rather God defeats 
the evil and blindness of the world by entering it and taking it into himself so 
that, as Barth says, “all the limitations of man are God’s limitations…all his 
perversities are His.” This is where we start to see the continuity in the rupture. 
What we see in Christ is ourselves. He takes into his own life our fallen, 
broken selves. He enters our evil society, subjects himself to the powers, 
suffers, and dies.  
 
                                                
358 CD IV.1, 158. Italics added. 
359 Ibid. 
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 b) Against 
 
 Now, against the claim that Jesus Christ is somehow a historical novum, 
Barth, much later in the Church Dogmatics, claims that the coming of the Son 
was “not the arbitrary action of a Deus ex machina, but that it was and is the 
fulfilment—the superabundant fulfilment—of the will revealed in the Old 
Testament of the God who even there was the One who manifested Himself 
in this one man Jesus of Nazareth—the gracious God who as such is able and 
willing and ready to condescend to the lowly and to undertake their case at 
His own cost.”360 This movement of the Son of God into the far country, into 
the world of sin and death, is an act of grace and as such it is not a novum. It is 
not a novum precisely because if it were it would not be a true incarnation; the 
journey into the far country would be incomplete. The logic of incarnation, as 
it is revealed in the actuality of incarnation, works according to the totality of 
the event of incarnation. God enters the world so that he is in history, so that 
he is “incognito”,361 hidden in the processes of world-history. Kierkegaard’s 
Anti-Climacus describes the totality of this incognito as an “omnipotently 
maintained incognito”: 
 
Only in this way is there in the profoundest sense ernestness 
concerning his becoming true man; this is also why he suffers through 
the utmost suffering of feeling himself abandoned by God. He is not, 
therefore, at any moment beyond suffering but is actually in suffering, 
and this purely human experience befalls him, that the actuality proves 
to be even more terrible than the possibility, that he who freely 
assumed unrecognizability yet actually suffers as if he were trapped or 
had trapped himself in unrecognizability.362 
  
But, in this incognito, he comes into the history of Israel. It is Israel’s history in 
which he hides and in which he reveals himself. The tension between the 
                                                
360 Ibid., 170. 
361 Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Howard V. Hong, and 
Edna H. Hong, vol. XX, Kierkegaard’s Writings (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), 127-33.  
362 Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 132 
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initial positive assessment of the novum and this later negative assessment can 
be seen in the following passage from Barth, a passage which brings together 
the historical continuity of Jesus vis-à-vis the history of Israel and the fact that 
as God in history, history itself is relativised: 
 
But where in the Old Testament we find Israel, or the king of Israel, in 
the New Testament we find the one Israelite Jesus. He is the object of 
the same electing will of the Creator, the same merciful divine 
faithfulness….He is the Son of the Father with the same singularity and 
exclusiveness. Of course, what is and takes place between Him and the 
Father is relatively much greater, and as the self-humiliation of God 
much more singular, than anything indicated by the father-son 
relationships of the Old Testament. For this one man—it is as if the 
framework is now filled out and burst through—is the Son of God who 
is one with God the Father and is Himself God. God is now not only 
the electing Creator, but the elect creature.363  
  
If the history of Israel is the “framework”, i.e. Jesus is, himself, Israel, this 
framework is “burst through” because Jesus is not just a human standing in 
for Israel as the Messiah, but he is also God standing in as Israel, an 
unprecedented event that can only be held together according to the dialectic 
of the hypostatic union. Discontinuity and continuity, divinity and humanity, 
novum and not novum; When Barth commented that we can speak of God’s 
coming as, “from outside, from above,”364 he was drawing attention to the 
fact that God was doing something from “the aspect of His grace in which He 
does something unnecessary and extravagant, binding and limiting and 
compromising….” That is, the externality that characterises the ‘from’ of the 
divine movement is precisely the freedom of God’s electing grace. This is the 
locus of the continuity that would characterise Barth’s ‘apocalyptic’ theology.  
 After rejecting the Christ-event as a historical novum, Barth turns to the 
history of Israel as the particular history into which Jesus was born to show 
that this history is itself evidence that God’s action in Jesus is “the conclusion 
                                                
363 CD IV.1, 170. 
364 Ibid., 158. 
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and sum of the history of God with the people of Israel.”365 This history as the 
history of God’s work carries on from the history of God in the Old Testament 
in which “He is already on the way into the far country to the extent that it is 
an unfaithful people to whom He gives and maintains His faithfulness.”366 
That which characterises this journey into the far country is, again, grace. 
“The grace and work and revelation of God has [sic] the particular character 
of election.”367 That which makes up the continuity between the Old and New 
Testaments is the electing grace of God who is faithful to a sinful and 
disobedient people. This is why Barth says it is not a historical novum. God 
has been active. We can affirm that the invasive nature of God’s act is invasive 
with respect to human sin and the structures of evil that characterise the 
world in rebellion to God. Barth describes the situation of human rebellion, 
the situation of the human being elected by God as one who in the 
contradiction of rebellion “is broken and destroyed by the greater 
contradiction of God. He cannot stand before Him, and therefore he cannot 
stand at all. He chooses a freedom which is no freedom. He is therefore a 
prisoner of the world-process, of chance, of all-powerful natural and historical 
forces, above all of himself.”368 In this world so enslaved, the only continuity 
one can point toward in order to make sense of the whole of history is the 
grace of God in his election to save. This is not a novum with respect to God, 
but it is a novum with respect to human judgment and the way in which, from 
an anthropological epistemic base, we tell the human story. In other words, 
the Christ event is external with respect to the intra-historical forces of world-
process, forces that would interpret the direction of history according to an 
immanent logic.369 Or, as Paul writes to the Corinthians, “From now on, 
                                                
365 Ibid., 166. 
366 Ibid., 171. 
367 Ibid., 170. 
368 Ibid., 173. 
369 Here, Nathan Kerr is especially helpful, pointing out the way in which 
‘apocalyptic’ directly challenges the “presuppositions of modern theological 
historicism.” Specifically, these presuppositions should be understood as the 
purely immanent forces that direct human politics toward a telos that exists in 
the future. Kerr, following John Howard Yoder, identifies these forces with 
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therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view; even though we 
once knew Christ from a human point of view, we know him no longer in that 
way. So, if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has 
passed away; see, everything has become new! All this is from God, who 
reconciled us to himself through Christ…” (2 Cor. 5.16-18a; NRSV).370  
 According to Bonhoeffer, the unity of the individual (the one who, in 
Paul’s words has, in Christ, become a new creation) is to be found “where 
human beings have been created, or are created anew, and where this creation 
both happens to them and is something in which they participate.”371 The 
location of this unity, the continuity of identity that makes an individual an 
“I”, 
  
must be sought…where human beings must know themselves, without 
interpretation, in clarity and reality. This means they must know that 
their unity and that of their existence is founded alone in God’s Word. 
It is this word that lets them understand themselves as ‘being in Adam’ 
or ‘being in Christ’, as ‘being in the community of faith of Christ’, in 
such a way that the foundation of unity in the Word becomes identical 
with the foundation of that unity in the being in Adam or in Christ. 
This…is not a datum of experience but is given to faith as revelation. 
Only in faith does the unity, the ‘being’, of the person disclose itself.372  
                                                                                                                                       
the Pauline “principalities and powers.” Such an identification cannot, of 
course, be made except from the perspective of the new in Christ. Kerr, Christ, 
History and Apocalyptic, 137-38. 
370 Cf. Wright’s comment in PFG: “And with that new creation… there went a 
new mode of knowing…. For Paul, the point was that the new creation 
launched with Jesus’ resurrection was the renewal of creation, not its abolition 
and replacement; so that the new-creation mode of knowing was a deeper, 
truer, richer mode of knowing about the old creation as well. And with that 
deeper knowing came all sorts of consequences….” p. 1310. Wright’s 
comment seems to miss the “sense of rupture” in Paul’s formulation. We 
might contrast “everything old has passed away” in Paul with “the new 
creation…was…not its abolition and replacement.” Surely Wright is 
concerned to preserve the ‘this-worldliness’ of the Christian faith, but does he 
also neglect the rupture that seems evident here and elsewhere in Paul? 
371 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology 
in Systematic Theology, trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt, vol. 2, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 102. 
372 Ibid., 102-03. 
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If the continuity of history is found in the elective grace of God, the continuity 
of the subject is found in the one who gives the gift of subjectivity, the one 
who creates us anew in Christ. This “in Christ” is a significant aspect of the 
‘apocalyptic’ logic that is being developed here, and will be explored with 
more dogmatic precision in the next chapter. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 We can now see the way in which we can speak of the enslaved cosmos 
and the individual who continues along in its darkness, both of which are in 
need of God’s irruptive act, his act of entering into human existence himself 
and rescuing humanity from slavery to the powers of sin. To the extent that 
the act of God in Jesus Christ is a movement into the darkness of the world, it 
is irruptive; with respect to the path of history apart from God, it is a novum. 
For the present soteriological concern, we can identify continuity only with 
respect to the elective grace of God. The doctrine of election is therefore that 
which holds together, in continuity, the individual human and history. But 
this continuity is only known as the grace of knowledge given in the 
discontinuity of God’s irruptive and salvific act. In this way, the ‘apocalypse’ 
of Jesus Christ demands that we begin with the new beginning, 
hermeneutically, theologically, epistemologically, and historically. 
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CHAPTER 4. Christology and Creation: Furthering the 
‘Apocalyptic’ Logic 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The soteriological rupture articulated in the previous chapter, according 
to an account of ‘apocalyptic’ theology, is grounded in the event of God’s 
revelation in Jesus of Nazareth. Wright’s epistemology has been the occasion 
for this theological critique and for that reason we began with an examination 
of the knowing subject, a move that required that we begin with the 
soteriological rupture of epistemological subjectivity in divine revelation and 
the consequent conceptual problems this raises for hermeneutics and 
historical thinking. Now those problems need to be addressed from within a 
more focused account of Christology. The next step in the sequence, after 
Christology, will be in the direction of the doctrine of creation. This move 
toward the doctrine of creation addresses the metaphysical implications of the 
language of rupture or irruption that ‘apocalyptic’ theology uses. 
 
2. Christology: Anhypostasia and Enhypostasia 
 
 In our ‘apocalyptic’ logic we began with the reconciliation of the 
knowing subject. The next theological move must be to interpret the one who 
has revealed himself in his salvific act, who has given himself as object in 
history for our knowledge and yet who remains subject in relation to that 
history; the next task will be Christology. 
 
For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through 
him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on 
earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross (Col. 
1.19-20, NRSV). 
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 At the very heart of the theological doctrine of the Incarnation is the 
union of the divine and human natures in Jesus the Messiah. Rather than an 
abstraction from the biblical witness, the affirmation of the hypostatic union 
of the divine and human natures in the one hypostasis (e)n du/o fu/sesin 
a0sugxu/twv, a0tre/ptwv, a0diaire/twv, a0xwri/stwv) is a deeper penetration 
into the logic of what it means to call Jesus, “Emmanuel,” “God is with us” 
(Lk. 1.23). But if this is the case, then the move to look closer at this logic will 
also require that we look closer at what the Gospels actually say with respect 
to the historical events in which the one who was, and is, God with us, is 
revealed. For Wright this means especially looking at the actual message of 
Jesus, namely his proclamation of the Kingdom of God.373 But to reiterate, 
knowledge that this is God with us, is not derived from historical reasoning, 
but from the new birth that comes from God. For now the task is to articulate 
a Christology according to the ‘apocalyptic’ logical sequence of 
Reconciliation—Christology—Creation, acknowledging that these are not 
abstract statements, but are rooted in the actual events of God’s self-revelation 
to human history. It is the Gospel and the ground of Christian theology, that 
God has freely revealed himself as both subject and object and that this 
knowledge comes about in a reconciled relationship with God through Jesus 
Christ. It is this God, revealed in this way, of whom theology must speak and 
it cannot do so apart from the sort of confession that Chalcedonian 
Christology affirms. Apart from this, Jesus is just another “crucifiable first-
century Jew”.  
 T. F. Torrance articulates twin doctrines of the hypostatic union, 
anhypostasia and enhypostasia, in such a way that we can map them on to the 
‘apocalyptic’ movement described above, that is, God’s coming to, or invasion 
of, the cosmos. This will help further clarify what we are actually saying when 
we say that the “apocalypse” of Jesus Christ is an “irruption” into the 
                                                
373 I agree with Wright that if we are to talk about the divinity of Christ—as 
we must—we must pay just as much attention to what the Gospel writers 
were trying to say about Jesus, namely “that he really was inaugurating the 
kingdom of God—the kingdom of Israel’s God—on earth as in heaven.” JPPG, 
133. 
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enslaved cosmos. Torrance emphasises that “we cannot think of the 
hypostatic union statically”374 which means that the fact of God’s unity with 
the man Jesus is only known in the dynamic of God’s coming, in the act of God 
making himself known, and as such has the nature of an event. Since God is 
the subject who presents himself to us as object, we cannot say what God is 
without first saying who God is, and therefore, conversely, what God is, is 
who God is. Who God is, is God as he acts to reveal himself and his being 
cannot be abstracted from this act. God is only known as “active subject.”375 
The doctrine of the hypostatic union is, therefore, not a doctrine of God’s 
being, and then a doctrine of that being in relation, but it is a doctrine of 
God’s relation in act and, as such, is a doctrine of God’s being in act.376 It 
follows that the twin doctrines that expound the hypostatic union, 
anhypostasia and enhypostasia, are equally dynamic and relational doctrines 
that describe an event and therefore God’s being through this event. 
 
a. Anhypostasia 
  
 In the anhypostatic movement, God the Son comes to his creation and 
assumes humanity for himself, “in terms of the great divine act of grace in the 
Incarnation.”377 Anhypostasia (an-hypostasia) affirms that Jesus of Nazareth is 
not a person, a hypostasis—or “personal mode of being” (Barth)—apart from 
his union with the Son. This is expressed by Torrance negatively by the 
statement: “apart from the pure act of God in the Incarnation, there would 
have been no Jesus of Nazareth.”378 Dogmatically, this means that Christ’s 
human nature lacks its own personal subsistence apart from the person of the 
Son; the subject that we encounter when we encounter Jesus is the subjectivity 
                                                
374 T. F Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ (Downers Grove, IL: 
IVP Academic, 2008), 85. 
375 Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming, 78. 
376 Cf. Bonhoeffer, Act and Being. 
377 Torrance, Incarnation, 84. 
378 Ibid. 
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of the Son.379 The hypostasis of the Son, as Jesus of Nazareth, is, in Barth’s 
words, “that of the Logos, [and] no other. Jesus Christ exists as a man because 
and as this One exists, because and as He makes human essence His own, 
adopting and exalting it into unity with Himself.”380 The emphasis on human 
essence is important for Torrance because it links the Incarnation with 
humanity, not with a particular human person. He assumed that which 
makes humanity human, and not just one already existing person or 
hypostasis;381 so, following the rule laid down by Gregory of Nazianzus, (“For 
that which He has not assumed He has not healed; but that which is united to 
His Godhead is also saved”)382 he is the saviour of humankind, not just the 
saviour of one man (one human hypostasis). Simply put, the Son does not 
unite himself with a man (homo), but with humanity (humanitas). The 
singularity of Jesus as a man is uniquely subsistent with the divine Logos.383  
                                                
379 Ivor Davidson finds this in Cyril of Alexandria who, “famously contended 
that the Word was united ‘hypostatically’ (kath’hypostasin) with human nature, 
so that the Word was the subject of all the experiences of the enfleshed Christ. 
Logically, therefore, for Cyril, the human nature did not have its own 
hypostasis, but was hypostatised by the Word.” Ivor Davidson, “Theologizing 
the Human Jesus: An Ancient (and Modern) Approach to Christology 
Reassessed,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3, no. 2 (2001), 139. Cf. 
Karl Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, trans. 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley, vol. I (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 157. 
380 CD IV.2, 49. 
381 Oliver D. Crisp’s argument that human nature needs to be understood in 
this formulation according to a concrete-nature view rather than an abstract-
nature view is instructive but, for my purposes here, beyond the needs of the 
argument. However, Crisp’s contribution is important as far as it serves to 
establish the analytic coherence of the an-enhypostatic distinction. Oliver 
Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72-89. 
382 Gregory Nazianzen, “To Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius” in 
Philip Schaff, and Henry Wace, eds. Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nazianzen, vol. 
7, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 
2012), 440.. 
383 The language of “subsistence” is used instead of “existence” for the reason 
that “‘existence’ might imply accidental being, whereas ‘subsistence’ suggests 
necessarily actual being by virtue of—but only by virtue of—assumption by 
the divine hypostasis of the Logos.” Davidson, “Theologizing the Human 
Jesus,”135. 
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 Historically speaking, this means that the Jesus of history is uniquely 
and exclusively identified with the person, or mode of being, of the Son. Jesus 
is not a person apart from the personal identity of the Son. On this positive 
side, then, it is affirmed that, “the truly and fully human life of Jesus is 
grounded in the act of the Son or the Word becoming flesh.”384 Jesus’ 
humanity is true humanity, but it is a humanity in unity with the Son as this 
one, definite, individual (in uno certo individuo).385 “He is a real man only as 
the Son of God.”386 So we affirm one hypostasis, fully human and divine. 
Precisely because of the anhypostatic denial (the hypostatic union of God and 
humanity in the person of Jesus is not separable into two hypostases) the 
union is dynamic; it is a true becoming. God’s being is revealed in his act, and 
this act is not separable from the person of Jesus because the act is a 
‘becoming.’387 “And the Word became (e0ge/neto) flesh and lived among us…” 
(Jn. 1.14a). If we read this doctrine together with both a doctrine of sin and a 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, it becomes an ‘irruptive’ doctrine. God is free with 
respect to creation and this freedom is metaphysically displayed in the 
ontological distinction between God and the world. This ontological 
distinction can be conceived in terms of distance (as in the early Barth of the 
second edition of the Römerbrief) but rather than spatial it is truly ontological, 
meaning that God may be absolutely ‘close’ or absolutely ‘far,’ but the real 
difference is the ontological distinction between the creator and the creation. 
It is the sin of the world with its fallen state that makes the reconciliatory 
dynamic, in biblical imagery, invasive (cf. Col. 2.15). The parousia of the Son of 
God, his “journey into the far country” (Barth)—anhypostasis—is 
unprecedented and radically new, and, from the perspective of immanence, is 
a “breaking-in” from the transcendent.388 Here the anhypostatic side of the an-
enhypostatic distinction is a ‘movement’ from God to humanity in and as the 
                                                
384 Torrance, Incarnation, 84. 
385 CD IV.2, 49. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Cf. Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming. 
388 Here, of course, the language of transcendence and immanence is not 
spatial, but metaphysically based in the ontological distinction between God 
and the world: ontology being a possibility for the world, but not for God. 
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personhood of the Son.389 The full movement can be seen here in Barth’s 
description of this complete movement: 
 
If we put the accent on “flesh,” we make it a statement about God. We 
say—and in itself this constitutes the whole of what is said—that 
without ceasing to be true God, in the full possession and exercise of 
His true deity, God went into the far country by becoming a man in 
His second person or mode of being the Son—the far country not only 
of human creatureliness but also of human corruption and perdition. 
But if we put the accent on “Word,” we make it a statement about man. 
We say—and again this constitutes the whole of what is said—that 
without ceasing to be man, but assumed and accepted in his 
creatureliness and corruption by the Son of God, man—this one Son of 
Man—returned home to where he belonged, to His place as true man, 
to fellowship with God, to relationship with his fellows, to the ordering 
of His inward and outward existence, to the fullness of His time for 
which He was made, to the presence and enjoyment of the salvation for 
which He was destined. The atonement as it took place in Jesus Christ 
is the one inclusive event of this going out of the Son of God and 
coming in of the Son of Man.390 
 
b. Enhypostasia  
 
 We now turn to this second movement, the return of the Son of Man, the 
enhypostatic dynamic that completes the ‘apocalyptic’ movement. In dogmatic 
terms, enhypostasia affirms that “the humanity of Jesus had real existence in 
the person of the eternal Son.”391 This is, as Barth clearly affirms in the above 
passage, from the perspective of the “flesh” or humanity of Jesus. From this 
perspective we speak of the “enhypostasis of the human being of Jesus Christ, 
                                                
389 Crisp critiques the idea that the an-enhypostatic distinction can be read, in 
Barth and Davidson, to be simply a positive and negative aspect of one thing, 
the hypostatic union, and, if so, is not very informative. Yet Torrance’s 
account—and Barth’s—can be understood to be making an important 
distinction between the ‘movements’ in God’s self-revelation. In this way they 
are understood dynamically, contributing to the ‘apocalyptic’ picture that I 
am describing. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 73-75. 
390 CD IV.2, 20-21. 
391 Torrance, Incarnation, 105. 
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His existence in and with the Son of God.”392 This means that humanity, 
Christ’s human nature, is brought into the Godhead in this particular man, 
Jesus of Nazareth, by way of God’s “taking up” humanity into the Trinitarian 
communion, through the one hypostasis that is the Son of God, now fully 
human and fully divine. Because humanity does not exist apart from the 
concrete particularity of individual human persons, humanity cannot be 
assumed apart from its actual en-hypostasis. This ‘movement’ of humanity into 
the being of God is actualised in the one person of Jesus. The second part of 
Gregory of Nazianzus’s axiom—“but that which is united to his Godhead is 
also saved”—reflects this logic in its soteriological implication. It is important 
to make clear, as well, that it is humanity in this one person, Jesus, that is 
taken up. It is not all human persons. Because of this, our salvation must be 
participation in his humanity, a participation given to us through the work of 
the Spirit. Jesus is the new Adam, the one man in whom humanity is 
refocused.  
 Two things need to be said at this point to advance the argument. First, 
this takes us back to the account of participation that T. F. Torrance offers in 
which we see the knowledge relationship between the Father and Son as the 
fulfillment of the human knowledge of God within a sort of closed polarity. 
Knowledge of God is realised for humanity only in the knowledge that the Son 
has of the Father. We are given the gift of participation in this knowledge by the 
gift of the Spirit, who, in the act of rebirth, makes us to be subjects, in Christ, 
of God as Object. In this way God remains both Object and Subject of human 
knowledge and humans can know God only through the divine act of the 
Spirit. The unity of Object and Subject are therefore described according to the 
orthodox Trinitarian affirmation of the homoousion, an affirmation that is 
preserved in the pneumatological account because the Spirit, too, is affirmed 
as homoousion with the Father and the Son. We know God, therefore, only 
through God; we know the Father in the Son, through the Spirit.  
 Second, this allows us to focus on the singularity of the history of Jesus 
the Messiah as the historical focus of what it means to be a human subject. 
                                                
392 CD IV.2, 53. 
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This is because it is as this one man Jesus of Nazareth, that the divine Logos, 
the Son of God, redeems and restores humanity and so humanity is redeemed 
in him, and is restored to knowledge of the Father. This is the import of the 
enhypostatic movement, in which humanity in essence (humanitas) is taken up 
into the singular hypostasis of the divine Logos. Humanity is now understood 
as revealed in this singular history of this one man. The universal is narrowed 
into the particular. 
 If in the Incarnation God gives himself, as the Son, to be known in his 
subjectivity to humanity, and then restores human knowledge of God in 
himself, as both subject and object of knowledge, where does that leave us? 
Where does that leave the humanity that God assumed in the actual event of 
incarnation, a humanity that is necessarily part of the human community—
society, history, culture, etc.—in which the Subjectivity of the Son was an 
actuality given to history? If the Incarnation is, epistemologically, a closed 
polarity, does it not therefore make Jesus’ time here with us incidental? And 
yet, the doctrine of the Incarnation and the hypostatic union are profound 
precisely because of the unity that is understood between God and humanity. 
Jesus’ is not a truncated humanity, he is not a fleshly shell only to be 
abandoned, but a real human subject as the one subjectivity of the Son. It is 
human subjectivity taken up into the subjectivity of the Son as one 
subjectivity that makes the Incarnation such a profound and transformative 
doctrine for our understanding of what it means to be reconciled to God. The 
“closed polarity” of the an-enhypostatic movement is only closed as it includes 
humanity in the dynamic sweep of God’s movement into human history and 
back, with humanity, into the divine life and knowing relationship between 
the Father and the Son in the Spirit.  
 But can the Son’s subjectivity in history be inadvertently isolated from 
the world of history by closing the loop and speaking of a closed polarity 
apart from humanity? What of the effects of this one historical subject in 
history, given as effects of a theanthropic presence, but nevertheless effects 
that can be known and studied in the normal methods of historical research? 
Anhypostatically, when one is investigating the person of Jesus Christ—his 
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aims and intentions as well as his acts—one is investigating the one divine 
subject, the Son of God. Yet, enhypostatically, when one is doing this, one is 
also investigating the fully human nature of this one divine subject. How does 
one investigate, according to the normal methods of the historian, the 
subjectivity of the Son of God, even as he is given to us in his assumed full 
humanity?393 On the other hand, how does one formulate theological dogmas 
of the one subjectivity that is the Son without paying close attention to the 
historical contexts that provide the connection of his humanity to humanity at 
large? Is this connection merely incidental? How are they related, the 
historical to the divine subject?  
 These questions will be addressed in due course, but at this point it 
remains to be seen how the Bible understands the participation of the 
individual subject in the humanity of Jesus Christ. This participation, rather 
than being an abstract, spiritual retreat from history, is instead a subjective 
refiguring of the history of the individual around the personal history of Jesus 
of Nazareth. This way the historical question begins to be answered by 
attention to the Christian practice/sacrament of baptism. We began with 
soteriological arguments regarding human subjectivity, yet these arguments 
remained somewhat abstract until they could be fleshed out according to a 
more robust Christology. Here, as we begin to consider baptism, the 
soteriological dimension is given rich, Christological and ecclesial content.  
 
c. Baptism: Romans 6.1-11 
 
                                                
393 It must be made clear that this way of speaking about the one subjectivity 
of the Son is not a way of saying that the man Jesus was not a human person. 
If we were to say that he is not a human person, then we would be denying 
the Incarnation. If we were to affirm that he is two subjects (one human and 
one divine) that would fail the Chalcedonian test of Christological orthodoxy. 
If he was a human subject given a divine essence, then that would deny the 
eternal existence of the hypostasis of the Son, since his hypostatic existence 
would be dependent on the existence of the human, finite, hypostasis of Jesus 
of Nazareth. It remains that we need to affirm the one subjectivity of the fully 
human, fully divine, Jesus of Nazareth that is identical to the one person of 
the eternal Son. 
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 Human participation in the particular humanity that is Jesus’ life is not 
given to us according to a general participation in humanity, but is given to us 
as a participation in the life of one man. In this one man is the unity of subject 
and object, a unity in which the origin and goal of humanity is realised in 
history and this one man is given so that all may participate in his new 
humanity. This participation is focused on the Christian baptismal practice in 
which the individual human finds his or her humanity redeemed in the one 
human who died and rose again. Baptism is that central, identity-determining 
practice in which we find the anhypostatic/enhypostatic dynamic proclaimed in 
such a way that it includes the individual, through the Spirit, in its dynamic, 
and forms through identification a new humanity determined by the risen 
and ascended Jesus.  
 Paul, in Romans 6, asks, “Do you not know that all of us who have been 
baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised into his death? Therefore we have 
been buried with him by baptism into death, so that, just as Christ was raised 
from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of 
life” (Rom 6.3-4; NRSV). If, as Paul says, Christians are, first, baptised into his 
death, then the epistemological position that has been articulated herein with 
reference to Torrance and Kierkegaard begins, not with a simple transitional, 
revelational experience, but with a mortal crisis! Death precedes resurrection. 
This raises the question of continuity. If the subjectivity required for 
theological knowledge is given as a requisite condition by God, and this 
condition is understood in conjunction with the death of Jesus, a death in 
which the subject participates through baptism, then how is it that the human 
subject can be understood in continuity? If new creation, or death and 
resurrection, are the motifs governing this theological grammar, then the 
issues of continuity and discontinuity are given a certain biblical clarity in 
baptism. 
 In baptism the continuity of a disciple’s life is identified with the life of 
Jesus. The significance of this is that the resurrection, an actual event in the 
life of Jesus, is claimed by Paul to be an actual event that each baptised 
believer can expect in his or her own future, after death. “For if we have been 
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united with him in a death like his, we will certainly be united with him in a 
resurrection like his” (Rom. 6.5; NRSV). If Jesus’ resurrection was an actual 
resurrection—a return to physical life from the death of the body—then the 
resurrection the believer expects is also a physical resurrection. The future 
holds out the sure hope that there will be resurrection from the dead, that is, 
an actual, future historical occurrence. What does it mean, then, that the 
baptised subject is to expect a death like his? Is such a death just as certain as 
the resurrection is certain? Is water baptism to be understood as that death? 
My suggestion is that the act of going in (or under) the water, symbolically or 
actually, rather than being simply a remembrance of Jesus’ death, or a 
sacramentally effectual washing, or a crossing of the Jordan, or an ordeal that 
must be gone through symbolically,394 is in fact the pledge that the life the 
baptised will now live is a life of discipleship lived on the way to the cross. 
This is the corollary of the equally important point that the life of the baptised, 
after baptism, is lived in the light of the still future resurrection. That is, we 
need to correlate two deaths: the still future death of the individual and the 
death of Jesus. So the cross of Jesus, in baptism, has a twofold effect. 
 First, it is Jesus’ act, his death, on behalf of the baptised. The old 
humanity, in Adam, is judged and killed, taken up by God himself, “the judge 
judged in our place” (Barth): the anhypostatic dynamic in the hypostatic union. 
For that reason sin no longer has final dominion over humanity. “We know 
that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be 
destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin” (6.6). This has been 
done for humanity in the one God-man Jesus. Paul continues his argument: 
“whoever has died is freed from sin” (v. 7). This means that, because of the 
resurrection of Christ, death holds no more dominion over him (v. 9). The 
dominion of death, its logic that subjects every decision to the fear and the 
finality of death, is broken, and humanity is free; this freedom is claimed and 
realised in baptism. In baptism, the human individual dies with Christ, 
participating in his death, and is therefore freed from this logic. The 
individual is no longer a slave to the tyranny of sin and the force that it plays 
                                                
394 Although it may indeed be all of these things, too. 
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in determining a life lived according to fear inherent in the ultimate finality of 
death. But then, in verse 12, Paul exhorts the Roman church, “Therefore, do 
not let sin exercise dominion in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their 
passions.” Why, if death has happened in baptism, must we still find sin 
exercising dominion? 
 The answer to this question, and the second effect of the cross for 
baptism, is that the cross remains ever before the baptised as the determining 
factor for an individual life. Christian life is lived toward the cross. The 
answer must be that just as the resurrection awaits the baptised individual’s 
future (although it is already a reality in Christ), so too, death still awaits, so 
that its logic and dominion remain always before the believer, as a reality that 
remains determinative for the future. Baptism, however, provides the 
baptised with a new frame of reference in which to understand this future, 
namely the cross—or the death—of Jesus. This means that the life lived toward 
each individual’s own future death is to be shaped according to the life Jesus 
lived toward his own death. Jesus’ sinless life, in which he took up humanity 
in its sinfulness, was lived free from the constraining logic of death and is to 
be the new model for the life of the disciple, lived toward his or her own still-
future death. In this way baptism identifies the individual’s future death with 
Christ’s own death, giving life meaning according to that which gave his life 
meaning. Because life lived toward the cross is not determined by death, but 
by resurrection—that is, the faithfulness of God—the witness of Christian 
living is to the resurrection. This patterning in baptism is what C. Kavin Rowe 
identifies with the missionaries in the book of Acts.  
 
The life of the missionar[y]…is in essence a life of response, an 
alternative way of being in the world that takes as its pattern the life of 
the one to whom they bear witness. Differently said, Acts does not 
construe “witness” monothematically as the proclamation of Jesus’s 
resurrection—preaching the word, as it were—but more 
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comprehensively as living out the pattern of life that culminates in 
resurrection.395 
 
 Baptism witnesses to the rupture that was Jesus’ death and resurrection 
and identifies that rupture as determinative for the rupture that occurs as 
humans are made subjects to the knowledge of God. Baptism is the new birth 
or new creation of humans into a reconciled relationship with God. The 
fullness of this reconciliation is in Christ, in whom the baptised participate by 
the Spirit. But for each individual who remains in the time before death, this 
time is characterised according to the tension between future death and future 
resurrection. The tension, however, is not dialectical for the very reason that 
resurrection is more determinative than death. This robs death of its finality 
and frees human lives from the logic of death, from its determinative “sting.” 
The baptised participate through the Spirit in Christ’s life now, but 
nevertheless remain in this tension: reconciled yet in a world in which the old 
Adam remains. On the one hand, the point that all of this makes with respect 
to history, to the extent that human lives are given meaning in the life of Jesus, 
is that the collective meaning of lives not baptised can only be death. That 
means that human history, even the history of the baptised, plods along its 
way to death, even the death of the cross. On the other hand, the collective 
meaning of the lives of those who have been baptised can never be the finality 
of their own deaths (for they will still die), but will find collective meaning—
history—in the one history of Jesus the Messiah. 
 
3. Creation and ‘Apocalyptic’  
 
 The third movement in what I am calling the logic of ‘apocalyptic’ 
theology is that it moves theology from the epistemic base of reconciliation to 
the dynamic of Christological participation through the Spirit, and only then 
                                                
395 C. Kavin Rowe, World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the Graeco-Roman Age 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 153. 
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can turn to say something about the creation. The following words from 
MacKinnon help to describes this movement: 
 
The doctrine of creation trembles, as it were, on a tight rope between 
the fields of natural and revealed theology. For, though in the classical 
natural theology of St. Thomas the quinque viae might be thought to 
yield us a creator, the whole mystery of creation can only be penetrated 
(in a manner proportionate to our understanding, be it insisted), when 
in the Incarnation of His Son God finally and once for all disclosed His 
love for man. For in and through His own self-imposed act of self-
disclosure we are in a measure privileged to scan the being of God 
Himself and therefore to dare to frame the question—‘Why did God 
create?’396 
 
For MacKinnon the question “Why?” is the key to the metaphysical puzzle, 
since metaphysics attempts to account for the contingent by appeal to the 
necessary. But the reason the necessary brings forth the contingent cannot be 
shown, and so metaphysics remains a problem. In Christian theology this 
question is thrust back on God, and as such must be focused on the revelation 
of God’s answer to the “why” question. That question, now echoing 
Bonhoeffer, is directed to the question, “Who?”397 since the revelation of 
God’s being is located in the person of Jesus Christ. However, the need for a 
metaphysical link between the necessary and the contingent is never satisfied 
for the very same reason that grounds the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo: God is a 
free creator. No necessity links the contingent and the necessary except the 
freedom of God who creates out of nothing. 
 There are two significant reasons for carrying the logic of ‘apocalyptic’ to 
the doctrine of creation. The first is that opposition toward an ’apocalyptic’ 
theology focuses on its assumed metaphysical dualism, implied by spatial 
metaphors, and supported by invasive language. If God has to invade from 
outside, where was he? “Invasive” language appears to favor discontinuity at 
                                                
396 MacKinnon, Philosophy and the Burden of Theological Honesty, 141. 
397 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “Lectures on Christology,” in Berlin: 1932-1933, ed. 
Larry L. Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press), 302. 
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the expense of continuity, thereby disrupting any sense of historical 
continuity or overarching context, narrative, worldview, or ontology, that 
consistently accounts for the whole of life in creation. Second, a doctrine of 
creation ‘apocalyptically’ construed, counters other formulations of creation 
theology that undermine the ‘apocalyptic’ dynamic that I have articulated 
thus far. Creation is an essential piece of the ‘apocalyptic’ logic. To make this 
claim, it will be helpful to look at one alternative account of the relationship 
between continuity and discontinuity in the doctrine of creation. Although 
there are far more than just this one, the selection that follows will serve to 
orient the argument in such a way that the reasons for choosing an 
‘apocalyptic’ approach will become clear. 
  
a. Creation Order  
 
 One common theological approach for the sake of maintaining 
ontological or conceptual continuity within the created world is through an 
appeal to an original created order. If the creation itself can be understood to 
possess, or be characterised by, an order that is trans-lapsarian and God-given, 
then the created order of the world itself is the continuity necessary for 
making sense of temporal life. A path can be traced from the contingency of 
existence back to the divinely ordained, and therefore necessary, created 
order. This provides norms for human agency in history. One example of this 
is the moral theology of Oliver O’Donovan.398 O’Donovan articulates one way 
of arriving at a theological account of order that also attempts to affirm a 
revelational (‘apocalyptic’?) perspective alongside the continuity provided by 
an appeal to created order. 
 
...we are constantly presented with the unacceptably polarized choice 
between an ethic that is revealed and has no ontological grounding and 
an ethic that is based on creation and so is naturally known. This 
                                                
398 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical 
Ethics, 2nd ed., (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994). 
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polarization deprives redemption and revelation of their proper 
theological meaning as the divine reaffirmation of created order. . . . it 
is the gospel of the resurrection that assures us of the stability and permanence 
of the world which God has made. . . . In the sphere of revelation, we will 
conclude, and only there, can we see the natural order as it really is 
and overcome the epistemological barriers to an ethic that conforms to 
nature.399 
  
For his part, Wright follows O’Donovan and this line of reasoning, especially 
with respect to the history of the resurrection and its significance for 
epistemology. In an interesting essay, Wright agrees—tentatively—with the 
claim that the resurrection is the starting-point for a Christian epistemology. 
Yet, an epistemology begun in resurrection, turns us back to the created order 
and the naturalistic epistemologies by validating that order, a validation 
warranted by the assertion that the resurrection affirms the goodness of 
“God’s present creation.”400 The tension between the new (discontinuity) and 
the constant (continuity) can be seen where Wright recounts the limits of 
natural epistemologies. “A resurrection-based epistemology, in other words, 
while being significantly new, might nevertheless affirm the goodness of non-
resurrection-based historical knowledge, even while recognizing, as such 
knowledge itself sometimes insists, that it cannot reach beyond the 
naturalistic and even reductionistic account such as we find in Troeltsch.”401  
 Appeals like O’Donovan’s or Wright’s use the resurrection as a means of 
turning us back to the ontology of the created order as the source for either 
moral norms or as a validation of natural epistemologies.402 Even if those 
norms are learned through the revelational act of God in Jesus Christ, the 
                                                
399 Ibid., 19-20. Italics added for emphasis. 
400 N. T. Wright, “Resurrection: From Theology to Music and Back Again,” in 
Sounding the Depths: Theology Through the Arts, ed. Jeremy Begbie (London: 
SCM Press, 2002), 208. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Based on this essay, Wright would want to say more than just this since the 
point he is making is that the resurrection is the valid starting point for a 
Christian epistemology. Regardless, the effect is seen in the short-comings of 
his CRw, namely that it does not allow for the reality of God and God’s 
continuing activity to inform the interpretative method.  
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‘rupture’ nevertheless affirms a prior and more basic creation order, turning 
us to a doctrine of creation that can be constructed apart from the resurrection. 
It can be constructed apart form the resurrection because the resurrection is 
only a validation or affirmation of an already existing order; the resurrection 
is valued in this way according to its importance as a signifier. The order itself 
does not change in any fundamental way based on the ontological reality of the 
resurrection.  
 ‘Apocalyptic’ theology offers a dual critique. First, the biblical witness to 
the revelation of God in Jesus Christ points us to a new creation rather than to 
a restored old creation. Even if God’s work of new creation is considered 
more of a transfiguration rather than a complete destruction and re-creation, 
it nevertheless maintains its focus on the revelation of that order in the 
resurrected Lord, and not in the creation itself, a creation, it should be noted, 
that has not been resurrected (Rom. 8.18-25).403 Second, the apocalypse of 
Jesus Christ invites our participation in the new creation by way of baptism, 
of death and resurrection into Christ’s life, not into a renewed creation now 
(e.g. 2 Cor. 5.1-5; 1 Peter 1. 3-5). For now it is enough that O’Donovan and 
Wright show us one way that continuity and discontinuity can be related in a 
way that is very different from an ‘apocalyptic’ theology. This difference can 
be identified with clarity if the question is focused on the ontological locus of 
continuity. For the creation order account, continuity is guaranteed by the 
ontological unity of the creation itself (even if guaranteed by God). For the 
‘apocalyptic’ account, continuity is guaranteed by God’s action of raising 
Jesus from the dead, an ontologically unique and novel event. 
 The importance of thinking together soteriology and the doctrine of 
creation can be seen in the contrast between the creation order approach and 
the ‘apocalyptic’. O’Donovan emphasizes the continuity and stability of a 
normative created order, validated by the resurrection. Salvation is 
understood in this view in restorative terms, even if the attempt is made to 
                                                
403 The argument in Romans that the creation waits to be set free from its 
bondage to decay is not a look back to the created order, but a look to the 
“freedom of the glory of the children of God,” arguably a reference to the 
glory that we have in the (resurrected) Messiah (cf. 8.17). 
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describe it eschatologically.404 The ‘apocalyptic’ approach emphasizes the 
discontinuity of the soteriological event and de-emphasizes any positive gain 
from an appeal to creation order (unless that order is Christologically 
determined). 
 
b. Creation, Soteriology, and the ‘Apocalyptic’ Imagination: Clarifying 
Tensions  
 
 There are several important strands in the ‘apocalyptic’ imagination that 
are not operative in the creation order schema and that create difficulty 
communicating between the two positions: 1) the opposition, in spatial terms, 
of God and the world; 2) the Marcionite possibility of an opposition between 
a distant (alien) God and the God of creation who is known according to the 
world; 3) the revolutionary character and pathos of the alien God; and 4) the 
eschatological character of this God who “promises new things.” The first two 
characteristics bring to our attention the relationship between God and 
creation. How God is said to relate to creation determines to a great extent the 
way in which we articulate our knowledge of his acts and the way in which 
we understand the continuity of those acts. Is God in the world? Is he part of 
the world? Does he exist away from the world, outside of it? Assuming that 
there is no real temptation to affirm two oppositional deities as did Marcion, 
is there nevertheless a tension between the God of ‘apocalyptic’ theology and 
a creator God so that Marcion’s ghost must always haunt ‘apocalyptic’ 
theology? Is there a possibility of an ‘apocalyptic’ doctrine of creation?  
 The second two questions address, loosely, the question of soteriology. 
For the ‘apocalyptic’ theologians, how does God save? The use of metaphors 
like “irruption”, “invasion”, etc., suggest a particular spatial relationship to 
the world, but they also suggest a soteriological orientation, one characterised 
by movement, force, action, and even violence. The question that this raises 
for our overall question of theological epistemology and its relationship with 
historical method, given that theological epistemology is rightly located 
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within a doctrine of reconciliation, is whether the ‘apocalyptic’ proposal is 
adequate to the metaphysical dimensions of the question (the question of 
God’s relationship to the world; creation and spatial questions) and the 
soteriological dimensions (the question of problem and solution; history and 
theology).  
 Our concern throughout this chapter has been an interaction with 
‘apocalyptic’ theology, tracing its dogmatic implications from soteriology to 
Christology and now to creation, with an eye toward its implications for the 
epistemological relationship between history and theology. Martyn’s work, as 
a key genealogical source for this new ‘apocalyptic’, is illustrative of the way 
in which the soteriological and creation dimensions interact. With respect to 
the creational question of space, we can, with clarity, see the way spatial 
metaphors operate in Martyn’s ‘apocalyptic’ in his assumption of the 
designation “cosmological apocalyptic eschatology,” drawing on the work of 
his student Martinus C. de Boer.405 Martyn proposes to read Pauline 
apocalyptic (in Galatians) according to an image of cosmic liberation. 
“Specifically, both God’s sending of Christ to suffer death on behalf of 
humanity (the cross) and Christ’s future coming (the parousia) are invasive acts 
of God. And their being invasive acts—into space that has temporarily fallen 
out of God’s hands—points to the liberating war that is crucial to Paul’s 
apocalyptic theology.”406 In the notes on Gal. 4.4407 he writes, “Redemption 
has occurred in the human orb via an invasion that had its origins outside 
that orb.” The language of invasion is distinctive of Martyn’s work and, when 
combined with the extensive use of “apocalypse” and “apocalyptic,” creates a 
powerful imagery that, of itself, contributes to the way his theological claims 
are read. A further comment on Gal. 4.3-5, a text Martyn sees as “the 
                                                
405 Cf. Martyn, Galatians, 97n.51.; and most recently, Martinus C. de Boer, 
Galatians: A Commentary, The New Testament Library (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 31-35. 
406 Martyn, Galatians, 105. 
407 “But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a 
woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the 
law, so that we might receive adoption as children” NRSV. 
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theological center of the entire epistle,”408 reveals, again, language that relies 
upon metaphors of spatial distance and active invasive movement: “In short, 
the Son’s sending is an invasion of cosmic scope, reflecting the apocalyptic 
certainty that redemption has come from outside, changing the very world in 
which human beings live, so that it can no longer be identified simply as ‘the 
present evil age’ (1:4). In this sense the Son is a distinctly other-worldly figure 
who has his origin in God.”409 Martyn’s language is decidedly spatial and 
mythological.  
 This spatial imagery contributes to the way in which the soteriological 
dimensions of Martyn’s ‘apocalyptic’ are worked out. The plight that Martyn 
sees from Paul’s letter to the Galatian church is cosmic in scope, larger than 
the unique plight of Israel—although inclusive of it410—and describable in 
terms that go beyond modern notions of sin as personal guilt—although 
inclusive of this as well.411 
 
God has invaded the world in order to bring it under his liberating 
control. From that deed of God a conclusion is to be drawn, and the 
conclusion is decidedly apocalyptic: God would not have to carry out 
an invasion in order merely to forgive erring human beings. The root 
trouble lies deeper than human guilt, and it is more sinister. The whole 
of humanity—indeed, the whole of creation (3:22)—is, in fact, trapped, 
enslaved under the power of the present evil age. That is the 
background of God’s invasive action in his sending of Christ, in his 
declaration of war, and in his striking the decisive and liberating blow 
against the power of the present evil age.412 
 
From the perspective of plight, we see that Martyn’s interpretation is cosmic 
and spatial in scope, whereas in Wright’s articulation of the plight, located in 
Israel’s self-understanding as a nation called into existence by their God, the 
                                                
408 Martyn, Galatians, 406. 
409 Ibid., 408. Cf. Ibid., 105. 
410 Ibid., 390. Here, “inclusive of it” can be read rather as if it had been 
subsumed under the larger, more determined category of “cosmic element.” 
411 Ibid., 97. 
412 Ibid., 105. 
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plight is existential and historical, having to do with their existence as a 
people in history.413 For Wright, God is there, in history, with his people, 
bringing their history to a climax. For Martyn, God is presumed distant from 
a world given over to evil powers, and this distance necessitates nothing less 
than an invasion. 
 These two aspects of the plight that salvation addresses, its cosmic 
dimension and historical context in the history of Israel, can be reconciled if 
we look back to the previous chapter and reiterate Barth’s account of “The 
Way of the Son of God into the Far Country.”414 In this section, as we have 
seen, the metaphor of movement from one place to another is given its proper 
‘apocalyptic’ emphasis with respect to the “invasive” nature of a particular 
event, the relationship of that event to the plight that is both cosmic in scope, 
and historic in nature, and a consistently maintained commitment to the 
epistemological priority of the Christ event. All of these are held together in 
Barth’s theology by the doctrine of election. Election grounds the continuity of 
history and the subject but preserves the apocalyptic dynamic. By looking at 
Barth we can see how the main concerns of this section, namely the 
relationship between soteriology and a doctrine of creation are addressed as 
the tensions inherent in the ‘apocalyptic’ continuity-discontinuity are given a 
dogmatic resolution. Nevertheless, if the soteriological problems are 
addressed in Barth, what about the creational question? Is there a material 
continuity, derived from the doctrine of creation, that contradicts the 
‘apocalyptic’ perspective? 
 
c. Creatio ex nihilo: The Metaphysics of God’s Freedom 
 
 The doctrine of creation, as we have seen, can function as a stabilizing 
doctrine, using the language of order to establish ontological continuity. The 
way order functions is to give both material reality and social reality a 
                                                
413 This, of course, has a bearing on the cosmos as well, but the differences in 
emphasis should be clear. 
414 CD IV.1, pp. 157-210. 
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stability and normativity that grounds human epistemological enterprises, 
enterprises such as history, sociology, and the natural sciences. So, for 
example, if we know God through history, that means that he has a 
relationship with human history in which he is given to be known according 
to the norms of human knowledge of past events. However, if God’s 
relationship to history is other than this, if the continuity, the stability that 
makes knowledge of anything possible, is grounded in God’s elective grace—
if it is ‘apocalyptic’—then the doctrine of creation must be articulated so that 
creation order is understood with respect to this contingency, rather than as 
an epistemological ground in its own right. If the continuity that makes 
knowledge of God possible is the elective (and therefore active) grace of God, 
seen supremely in the resurrection, then the appropriate way to describe the 
metaphysical relationship between God and creation is through the doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo maintains two key 
affirmations essential to an ‘apocalyptic’ account of creation: a) the absolute 
distinction between God and the world and, b) the freedom of the creator. But 
before considering these two affirmations in detail, it must be seen in what 
way the doctrine relates to Christology since Jesus the Messiah is the person 
and event that centres our epistemological project. 
 “The world exists in the midst of nothing, which means in the beginning. 
This means nothing else than that it exists wholly by God’s freedom.”415 
Bonhoeffer’s articulation of creation from nothing in his lectures on Genesis 1-
3 is instructive because he grounds our knowledge of the doctrine in the 
resurrection. This gives a Christological priority to the doctrine of creation 
and locates our knowledge of God’s creative act definitively in the revelation 
of God in Jesus. “The world exists in the beginning in the sign of the 
resurrection of Christ from the dead.”416 The editor of Bonhoeffer’s lectures 
references at this point a quotation from Willhelm Vischer: “As absurd as it 
may seem to base the exposition of the first book of Moses on the Easter faith, 
                                                
415 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, 
trans. Douglas Stephen Bax, vol. 3, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 34. 
416 Ibid., 34-35. 
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so much does it make sense and so pertinent and essential is it to do so. For 
the Easter message is the verification of the message of the creation story, and 
the message of the creation story is the presupposition of the Easter 
message.”417 This is, of course, similar to the argument advanced by 
O’Donovan and affirmed by Wright. Yet with Bonhoeffer we have, rather 
than a validation of the created order, the validation of the freedom of God in 
the creation of the world, known in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. 
The affirmation is theological, rooted in God and God’s act, not creational, i.e. 
rooted in our knowledge of the created world. Does this mean that creation is 
not affirmed in the resurrection? Not at all! Creation is affirmed, but it does 
not become epistemologically central. The resurrection affirms the value and 
goodness of creation, but because this affirmation comes from the freedom of 
God, God is the only epistemological ground for knowledge of the 
relationship between the creator and the creation. There is no necessity in the 
resurrection or in the creation, but God’s freedom to bring into being that 
which is not (Rom. 4.17).418 Furthermore, the resurrection points to the new 
ontological quality of the resurrection and not to the existing (groaning) 
creation. Of course, the doctrine of creation out of nothing is not a novelty 
unique to the Christian faith,419 but with the Christian faith it is reoriented 
hermeneutically to the resurrection. Reoriented accordingly, the two 
doctrines—creatio ex nihilo and resurrection—mutually inform each other. So 
Bonhoeffer writes, “There is absolutely no transition, no continuum between 
the dead Christ and the resurrected Christ, but the freedom of God that in the 
beginning created God’s work out of nothing.”420  
 There is also no reason to think that the emphasis here on creation out of 
nothing nullifies any account of creation order, for surely God’s creation is 
ordered. To think otherwise would be verging on nonsense, since any act of 
                                                
417 Ibid., 35 n. [32]. 
418 Rom. 4.17 brings together the resurrection and creation in the context of the 
calling into existence the people of Israel out of Abraham. In each of these 
cases it is the freedom of God’s elective grace that is at work. 
419 Cf. David B. Burrell, C.S.C., “Creatio Ex Nihilo Recovered,” Modern Theology 
29, no. 2 (2013): 5-21. 
420 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 35. 
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communication presumes order. And if the Genesis creation account affirms 
anything it is that God brought order out of chaos.421 Rather, given what is 
revealed in the resurrection—the new life of Jesus, the firstborn of creation 
and the firstborn from the dead (Col. 1.15-18)422—Christian theology looks to 
the resurrected Lord for knowledge of creation and the created order. 
Furthermore, the classical doctrine of creatio ex nihilo does not reject, nor 
replace, the concept of a created order. As Eric Osborn points out with respect 
to Irenaeus’s formulation of the doctrine, God as architect and king are held 
together in the doctrine of creation out of nothing: “creation of matter and the 
shaping of the world are two aspects of a single act by God who is both supreme king 
and wise architect.”423 That is, both God’s lordship and his act of creating order 
are grounded in the free act of God, according to his will, rather than 
according to his being.424  
 But this means that the doctrine of creation articulated in terms of creatio 
ex nihilo is not first of all a doctrine about temporal origins, one that teaches 
the first cause in a causal chain, but rather it is a doctrine that articulates 
particular nuances of the ontological and metaphysical relationship of God to 
creation. If approached from the direction of soteriology, it does this 
according to the reality of the Incarnation, the presence of God as and in the 
person of Jesus the Messiah. God’s presence as this man is not the presence of 
a higher form of being made into a lower form of being, but is, rather, the 
unprecedented entrance of the creator of all things into the creation which he 
has made (Jn. 1.3; Col. 1.15-20). It is the dynamic of ‘entrance’ in the 
Incarnation that introduces the need for an account of the metaphysical 
distinction implied in that dynamic. If the distinction between the creator and 
                                                
421 Cf. CD III.1, 123. 
422 I take this to be the point in Colossians, not to point us to a creation order, 
or affirm such an order, but to show that the creation is known in its 
relationship to and dependence upon Jesus. 
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the creation, ‘transgressed’ in the Incarnation, is pressed, we find that it is the 
doctrine of creation out of nothing that most satisfactorily answers the 
questions and articulates the distinction between God and creation that we 
see in the one man Jesus the Messiah.  
 Because we are beginning with soteriology, the distinction between God 
and the world appears first and foremost as a relation. The nature of that 
relation, revealed in the person of Jesus, is elucidated in its distinctive form 
for creation theology by the absolute distinction between God and the world. 
God is absolutely other than the created world, an otherness that is 
dogmatically grounded in the affirmation that he created the world out of 
nothing, by divine fiat; God spoke, and the world came into existence. 
“Nothing” in this sense is not another way of saying God created out of 
“something” which is cleverly being called “nothing.” Rather, nothing truly is 
nothing (or, nothing truly isn’t). The key to articulating the distinction 
between God and the world is to take great care with any implied “either-or” 
logic or dualism in our talk about God and the world. First, this means that 
we do not say “God and the world are one”. God is ontologically distinct 
from the world. But second, we must also be careful about the way we say 
that “God and the world are two”. This especially is the case if by ‘two’ we 
are implying two realities subsumed under one ontological category. It is 
imperative to recognise that when we speak of the reality of God and the 
world we recognise that both are neither necessary beings nor contingent 
beings. Rather, God is a necessary being and the world is a contingent being. 
Indeed, God and world are both real, although, as should be clear from the 
above, God and the world do not compete for ontological space: God’s way of 
being and the world’s way of being are absolutely distinct. “God is not an 
oppositional reality…not a being among beings, not a power among 
powers.”425 Because of this there is no reason to say that the absolute 
distinction between God and the world carries the implication that God is far 
removed or far away form the world. Just the opposite is true. It means that 
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there is no ontological barrier, however large or small, that would introduce a 
competitive barrier to God’s presence. Robinette clarifies this point: 
 
Although on our “side” of this qualitative distinction we might 
conventionally speak of transcendence as “beyond” the world and 
immanence “within” it, a more consistent way of putting the matter is 
that the self-bestowal of the wholly transcendent God is “the most 
immanent factor in the creature.” God is nearer to me that I am to 
myself, as Augustine declares.426 
 
But his absolute distinction from the world is a barrier for those created, since 
we are made in contingency, dependent upon God’s own freedom to reveal, 
to make himself known. His closeness to us is just that—his.  
 The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo teaches us that God is absolutely distinct 
from the world so that his transcendence is unlimited, as well as his 
immanence. We can chase down the trail of contingency toward some 
metaphysical resolution, but in the end all we end up with is more 
contingency, not the necessity and universality we are looking for. If we peer 
beyond this from where we stand to speak in protological terms on the basis 
of what has been made, we necessarily err. Irenaeus corrects our attempts to 
say more in this regard: 
 
Moreover we shall go wrong if we affirm the same thing concerning 
the origin of matter, namely that God produced it, for we have learned 
from the scriptures that God holds primacy over all things. But whence 
did he produce it and how? That, scripture nowhere explains, and we 
have no right, with our own opinions, to launch ourselves into an 
unending sea of fantasy concerning God; we must leave such 
knowledge to God.427 
 
                                                
426 Ibid., 534. Internal quote is from Karl Rahner, “Immanent and 
Transcendent Consummation of the World,” in Theological Investigations (New 
York: Seabury, 1978), 281. 
427 Quoted in Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 72-73. 
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What we know in scripture is that God created, he acted, and there is no more 
that we know regarding the “how” of that act other than metaphors and 
anthropomorphisms. Neither are we given the “why” of that except in the 
perspective gained by God’s act of redemption. Creatio ex nihilo, as a 
metaphysical corollary of soteriology and Christology, serves to emphasize 
the limits to what we can say about creation from the basis of the creation 
itself. But these limits tell us something important. Were we to look for an 
answer to the question “why” God created in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
we would come up empty. On its own, that there is a creation, even that a god 
created, gives us nothing to say with respect to divine rationale. In other 
words, we are not given the divine deliberation “behind the scenes,” as it 
were, regarding God’s decision to create. But this is not to affirm that the 
creation of the world was an arbitrary act. Eberhard Jüngel argues that to 
claim such arbitrariness is to reject theology itself, since if it were the case that 
God created for no reason then theology would have nothing to say, for there 
would be no order to theology. He writes that “[humanity] can be thought of 
only as the creature of a creator who is not conceived of as arbitrary when the 
being of this [person] who is to be created moves the being of the creating 
God inwardly.”428 In other words, there is something that orders the 
relationship between God and the world, and this is not an order that is 
exerted from the side of the creature, for then the act of creation would still be 
left in question. Rather, there must be some reason that makes sense of God’s 
act of creation. If that act is affirmed to be a free act, then it is moved by 
something that is not ontological, but relational. Christian theology looks to 
the revelation of Jesus Christ for the answer, where we are told that because 
he loved us we are given the gift of his Son (Jn. 3:16). Jüngel, again: 
 
That God creates as his counterpart man is the execution of his self-
determination, according to which God does not desire to come to 
himself without man. This self-determination, if it really is a decision of 
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love which desires to come to itself with another one and only with that 
one, implies the freedom of God and man as opposites of each other. If 
God has created man as the one elected for love, then man is what he is 
for his own sake. For one is loved only for his own sake or not at all.429 
 
God is revealed in his free movement to us, and not in the being of the world. 
This is expressed in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo since the world is not 
created out of God’s being, but out of nothing. There is no ontological link, no 
path back from the contingent to the necessary that we can follow to have our 
questions answered. Because he remains distinct from the world and because 
that distinction is absolute ontologically, we cannot work backwards from the 
creation or its order and derive at some knowledge of the God who made the 
world. Instead we come back against nothing, the nothing out of which the 
world was created.430 But this nothing means that if we are to know God, we 
must gain such knowledge according to the same basis on which God created 
and relates to the world, i.e. according to his divine freedom (in love). That 
freedom is what we see in his electing to save the world. Therefore the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo turns us back on the God who is absolutely free 
with respect to creation, and who is related in continuity with it, not in his 
being, but in his freedom, in his electing and reconciling grace. The movement 
of God to us is definitively known in the Incarnation and the events of the life, 
death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus of Nazareth. God is revealed in the 
freedom of his acts, in the ‘dynamic’ of his coming to us, in the apocalypse of 
his son, and not in the ‘static’ being of the cosmos. Karl Barth’s tautology, 
“God is God,” implies this dynamic, since God is known as God only in his 
act of coming to us, and this is known decisively and finally in the 
anhypostatic/enhypostatic dynamic of God the Son.  
 The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, therefore, separates the being of the 
cosmos from the being of God, but links God’s creation to God ultimately 
according to the free act of divine self-giving love in which the creator takes 
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into himself the very being of the creature. The tautology, God is God, is 
therefore an ‘apocalyptic’ movement of God which includes ‘movement’ of 
God into the world and his return to himself, bringing humanity (and the 
cosmos; Rom. 8.18-25) along with him. The doctrine of creation out of nothing 
implies an ontological discontinuity that is contrasted with a continuity 
located in the freedom of God’s elective love, known in Jesus Christ. “If then 
man is the one elected for love, he is what he is in a relationship to God which 
is determined by freedom. This relationship could only be diminished by any 
talk of the necessity of God for man. Love bursts apart the relationship of 
necessity by surpassing it.”431 The similarity to Kierkegaard’s Climacus is 
evident: “Out of love, therefore, the god must be eternally resolved in this 
way, but just as his love is the basis, so also must love be the goal….”432 
 To be clear, the issue at hand remains the implications of the sheer 
reality of God for theological knowledge. This has been discussed in terms of 
God’s objectivity and what that means for human subjectivity, namely, that 
human subjectivity vis-à-vis God has its source in God. The doctrine of 
creation helps us see how the metaphysics of the God/World distinction, 
essential for understanding the objectivity of God, imply an absolute distance 
from God from the human perspective, but an equally absolute closeness to 
God from the theological perspective. This closeness, however, is only 
metaphorically spatial; God’s closeness is based on his freedom, our distance 
on our creatureliness and our sin. Where this distance is overcome, from our 
perspective—the perspective of the creature—is in the Incarnation. And, as 
such, it is irruptive—necessarily so as seen from ‘within’ the contingencies of 
creation. The question that remains is that of history, if there is, indeed, an 
unbridgeable gap between the world of creational—and therefore, 
historical—being, and the God who created the world and the place and time 
for history. To paraphrase Lessing, to what extent can the contingent, the 
historical, deliver the necessary truths of theology? 
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4. N. T. Wright and ‘Apocalyptic’ Reconsidered 
 
 Again, this theological conversation has perhaps become too “abstract” 
and has found dogmatic and theological doctrines to be the definitive sources 
for understanding ‘apocalyptic’ and its theological import. Continuity has 
been described in terms of God’s electing love and gracious salvation; 
discontinuity is seen in terms of sin and the powers of evil and also in terms 
of the absolute ontological distinction between God and the world. At this 
point Wright might join in and point to the overarching narratives that make 
sense of the whole, stories that have their sources in the history of Israel’s 
interaction with the God who called them out of Ur, from Egypt, into Canaan, 
and to Mount Zion. In Paul and the Faithfulness of God Wright identifies three 
interrelated stories that make up Paul’s worldview, the story of God and the 
cosmos, the story of God and humans, and the story of God and Israel.433 
Where is this narrative in the account I have provided and, conversely, how 
might sense be made within the biblical narratives of terms like “creatio ex 
nihilo” or “the nonnecessity of God”?  
 Apocalyptic, in Wright’s theology, belongs within the overarching 
narrative of God’s covenant faithfulness. For Wright, apocalyptic is not a 
theological movement or motif, but rather a particular worldview, or set of 
conditions that make possible the reading of apocalyptic literature. This does 
not mean that he rejects the sort of ‘apocalyptic’ perspective for which I have 
been arguing, but it does mean that the conversation can get confusing. At 
this point in my analysis, I want to argue that Wright’s perspective on 
apocalyptic fundamentally agrees with the account I have provided. This 
leads to a particular narration of Israel’s history vis-à-vis the Messiah that 
suggests a particular theology of history. But this theology of history 
undermines his methodological commitment in NTPG.  
 Wright rejects the ‘apocalyptic’ “programme to which Schweitzer and 
Bultmann—and Käsemann as in some ways the successor of both—gave such 
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energetic attention.”434 This program was characterised, as we have seen, by 
the imminent expectation of the return of Christ and, in Wright’s 
interpretation, the end of the space-time world. In Wright’s account of 
apocalyptic, rather than a radically dualist and Gnostic interpretation of early 
Christian expectation, apocalyptic is interpreted according to “classical 
prophecy: complex, many-layered and often biblical imagery is used and re-
used to invest the space-time events of Israel’s past, present and future with 
their full theological significance.”435 First, the difference between what I have 
described as ‘apocalyptic’ and what Wright is interpreting as “apocalyptic” 
should be clearer. Wright is concerned with the hermeneutical contexts for 
making sense of literature characterised as apocalyptic. Schweitzer, Bultmann, 
Käsemann, and Martyn (to follow the genealogy) are also interpreting 
apocalyptic literature, or, at least, apocalyptic tendencies in the biblical 
literature. But the ‘apocalyptic’ theology I have been describing, and that is 
equally present (although not at all uniform) in Bultmann, Käsemann, and 
Martyn, is not tied to a literary genre (although it is attentive to the genre). 
Rather it is attentive to the theological implications of God’s self-revelation as 
free, dynamic, and resurrecting. Käsemann, who certainly defined 
“apocalyptic” as imminent expectation (even in a personal letter to Wright),436 
also uses it in the manner in which I am describing: “But where Protestant 
theology conceives apocalyptic as the message of God’s kingdom revealed in Christ 
and as the worldwide liberation of the children of God, world anxiety may 
not be derived from it.”437 The point here is that ‘apocalyptic’ is turned back 
on Jesus Christ, as the one “apocalypsed,” and, as such, he is imminent 
expectation, realised.  
 
At Easter is repeated that apocalyptic event which the Gospel reports 
Jesus himself underwent in the Jordan baptism. At Easter the Son, 
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proclaimed as such by the divine voice and equipped with the Holy 
Spirit for his mission, creates sons and daughters of the heavenly 
Father who follow him in his mission throughout the world and to 
whom he gives the Spirit as the power for their earthly service. What 
he defined as his task in his inaugural sermon at Nazareth they must 
pursue in discipleship, that is, set on the way with him under the sign 
of the cross, in the transport of the Spirit bringing the promise of 
freedom to those captive to demons.438  
 
To the extent that Käsemann is turning to the Messianic events as the arrival 
of what was ‘imminently expected’ his use of ‘apocalyptic’ is consistent with 
what Wright claims, writing about Paul, that the realised apocalypse “has 
already come about in and through the events concerning the Messiah, Jesus, 
particularly through his death and resurrection.”439  
 In his interpretation, Wright describes Paul as “playing the part of the 
angel” as he describes “how these strange events actually unveil God’s 
mysteries, and how the whole picture now works out.”440 This identifies an 
interesting transition between the literary genre and ‘apocalyptic’ theology. 
Even if the literature that we now identify as apocalyptic was forming Paul’s 
worldview, it was the apocalypse of Jesus the Messiah that became the event 
around which apocalyptic themes were interpreted. The actual event of 
apocalypse became the hermeneutical centre. What seems to be the crux of the 
issue for Wright is that apocalyptic is not about the end of the space-time 
world, but rather about the faithfulness of God to his covenant. Wright’s 
position on apocalyptic is laid out in a clear way in the following passage, 
making it worth quoting at length. 
 
[For] Paul, ‘apocalyptic’, the sudden, dramatic and shocking unveiling 
of secret truths, the sudden shining of bright heavenly light on a dark 
and unsuspecting world, is after all what God had always intended. 
One of the central tensions in Paul’s thought, giving it again and again 
its creative edge, is the clash between the fact that God always 
                                                
438 Ibid., 13. 
439 Wright, Paul, 52. 
440 Ibid. 
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intended what has in fact happened and the fact that not even the most 
devout Israelite had dreamed that it would happen like this. We cannot 
expound Paul’s covenant theology in such a way as to make it a 
smooth, steady progress of historical fulfillment; but nor can we 
propose a kind of ‘apocalyptic’ view in which nothing that happened 
before Jesus is of any value even as preparation. In the messianic 
events of Jesus’ death and resurrection Paul believes both that the 
covenant promises were at last fulfilled and that this constituted a 
massive and dramatic irruption into the process of world history 
unlike anything before or since. And at the heart of both parts of this 
tension stands the cross of the Messiah, at once the long-awaited 
fulfillment and the slap in the face for all human pride. Unless we hold 
on to both parts we are missing something absolutely central to Paul.441  
 
The faithfulness of God to his covenant, rather than implying a rejection of 
‘apocalyptic’ theology, actually affirms one of the key tenets of ‘apocalyptic’, 
namely, that the continuity of history is located in God’s act, in his 
relationship to creation in self-revelation. For covenant, as it is revealed in 
Jesus Christ as “new covenant” (1 Cor. 11.25; Jer. 31.31-34), is entirely 
dependent upon God’s graciousness and his faithfulness. Just as we have seen 
that Jesus is the one who knows the Father and so fulfills the telos of human 
existence, so also Jesus fulfills the requirements of the covenant in such a way 
that his Messianic vocation is to represent the people of Israel in covenant 
faithfulness. Wright makes this point in reference to Gal. 2.19-20, where Paul 
says that he has “been crucified with Christ” and that it is no longer he who 
lives, but “Christ who lives in me.” The identity of the people of the Messiah 
is now found in the Messiah, “in terms of the Messiah’s own new life.”442 
Here the similarity between Wright and Barth is clear. Both articulate an 
interpretation of Jesus as the embodiment in one man of the identity of the 
entire people of Israel: 
 
 We have seen that according to the Old Testament Israel is the son who 
 is pledged to obedience and service to God as its Father and Creator, 
                                                
441 Ibid., 54. 
442 Ibid., 113. 
 180 
 and that according to the New Jesus accepted this obligation in its 
 place….The place taken by the one Israelite Jesus according to the New 
 Testament is, according to the Old Testament, the place of this 
 disobedient son, this faithless people and its faithless priests and 
 kings.443 
 
And, just like we have seen in the forgoing discussion of creation, “[t]he 
energy driving this redefinition is nothing other than the love of the Messiah 
himself, just as in Deuteronomy the reason for election was simply the love of 
YHWH for Israel.”444 The continuity, revealed in the Messiah, is the continuity 
of the love of God for the world, and nothing else.  
 The question remains, however, as to the value of what came before the 
Messiah as “preparation”. Whatever sudden break ‘apocalyptic’ writers 
imagine, the Bible is the source in which the break makes sense. When Philip 
is called by Jesus he finds his friend Nathanael and tells him, “We have found 
him about whom Moses in the law and also the prophets wrote, Jesus son of 
Joseph from Nazareth” (Jn 1.45b). Clearly, the Hebrew scriptures are the 
source from which to make sense of what has happened—what was being 
revealed to Philip and Nathanael (1.50-51). How does the history that went 
before, and, more specifically, our ways of knowing history, interact with the 
revelation that comes to history as unprecedented, new, and irruptive? In 
short, how does ‘apocalyptic’ theology understand historical knowledge? 
That question is the task for the next chapter. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter and the previous one, have been articulating an 
‘apocalyptic’ theology in both its genealogical trajectory (Käsemann to Martyn 
and even Wright) and its theological commitments. ‘Apocalyptic’ theology is 
committed to the reality of God for theology—not God’s reality as an idea or 
concept, but as both subject and object. In theological, biblical terms, this 
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means that God is a reality in the past, present and future history of Jesus the 
Messiah, the Son of God, God with us. Theology can therefore be structured 
according to a ‘soteriology—Christology—creation’ sequence.445 At the heart 
of this sequence, from the human side of things, there is a determinative 
rupture, a break with the old and a start of something new. This rupture is the 
human experience of God coming to us from “beyond” as one who is 
transcendent, although in a non-competitive way with our existence. This 
rupture is also the human experience of God’s invasive act with respect to 
human sin and the evil powers that hold the cosmos enslaved. Yet, in 
theological perspective, there is no rupture, for God’s resolve to love and to 
redeem, out of which we learn that he has created the world and everything 
in it, is given the most assured continuity that there could be: God’s free, 
electing grace. In the history of world-events, this electing grace is clearly seen 
in the covenants he has made with his people, Israel, and then with the world 
in the atonement made by Jesus the Messiah. For the individual knowing 
subject, who would know God, the reality of God is only given to us as true 
knowledge as we participate in Christ’s knowledge, his humanity, and his 
history, in and through the Spirit; and this can all be seen and known in terms 
of the Christian act of baptism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
445 That soteriology comes first simply affirms the subjective starting point, i.e. 
the question of human knowing is the question that drove this sequence. In 
actuality, Christology comes first.  
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CHAPTER 5. History According to the Theologians: 
From a Theology of History to a Theology of 
Historiography  
 
 In this final chapter, by working toward a theology of history and 
historiography, we can bring together the reality and objectivity of God, his 
relation in movement toward the creation (described ‘apocalyptically’), and 
the way in which we ascribe meaning to the temporal events that originate in 
this divine movement. After a first section preparing the conceptual ground, 
the next section will present a theology of history and the final section a 
theology of historiography.  
 
1. Toward a Theology of History and Historiography 
 
 Understood at the most basic level, a theology of history is history 
subject to the criterion of theological knowledge. That is, in order for anything 
to be a ‘theology of’ it must be determined by the unique object of theological 
knowledge, namely God. Only then can the object of the preposition, in this 
case ‘history’, be understood to be properly qualified theologically. Because 
this is so, ‘history’ must remain a general conceptuality that is only given 
definitive content in light of the priority of the proper object of theology.  
 At this basic and elementary level, before the theological work is applied 
to it, “History is knowledge of the past”.446 We can differentiate between 
‘history’ and ‘historiography’ at this point simply by distinguishing 
historiography as the methodological dimension of the larger field of 
discourse that is designated ‘history’. The relationship is similar to the 
relationship between means and ends; historiography is the means by which 
one achieves the end that is history.  
 A theology of history locates the epistemological question that is central 
to historiography, the ‘science’ of history (knowledge of the past), in the 
                                                
446 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History With Lectures 1926-1928, Revised ed., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 363. 
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epistemological question germane to theological science (knowledge of God). 
Only after this has been articulated can the object of history (history as “the 
past”) find its place within a theology of history and be understood with 
respect to this proper but secondary object (‘secondary’ because it is primarily 
grounded in theology). 
 In order to delve deeper into the way in which theology conditions both 
the study of history, and the object of history, it will be helpful to review the 
historical paradigm within which Wright works and offer a constructive, 
theological critique. First we will review Wright’s historical method, and then 
turn to consider two sets of distinctions that condition the work of Wright’s 
historiography, the past/present distinction and the real/ideal distinction. 
This will be followed by a theological, Trinitarian corrective. 
 
a. N. T. Wright’s Historical Method Revisited 
 
 Following the general consensus of contemporary historiography, 
Wright claims that, “all history is interpreted history.”447 The proper object of 
history, being in one sense knowledge of the past, is never simply presented 
as the knowledge of bare facts about ‘the past’, whatever those would be, but 
rather as past events that belong within complex webs of meaning. It is in 
these complexes that events of the past can be known according to the unique 
way in which past events can be known.448 These webs of meaning are found 
to condition both the events of the past in their contexts and the 
epistemological situation of the historian. From within her own worldview, 
the historian directs questions of meaning to the events of history. These are 
appropriate questions of meaning, inquiring into aims, intentions, and 
motivations of historical subjects. These questions and their answers guide 
the historian to hypothesise, to formulate meaningful stories about events, 
                                                
447 NTPG, 88. 
448 Collingwood points out that knowledge of the past is not like knowledge 
of the actual, the present, but is properly considered to be “ideal.” 
Collingwood, The Idea of History, 364. 
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and then to verify those meaningful stories, testing them against the historical 
data. So the object of the historian’s research is not simply ‘bare facts’ about 
the past, but rather the meaning of those facts or events.  
 To get at the meaning of an event or series of events, the historian must 
look at both the “outside” of the event and its “inside.”449 This inside of an 
event is known by investigating the aims, intentions, and motivations of 
individuals and societies as these are knowable to the historical method.450 
This is, in part, because as R. G. Collingwood argues, history as a discipline is 
interested in thought.451 Bare facts are unimportant except as they reveal or 
relate to human thoughts and intentions. The goal of historical knowledge is 
both to get at the event that happened—what actually took place—but, more 
importantly, to understand how that event reveals and informs human 
thinking, both then and now. The historian “is only concerned with those 
events which are the outward expression of thoughts.”452 To say that history 
is knowledge of the past therefore must be expanded to qualify the past as the 
past of human intentionality. If historians simply wanted to get at events qua 
events, they would be more akin to natural scientists than historians.453⁠ “The 
                                                
449 NTPG, 110. 
450 Ibid., 110-112. Wright limits this investigation to that which can be known 
through historical methods but excludes psychological investigation. 
451 Collingwood, The Idea of History, 215ff. 
452 Ibid., 217. 
453 This distinction points the long standing distinction within German 
theology between Historie and Geschichte. It is important in light of the 
conversation partners chosen for this project that the difference between these 
two German words be clarified so as to acknowledge this broader theological 
conversation. According to Karl Barth, “‘Historie’ is something that can be 
proved by general historical science, whereas ‘Geschichte’, is something that 
really takes place in time and space, but may or may not be proved. The 
creation story has to do with ‘Geschichte’, for instance. It has to do with 
something that happened and therefore something historical, but something 
that is not open to historiographical investigation.” ⁠(Godsey, Karl Barth’s Table 
Talk, 45). For Barth, Historie and Geschichte can be simply distinguished along 
the lines of the difference between “history as event and history as record,” ⁠ 
respectively (Bromiley, An Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth,112).  
 This simple understanding is different from the understanding that 
permeated theological discourse with the work of theologians such as Paul 
Tillich and Rudolph Bultmann. ( ⁠It is not clear that Bultmann truly follows this 
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task of the historian is thus to address the question ‘Why?’ at all possible 
levels, down to its roots in the way the people under investigation perceived 
the world as a whole.”454 Wright’s definition of history in NTPG is a good 
base line from which to begin our consideration of a theology of history: 
“history is…neither ‘bare facts’ nor ‘subjective interpretations’, but is rather 
the meaningful narrative of events and intentions.”455 
 
b. The Past/Present Distinction 
 
                                                                                                                                       
dichotomy, although Torrance assumes that he does. Cf. Le Donne, The 
Historiographical Jesus, 34. T. F. Torrance describes the way in which these two 
words came to stand for a “fateful disjunction between two kinds of 
history” ⁠(Torrance, God and Rationality, 1997). Historie came to be used as a 
way to describe the “closed continuum of cause and effect”, while Geschichte 
was used to describe “the way the Early Church creatively expressed its 
orientation to ‘other-worldly’ reality.” (ibid., 109). Geschichte was not, in 
Torrance’s interpretation, an account of reality except that that reality was 
located in “man’s understanding of himself cut off alike from his conceptual 
relation to God and from his conceptual relation to nature.” ⁠(Ibid.). This 
movement of theology toward Geschichte thus understood is, as an approach 
to Jesus, one that “thrusts man back through encounter with himself upon his 
own mental structures divorced from objective and explanatory control from 
beyond himself” and “is the antithesis of the unremitting attack of Jesus upon 
every form of human self-centredness.”(Ibid.). 
 The division represented here by these two ‘types’ of history, while 
coming under attack from Torrance, nevertheless emerged as a response to 
the recognition that external reality is always subjectively experienced. All 
events, in order for them to have meaning, come to us from people who have 
experienced them subjectively and thus they come to us always already 
interpreted, and our reception of these events as others’ interpretation 
involves us in further interpretation. Contact with the actual event, even for 
the eyewitness, is to engage in interpretation. Historie, if much is to be made 
of it, may be said to subject the historical event to the ‘acceptable’ standards 
or methods for historical science. Geschichte, may be said to be the 
interpretation of those events beyond the simpler question of “did it happen” 
to the more complex question, “what does it mean?” Regardless, the two 
types are not easily separated without doing violence to more recent 
developments in hermeneutical theory (Cf. the discussion in Le Donne, The 
Historiographical Jesus, 17-39).  
454 NTPG, 112. 
455 Ibid., 82, emphasis in original. 
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 In an analysis of the general norms of historiography from its 
ascendence within the political upheavals of the Renaissance and Reformation, 
Constantin Fasolt identifies ‘absence’ and ‘immutability’ as two characteristics 
that determine the object of historical investigation, if that object is 
understood to be knowledge of the past. Any given event in the past is, in the 
modern historian’s perspective, absent; and in its chronological absence it is 
fixed and unchanging, therefore immutable.456 The truth about history, about 
the past, is that it is a fixed reality, distant from us, that cannot be changed. If 
this is the case then one cannot really have contact with events of the past but 
only with objects in the present that tell us, in various mediums, about the 
past. Because of the absence of the object that the nature of evidence signifies, 
that is, because it points to something that is not here, the evidential nature of 
history undergirds the distinction that is fundamental to modern 
historiography: the distinction between the past and the present.  
 
We said that history was founded on the distinction between past and 
present. Quite so. But we failed to add that this is not a distinction 
given, but a distinction made. Reality may be impossible to know. (In 
order to avoid skeptical mis-interpretations, I hasten to add that this is 
different from saying that reality does not exist. The opposite is closer 
to the truth: reality does exist, which is why it is difficult to know….) 
But history is not the study of reality, much less the study of the reality 
of time. History is the study of evidence…and evidence is not reality. 
Evidence is a sign, as different from reality as letters are from meaning 
and as numerals are from numbers.457 
 
Rather than the events themselves, the direct object of historical research— 
the past—turns out to only be available through evidence,458 sources that 
contain accounts of, or clues to, the actual events (whether the ‘inside’ or 
‘outside’ of these events). But the distinction that evidence relies on points to 
and reinforces the distance between the present and the past. The very 
                                                
456 Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), 5. 
457 Ibid., 12. 
458 Ibid. 
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method of the historian that enables access to the past actually creates the 
distance between the past and present that, in turn, is basic to the paradigm 
within which the historian works. One example Fasolt uses in this regard is 
the example of anachronism. Anachronism imposes the present view of 
things on the past and thereby transgresses the boundary between past and 
present. 
 
Have previous historians fallen into anachronism? Of course they have, 
as all historians must. Is that a reason to turn back? Quite the opposite, 
it is a reason to go on. It is a signal that the line between past and 
present has been breached. Alarms are sounded and historians rush to 
the defense in order to prevent the past from making its presence felt 
again.459 
 
 It may very well be that the approach to history that Wright defends and 
articulates, for all its effort at admitting the subjective factor in the historical 
endeavour and, in this, rejecting the hard and fast distinction between subject 
and object,460 nevertheless remains a modern exercise in historiography 
precisely because he continually asserts the “normal” methods of hypothesis 
and verification conditioned within worldviews. Worldviews, although 
usually hidden, “can themselves in principle be dug out and inspected”461 in a 
spiraling process of hypothesis and verification that gradually objectifies and 
knows, with increasing certainty and clarity, the object, the historical fact, 
event, aim, or intention. By specifically focusing on worldviews, Wright 
acknowledges the subjective aspect of the historian’s task, but makes this 
subjectivity, finally, into an object, isolated in the historiographical task, and 
determined by the distance between the present and past. If CRw 
acknowledges that we know reality by our contact with it, then for the 
historian, contact is with evidence and texts that function as signs to the past, 
but not the past itself. This method, as Fasolt has shown, not only assumes the 
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nature of the reality under investigation, but it goes further: it conceptually 
determines the nature of that reality. This is done as a determination of the 
distinction between past and present in such a way that the past is gone, 
absent, and immutable. If Fasolt is right then in this way, “history is a form of 
self-assertion.”462 By that he means that history asserts the autonomous 
position of the historian with respect to history and the question of the reality 
of history. This is a distinctly political reading of history. Not only is it 
political in the sense that the historicism that emerged in the 17th century 
emerged as a radical break from the narratives that located power in 
monarchies and institutions,463 but it is political in the sense that it locates 
power in the present vis-á-vis the past, in the hands of the historian—even if 
the historian makes allowances for the worldview or subjective element in the 
process. Modern historiography, almost regardless of method, assumes and 
reinforces the distinction between the past and the present, and in so doing, 
affirms the place of the present independent of the past—except as the past is 
admitted on the terms of the present. The historian sets the terms. 
 The point here is not to critique historiography, but to examine its 
assumptions and methods so that its relationship with theology can be 
understood. If the distinction between past and present exerts the sort of 
pressure Fasolt describes, then the impact of this distinction upon theology 
needs further examination. Before moving to that, however, there is one more 
distinction that needs to be made—the distinction between the particular and 
the universal.  
  
                                                
462 Fasolt, The Limits of History, 230. 
463 E.g., Fasolt writes, “By exploding the temporal unity of the period from 
ancient times to the present, the humanists changed truths that had enjoyed 
apparently unshakeable permanence into mere antiquities. They transformed 
things that seemed self-evidently true into things of the past that were 
henceforth impossible to know without a special effort. They demoted the 
universal power of pope and emperor from present experience to an aspect of 
history that had to be judged by means of evidence.” Ibid., 20. 
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c. The Concrete and Contingent (the Real); the Necessary and Universal (the 
Ideal) 
 
 Wright’s definition, that history is the “meaningful narrative of events and 
intentions,”464 points to the causal relationship between events and human 
intentions so that those events can be related in a meaningful narrative. 
Meaning and intention point to the subjectivity of the actors within history, 
their worldviews, and whatever those things are to which they point in order 
to make ultimate sense out of their lives. This can also be the meaning that the 
historian gives to the narrative that is told. At this point we might observe, 
with Hans Urs von Balthasar, that history involves the relationship between 
“the factual, singular, sensible, concrete and contingent; and the necessary 
and universal (and, because universal, abstract), which has the validity of law 
rising above the individual case and determining it.”465 That is to say, history 
lives within the tension of the contingent and the universal, an ever moving 
fluctuation between one and the other as the quest for meaning influences the 
historian’s understanding of events and, in an opposite movement, the events 
themselves, or the impressions events have left on human memory and 
historical evidence, serve as checks upon the universal interpretation of 
meaning. In a circular way it is as von Balthasar claims, “the whole of history 
[is] the world of ideas which gives [history] its norms and meanings.”466 
Without wandering too far afield into the dynamics of various accounts of the 
hermeneutical circle, it is important at least to recognise this feedback loop at 
work in the historian’s enterprise. The commitment required by such a loop is 
that human interpretation is, to some degree, checked by a reality external to 
it, whether a past reality whose effects remain in the present through 
historical evidence (memory, artefacts, texts and the like), or a present 
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465 Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1994), 9. Here von Balthasar is describing the basic tension in Western 
philosophy, a tension that plays itself out in the philosophy of history no less 
than in other areas of philosophical inquiry. This, of course, is also the basic 
model which provides the backdrop for Lessing’s “ugly ditch.” 
466 Ibid., 64. 
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objective reality. This latter reality can be the ideological commitments of the 
knower or at least the conscious/subconscious worldview brought to bear 
upon the reality in question. 
 A theology of history according to this view of history, will interpret the 
historical sources in light of theological claims, doctrines, and dogmas; the 
‘universal’ claims of theological knowledge provide the interpretative 
framework for understanding the unique particular events of the past. It is 
also possible for a theology of history to be articulated according to the 
theological beliefs and commitments of historical figures (so, in Wright, this is 
what we find when he articulates the theology of the apostle Paul), but these 
still remain past artefacts, concrete particulars in the form of beliefs, which 
remain removed (to the extent that they can be) from the normative claims of 
the universal hermeneutical commitments of the historian: those 
commitments which order the historian’s work of storytelling. Here, again, 
Lessing’s ditch reappears. How can the particular history (including beliefs 
and events) of Jesus and the Apostles be the source (as history) for the 
theological norms that, in turn, make sense of that history?  
 Again, the split between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ appears. To review, 
Wright’s work overcomes this tension through his critical realism which 
essentially lowers the bar for knowledge. Lessing’s ditch is an unreal 
construct that exists only if our standards of knowing are too high—higher 
than the nature of actual knowledge. Actual knowledge implies contact, 
which implies the reality of the thing known; but it also acknowledges that 
the standards for knowing laid out by the Enlightenment do not reflect this 
reality. Theology enters this mode of knowing according to the standard ways 
of knowing, a knowing that takes place within the critical examination of 
worldviews. 
 
d. A Trinitarian Corrective 
 
 In contrast to Wright’s position—or in furtherance of it—I have 
articulated a theological epistemology that assumes God as an active 
 191 
revealing and knowing subject, as both subject and object in the knowing 
relationship. This relationship is realised in fulfillment of all human knowing 
in Jesus of Nazareth where God the Son as the new Adam, in full humanity, 
knows God the Father. In Torrance’s theology, we participate in this knowing 
relationship through the agency and gift of the Spirit. This way the 
relationship between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ is overcome by the perfection of 
knowledge in the Trinitarian relations and as humanity is brought into that 
relation through the movement of the Son in the hypostatic union and 
through the work of the Spirit who gives the gift of participation in those 
relations. Wright’s move to lower the bar is the correct move with respect to 
the development of historiography since its ascendency, but the very 
epistemological paradigm changes when the Trinitarian dynamic is 
recognised. The paradigm within which Wright is working is the same basic 
paradigm that has determined historiography since the rise of humanism in 
Europe, the main distinction being that Wright allows a critical corrective to 
his method that undercuts idealism with an appeal to an external reality. Yet 
this paradigm that is at work is still the paradigm of the historian as subject 
who would know the object on his or her own terms, and who is 
methodologically committed to a metaphysically basic distinction between 
past and present. The past, understood as a reality to be known according to 
the usual methods of hypothesis and verification, held in critical check by 
evidence that signifies the past, is nevertheless a distant, immutable 
conceptuality held at that distance by the historian’s autonomy over it.  
 The theological paradigm for history, understood according to a 
Trinitarian paradigm, undercuts this precisely at the distinction between past 
and present. “And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age” 
(Matt. 28.20b). When Matthew closes his gospel with these words of Jesus in 
commissioning his disciples, or when Jesus tells his disciples, “you will 
receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you will be my 
witnesses…” (Acts 1.8a), what is being claimed is that the ongoing presence of 
God is the continuity by which the church lives. For a theology of history this 
ongoing presence and reality is precisely that which changes the historical 
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paradigm. Instead of there being a gulf between the past and the present, 
there is a theological continuity—theological because it is grounded in the 
ongoing presence of God with his people. Theological epistemology is a 
pneumatic event for the human knower, since the actual knowledge 
relationship is realised outside of the knower in the relationship between the 
Father and the Son. Theological knowledge is true knowledge, but it is an 
actively mediated knowledge according to the category of gift. The question 
that remains is how this changed paradigm relates to the practice of 
historiography.  
 The purpose of raising the question of the distinction between past and 
present and the ideal/real dichotomy is not to claim that there is another way 
of understanding the past, nor that historiography has been wrong about how 
it has approached historical knowledge, especially not Wright’s critical 
realism. Rather, the point is both to recognise the way in which these 
difficulties influence the historian’s task, specifically in setting up the 
historian’s position as almost unavoidably autonomous with respect to the 
past, and to show that theological knowledge, even knowledge seemingly 
grounded in past events, is not subject to these same problems. Wright is 
simply wrong to say that theological knowledge, that is, knowledge of God 
and God’s involvement in the contingent order, is like knowledge of anything 
else. 
 The first move toward this Trinitarian understanding of historical 
knowledge is to move in the direction of a theology of history, rather than a 
theology of historiography. This is so partly because one cannot develop a 
historiography without acknowledging the metaphysical commitments one 
makes as one poses historical questions.467 A theology of history articulates a 
perspective on the meaning of history as a whole, as, perhaps, a grand 
narrative that makes sense of all happenings in time and space, but does so 
according to the presently active reality of God. Again, this reality is not a 
reality obtained and possessed as universal knowledge in the way described 
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above, but rather is a reality that demands that the meaning of history be 
placed in the hands of the one who gives history meaning and who remains, in 
his freedom, determinative of that meaning. A theological epistemology, 
grounded in the Trinitarian way of knowing, suggests that a theology of 
history would determine a theological account of historiography because a 
theology of history changes the hermeneutical position of the historian with 
respect to the past. In other words, the shape of history determines how we 
give it meaning in our historiography since historiography is concerned with 
the inseparability of events and their meanings.  
  
2. A Theology of History 
 
 What then can be said of a theology of history? Where are we given to 
look for such a meaning? How can we speak of meaning if we have given up 
the place of interpretation to God himself? It remains that the only place 
where we can dare to speak of ascribing theological meaning to world events 
is at the place where God himself has entered into these events and has given 
himself to historical knowledge. But now we are in a dizzying circle: God has 
given himself to human historical knowledge, but in that given-ness he 
remains a present and free active subject with respect to whom knowledge 
remains contingent. What has been given is not ours to possess. Historical 
knowledge of God’s self-revelation is always a gift, contingent on the giver to 
sustain the gift. The same epistemological event that determines theological 
knowledge, the knowledge of the Father by the Son, given to history in the 
Incarnation, appears to determine historical knowledge, the knowledge of the 
meaning of history by the singular man Jesus of Nazareth. 
 In order to see how this works more clearly, consider this description by 
Anthony LeDonne of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768-1834) hermeneutical 
circle with reference to his discussion of Vorverständnis: 
 
Schleiermacher argued that in order for something to be understood, it 
must be associated with an already understood category. He gives the 
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example of a child learning a new word through the process of 
comparison. In his view, children are only able to understand a new 
word by relating the meaning of that word with a previously 
established category of meaning. He thus concluded that “every Child 
arrives at the meaning of a word only through hermeneutics.” 
Gadamer further unpacks this concept by explaining that, when a 
word is learned, one must assimilate an alien category into a limited 
sphere of significance, and this process initially alters the word’s 
“original vitality.” The process becomes circular because one’s 
grammar…is in constant interaction with the acquisition of new 
words.468 
  
Here we ought to be reminded of the Kierkegaardian critique of the Socratic. 
In order for the truth to be learned, that truth must come from outside, that is, 
it does not comport with any pre-understanding (Vorverständnis in 
Schleiermacher). To confess that Jesus is Immanuel, God with us, is to confess 
something that comes as knowledge given by God in the condition, and 
therefore soteriologically. If this is the case, the circularity of hermeneutics is 
broken into (irruption) by the gift of this condition so that Jesus can be 
recognised as the one in history who is the absolute norm of all history. This 
means that what the believer brings to the historical task is the confession and 
pre-understanding that Jesus is the absolutely unique event in history in 
which God has entered the reality of space and time at an ontological level 
(transgressing the “infinite qualitative difference”) and given it ultimate 
meaning in his very life, death, and resurrection. Such a confession only 
comes to us as a gift from outside, ‘apocalyptically’ as it were, and according 
to the soteriological act of God.  
 This can be described according to the model of knowledge as contact. If 
a theology of history/historiography is determined by contact with the reality 
that determines the meaning of history, then that means that a theology of 
                                                
468 Le Donne, The Historiographical Jesus, 29. Internal quotes are from F. D. E. 
Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, Nach den Handschriften neu herausgegeben und 
eingeleitet von Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Karl Winter Universitätverlag, 
1959), 40; and H. G. Gadamer, “The Problem of Lamguage in Schleiermacher’s 
Hermeneutic,” Journal for Theology and the Church 7 (1970): 72. 
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history would precede a theology of historiography for the reason that 
historiography is a reflection on what that contact means for the method of 
the historian. Part of that method are the metaphysical commitments that 
determine the interpretative framework of the historian. As Barth says in his 
Table Talk, “Historical research will never be an approach to the Word of 
God”469 but rather, as I am arguing here, it is a particular type of 
methodological reflection on the Word of God with which the believer has 
already come into contact. The interpretative framework that is basic for a 
theological historiography is the content of the theology of history. Therefore, 
theology of history comes first. 
 My argument in the present section is this: the knowledge given to us in 
Jesus’ history, expressed in the confession of who he is, is a knowledge of the 
end of human history and the beginning of a new kind of history. In Barth’s 
words, “What took place on the cross of Golgotha is the last word of an old 
history and the first word of a new.”470 This is an argument about the large 
sweep of human events and their ultimate meaning. The new history that 
comes after his history which ends at the cross is pointed in two directions: 
the first, back to the end of history which is Jesus’ death; and the second, to 
the history of the new covenant given and received in faith and remaining 
pneumatically determined according to the gift of the Father, through the Son 
in the power of the Spirit. In other words, the meaning of world history, given 
to human knowledge, is determined by the crucifixion of Immanuel, God 
with us. 
 
a. Jesus is the norm of history  
 
 In order to make the claim that Jesus is the norm of history we will turn 
our attention back to Kierkegaard and then introduce another voice into the 
conversation, Hans Urs von Balthasar, especially his short book, A Theology of 
History. Von Balthasar will give us the option to move in one direction from 
                                                
469 Godsey, Karl Barth’s Table Talk, 69. 
470 Barth, CD IV.1, 176. 
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an affirmation that Jesus is the norm of history, but I will part ways with him 
and move in another. If history is the meaningful narrative of human events 
and intentions then to say that Jesus is the norm of history is simply to say 
that he is the source of meaning for history.  
  
 i. Kierkegaard and the Unique Place of Jesus in History 
 
 Having already worked through Climacus’ take on the condition 
required for knowledge of God,471 it makes sense to build on that discussion 
at this point with a further examination of its relevance for the question of 
historical knowledge. Very simply, for there to be knowledge of God through 
historical investigation is a contradiction to the very affirmation of faith that 
God came in Jesus incognito. If God came to be among us in the very form of a 
servant, then this move would be imperfect and radically so were he to be 
discoverable as God through historical method. That means that the 
deliverances of historical method apart from the condition given in the gift 
and reception of faith are adequate only to hide who Jesus is, and not to 
reveal him to us.472 The modern quest for the historical Jesus, whatever it 
reveals, does not reveal that this is God with us. For Kierkegaard, all it reveals 
is the offence. “Jesus Christ is the object of faith; one must either believe in 
him or be offended; for to ‘know’ simply means that it is not about him. Thus 
                                                
471 See Ch. 2 above. 
472 This raises all sorts of Christological questions. Can we know through 
historical method the thoughts, aims, and intentions of Jesus? If so, does this 
mean that what we find are the thoughts, aims, and intentions of the divine 
Logos, the second person of the Trinity? Or are these thoughts, aims, and 
intentions only part of the incognito of the Son in human form? Are his 
thoughts, aims, and intentions available to us as his humanity—and his 
words—are available to us? To answer with Kierkegaard, i.e. to affirm that 
these would be part of his incognito and therefore not helpful through 
historical method is not to present a docetic Christology, but rather to affirm 
his full humanity in its theological meaning as God incognito. Cf. Barth’s 
discussion of the veiling and unveiling of the Word of God in CD I.1.4. 
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history can indeed richly communicate knowledge, but knowledge 
annihilates Jesus Christ.”473 
 Kierkegaard would have us remember the reason God entered history 
incognito. What faith in the incarnate God reveals is that the love that God 
desires is a love between equals. He wishes to establish an understanding 
between us that is grounded in the humility and actuality of his becoming 
human. “Only in equality or unity can there be an understanding.”474 Yet the 
knowledge of him gained through this abasement comes not as something 
that we have achieved, but rather as a gift, being given the eyes to see. The 
perceptual shift that comes with this gift allows us to see that this one who 
comes incognito is God with us, and yet it is him, incognito, humbled, human, 
whom we see.  
 History cannot reveal to us who this is, but nevertheless it is this one 
who, in history, must reveal to us what history is. What is found in 
Kierkegaard’s rejection of history, and especially the historical perspective of 
his age that wants to know Jesus on its terms, from its historical vantage point, 
is that because Jesus cannot be known this way we are thrust back on his life, 
not the results of his life, and on faith, to see and know history from this 
perspective. This is what gives Kierkegaard his polemic edge in Practice in 
Christianity (and elsewhere); he sees history from the vantage of the one who 
chose to be abased and to judge history from this position of abasement. In 
this way Jesus, God incognito, becomes the norm from which to understand 
history, but on faith’s terms, not “history’s.”  
 
 ii. Hans Urs von Balthasar’s A Theology of History 
 
 Hans Urs von Balthasar’s A Theology of History offers an account of 
history that is very similar to the sort of account offered here but with at least 
one major difference; because of this it is necessary to take a brief look at his 
                                                
473 Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 33. 
474 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 25. 
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account and where the divergence lies. By isolating that divergence, the 
distinction of my account should come into sharp relief.  
 There is much to recommend in von Balthasar’s short book, but the most 
significant for our purposes here is his account of the normative nature of 
Jesus for history. To begin, von Balthasar recognises the “methodological 
demands” of the subject-matter of theology, making theology unique with 
respect to other disciplines, including historiography. In this sense “Christ is 
the absolute” since “he remains incommensurate with the norms of this 
world.”475 According to the circularity we saw above,476 the particularity of 
Jesus’ historicity is the concrete norm that determines the abstract norm of 
history. This is tied to a theology of the divine Logos. “In Jesus Christ, the 
Logos is no longer tied to the realm of ideas, values and laws which governs 
and gives meaning to history, but is himself history.”477 The abstraction of the 
Logos in history in the ideality of general laws and values became 
particularized in the Incarnation of the Logos in Jesus Christ. How the Logos 
personally acts in history is the source for understanding a transpositioning of 
this once abstract ideality into the particular instantiation of the particularity 
of a human life. What this looks like in action is a unique mode of time 
determined not by Christ’s self-assertiveness within history, but rather by his 
receptiveness to the Father’s will, his obedience in renouncing sovereignty 
over his own existence.478 “By directly and freely obeying the Father in 
heaven, the Son fulfills and includes in his task the whole historical 
dimension, conferring upon it its ultimate meaning.”479 This affirms the 
proposition that began von Balthasar’s essay, “namely that the life of the Son 
is related to the whole of history as the world of ideas which gives it its norms 
and its meaning.”480  
                                                
475 Balthasar, A Theology of History, 19. 
476 See notes 20 and 21 above. 
477 Balthasar, A Theology of History , 24. 
478 Ibid., 40, 51. 
479 Ibid., 55.  
480 Ibid., 64. 
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 Appealing to a reading of this history in which the Christ event is seen 
in terms of recapitulation and predestination, the cross is interpreted as the 
“condition for the possibility not only of sin but of existence and 
predestination itself.”481 The cross holds together the rupture that would 
separate the old from the new: it makes continuous that which has been made 
discontinuous.  
 
There is an old homily, in the style of Hippolytus, which pictures him 
thus, as the one who, on the Cross, renews and holds together all 
things between heaven and earth: 
  
 The tree, which is as wide as the heaven, stretches up from earth to 
heaven, and he takes his stand—an immortal growth—halfway 
between heaven and earth. He is the fulcrum of all things, the 
foundation of the universe, the bond of the cosmos, which 
encompasses the world and man, riveted to the Cross by the unseen 
Spirit, so that, made like God, he may never tear himself loose. His 
head touching the heavens, his feet holding the earth fast, his 
immeasurable hands embracing the spirit of the atmosphere between: 
he is the totality of all things throughout all.482  
 
Von Balthasar rightly sees the Incarnation as central to an understanding of 
history and focuses that understanding on the particularity of the life of the 
Son. He brings to the fore the two doctrines of recapitulation and 
predestination, in which we can see a proper emphasis on the way that 
election grounds the relationship between God and history; and by 
emphasizing the obedience of Jesus he retains the priority of God’s freedom 
in command over his relationship to the world. That this plays itself out in 
human obedience to God’s will, rather than in idealistic formulations of 
human morality, has much in common with the ethical perspectives 
developed in Protestant thought by Kierkegaard, Barth, and Bonhoeffer. Yet 
here, in this account of the cross, von Balthasar makes the cross the source of 
                                                
481 Ibid., 66. 
482 Ibid., 69. Internal block quote cited by Balthasar from Eis ton Hagion Pascha, 
ed. Nautin, in Sources Chrétiennes 27, pp. 177-79. 
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historical continuity, that which would “[hold] together the rupture.” In the 
‘apocalyptic’ account I am arguing here, and contrary at this point to von 
Balthasar,483 the cross is the location of the rupture, the absolute barrier 
between the old and the new that cannot be overcome in any way except in 
the free act of God ex nihilo, in resurrection. The cross is not the link between 
heaven and earth, but just the opposite: it is the rupture, the discontinuity.  
 Consider, in contrast to von Balthasar, this from Alan Lewis: 
 
Then the grave of Jesus becomes a boundary preventing forward 
movement until one has first looked back, without the light of Easter, 
at the cross and seen its cataclysmic extinguishing of every light. In fact, 
there is no boundary, only a no man’s land. With no remarkable 
tomorrow on the horizon to give that sabbath special identity and form 
as an interruption between old and new, the interment of Jesus is 
shapeless and anti-climactic. It is simply the day after terminal rupture. 
This is the end of a man, a mission and a message; the end of the God 
of whom the message spoke, from whom the mission came, and to 
whom the man was Son; and the end of the world for all whose future 
hung with the coming of the Father’s kingdom.484 
 
b. The cross as the end of history 
 
 If Jesus is the norm of history, and his life is the particular instantiation 
of this norm, a recapitulation of humanity in this one life, then what do we 
make of his death? It is the posing of this question, the question of the death 
of Christ, that leads away from the continuity von Balthasar sees in the cross 
and suggests that we might take a more sustained look at the cross as a 
disruption of historical continuity, as a rupture in history.  
 
                                                
483 Von Balthasar is also described, for good reason, as an ‘apocalyptic’ 
theologian by Cyril O’Regan, but that discussion is beyond the scope of the 
present argument. Cf. O’Regan, Theology and the Spaces of Apocalyptic 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2009). 
484 Alan Lewis, “The Burial of God: Rupture and Resumption as the Story of 
Salvation.” The Scottish Journal of Theology 40, no. 3 (1987), 345-46. 
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 i. Bonhoeffer: From the End of History to the Resurrection 
 
 In his lectures on Genesis, Dietrich Bonhoeffer turns our attention to 
the beginning of history, the beginning of human thought that leads toward 
the movement of culture and community. This beginning is not at the Garden 
of Eden where God begins the history of humanity with God, but instead it 
begins “on the ground that is cursed. It is with Cain that history begins, the 
history of death.”485 Bonhoeffer’s exegesis here is not grounded of necessity in 
the Genesis text, but is determined hermeneutically from the perspective of 
the cross of Christ. It is because the judgment that occurs at the cross is the 
judgment against Adam’s usurpation of God’s place to judge (good from 
evil)486 that one can look back and see that which ends at the cross is that 
which had its beginning with the sin of Adam and Eve. This sin is exemplified 
by the birth of the first one to murder, Cain, whose place, sicut deus, is the 
final and ultimate extension of the original sin, that is, to be the judge over 
good and evil in place of God. Abel, in the Genesis account (Gen 4.1-16), is the 
first human to die, the first human to undergo the curse that, in God’s 
judgment, accompanies the sin of Adam and Eve. The violence of murder 
begins the history of death. For Bonhoeffer, this interpretation is grounded in 
the cross of Jesus and is made explicit in his line of reasoning: “The end of 
Cain’s history, and so the end of all history [das Ende der Geschichte 
überhaupt], is Christ on the cross, the murdered Son of God. That is the last 
desperate assault on the gate of paradise. And under the whirling sword, 
under the cross, the human race dies.“487 It is clear, then, that at this point in 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding, the historical trajectory that determines the 
human story is brought to a decisive end with the death of the Messiah.  
                                                
485 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 145. Italics in original. 
486 Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Reinhard Krauss, et al., vol. 6, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 313ff. 
Here Bonhoeffer discusses Jesus’ command not to judge in Matt. 7.1, which he 
links to the Genesis story of the Fall, “because judging is itself the apostasy 
from God” (p. 315). 
487 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 145-46. German in brackets as in original. 
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 To understand how this conception of the end of history functions for 
theology and a theology of history, it is important to remember the obvious 
fact that the human race, and along with it the creation itself, still experiences 
the finality of death as a horizon that lies in the future. Whether the death of 
individuals, genocide, war, the death of non-human species, or the feared 
death of the life supporting ecosystems of the planet due to ecological ruin 
(human-caused or natural in origin); the reality of death remains 
determinative for human understanding and for any sense of human progress. 
“The last enemy to be destroyed is death” (1 Cor. 15.26).  
  
 ii. Baptism 
 
 Baptism is a dwelling at the cross, a confrontation of the finality of 
death. It is part of a movement of grace that exposes one to the knowledge of 
the depths of the grave of the Son of God, but does so within the context of 
the promise of a new life. Baptism is to find one’s own death—future death—
in the one death of the Son of God. “To be conformed to the crucified—that 
means to be a human being judged by God. People carry before them 
everyday God’s death sentence, that they must die before God because of 
sin.”488 That death is the reality that faces all human life as an end and as a 
judgment on sin, is also the basis for the command to die to sin: “Human 
beings bear all suffering laid upon them, knowing that it serves them to die to 
their own will, and to let the justice of God prevail over them. Only by 
acknowledging that God is in the right over them and against them are they 
right before God.489 The good news of the Gospel is that the judgment that 
humans have brought on themselves is, at the cross, taken up by the judge 
himself.490 That is how baptism comes to play such a central role in the life of 
the disciple, for it is in baptism that the believer identifies her life with the life 
of Jesus on the way to the cross, and so is buried with him in the waters of 
                                                
488 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 94. 
489 Ibid., 95. 
490 CD IV.1 sect. 59.2. 
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death. The act of identification is the act of faith that Jesus’ death is now our 
death and the believer is free to live apart from the final, limiting logic of 
death. In the same way, history, with its end still out before it, is found to be 
taken up in the cross of Christ. The believing historian who would narrate the 
meaning of world events, of world history, must see that the only possible 
end for the world on the world’s terms is the cross of Christ. But to say “on 
the world’s terms” signals another possibility, as does the association with 
baptism: What other terms are there? What comes on the other side of 
baptism? 
 
c. History, Resurrection, and New Creation 
 
 In his Ethics, Bonhoeffer progresses from the disciple’s conformation to 
the crucified one to the disciple’s conformation to the risen one:  
 
To be conformed to the risen one—that means to be a new human 
being before God. We live in the midst of death; we are righteous in the 
midst of sin; we are new in the midst of the old. Our mystery remains 
hidden from the world. We live because Christ lives, and in Christ 
alone. “Christ is my life.” As long as the glory of Christ is hidden, so 
the glory of the new life also is “hidden with Christ in God” (Col. 
3:2).491  
 
As seen already in the previous discussion of creatio ex nihilo, Bonhoeffer 
relates the transition from death to life as analogous to the transition from 
nothing to being in the divine act of creation. This is why resurrection is not 
Hegelian synthesis, not Aufhebung, but is, indeed, a novum. It is, like the 
creation, a free act of God that is not contingent on anything but his will. Here 
we can bring to mind the Kierkegaardian infinite qualitative distinction. It is 
infinite, not according to a continuum of being with two poles, one finite and 
one infinite, but it is infinite as a way of saying that it is not ontologically 
comparable, thus a qualitative distinction rather than a quantitative one. The 
                                                
491 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 95. 
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distance between cross and resurrection is equally infinite and qualitative 
because it is grounded in the freedom of God who is wholly other. The 
resurrection, therefore, is not a historical event in the sense that history is a 
continuous narrative that finds its common thread in immanent processes of 
cause and effect—or even in a deity ontologically bound in whatever 
hierarchy we imagine to be a part of that process. To assert, as Bonhoeffer 
does, the relationship between creatio ex nihilo and the resurrection, is to make 
the freedom of God ‘apocalyptically’ related to the history of creation, even if 
God is intimately involved within history. He is never bound to a process of 
that trajectory, but free with respect to it. This is what it means to affirm that 
history ends at the cross. What begins at the resurrection is not a new history 
given to humanity to forge according to a new understanding, but—and this 
is seen clearly in baptism—a new history in Christ. Bonhoeffer states this 
clearly when he says that, “we are righteous in the midst of sin; we are new in 
the midst of the old. Our mystery remains hidden from the world.” 
 But again, we must qualify this theological reflection on God’s aseity 
and freedom with respect to the contingent, historical order. This is because 
there is an important Christological element that must be identified so as not 
to lose sight of the fact that the issue is not an escape from history, from the 
temporal world of time and space, but is rather a unique way of being present 
in time and space. The Christian way of living within history is a living 
toward the cross/death, but because death has been redefined by the cross, 
the person who has claimed the Yes of faith lives free from the constraining 
logic of death that directs the immanent forces of history.492 Again, Alan 
Lewis helps with an important corrective: 
 
On first hearing, the Easter story confirmed beyond all question God’s 
Yes to Jesus, and revealed him as the irruption of transcendent grace 
into a godless world. But hearing thereafter the extended story of his 
                                                
492 By “forces of history” I do not mean ontological forces, but interpretative 
forces: whatever narrative continuity makes sense of the movement of history 
and continues to direct that movement toward the future (e.g., the myth of 
American exceptionalism, the Pax Romana, etc.). 
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passion reinforces the unheard-of immanence: God’s presence, 
incarnate and unseen, in that godless world, among its criminals and 
cripples, its villains and victims, beside whom and as whom Jesus lived 
and died and was interred. Mark has a Roman officer penetrate the 
incognito at the point of maximum ungodlikeness (15.39)….To ease the 
awkwardness, a temporary suspension has in effect been postulated 
for the Incarnation. At the point of Jesus’ godforsakenness and death, 
the Word withdraws or lapses into quietitude[sic], that he should 
perish in his humanness alone. Yet if the resurrection has confirmed 
that this is God’s humanity, and has been all along, is he less so hanging 
in the garden or growing in the womb?493 
 
There is an “unheard-of immanence” with the Incarnation that forces our 
theological constructs to make room for the essential affirmation that the end 
of history and the new creation, ex nihilo, belong to the world. Preceding 
Bonhoeffer’s discussion of being conformed to the crucified, he writes that we 
are,  
 
[t]o be conformed to the one who has become human—that is what 
being human really means. The human being should and may be 
human. All super-humanity [Übermenschentum], all efforts to 
outgrow one’s nature as human, all struggle to be heroic or a demigod, 
all fall away from a person here, because they are untrue….The real 
human being is allowed to be in freedom the creature of the Creator. 
To be conformed to the one who became human means that we may be 
the human beings that we really are….God loves the real human being. 
God became a real human being.494 
 
Shortly after this passage Bonhoeffer goes on to turn on its head Athanasius’s 
claim that God became human that humans might become divine. Rather, 
“Human beings become human because God became human. But human 
beings do not become God. They could not and do not accomplish a change in 
form; God changes form into human form in order that human beings can 
                                                
493 Lewis, “The Burial of God,” 351. 
494 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 94. 
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become, not God, but human before God.”495 The Christological affirmation of 
the hypostatic union does not allow for the abandonment of history in favor 
of a non-worldly divine existence after the ‘end of history.’ Rather it affirms 
that the end of history is good news for the world, a news that is given to the 
world for the sake of the world (but not of the world). Those who have been 
baptised into this ending live the new life after baptism, in a new history.  
 
d. The End of History in Christological Terms 
 
 All human history is properly understood from the centre who is Jesus 
Christ. If Jesus is the one of whom the confession affirms that he is fully God 
and fully human, then he must reveal to us truly what it means to be human. 
This is affirmed in what T. F. Torrance refers to as the an-hypostatic 
movement of God the Son who became a human by taking into his person 
(hypostasis) humanity, but not a pre-existing particular human person, a 
second hypostasis. This singular hypostasis of the Son in human form, Jesus 
of Nazareth, not only takes up humanity, but in taking it up becomes the focal 
point for what it means to be human in truth. Paul’s Adam Christology 
assumes this close identification between normative (redeemed) humanity 
and Jesus by associating him directly as the last or second Adam as well as 
the prototype of resurrected humanity (1 Cor. 15.45-49). In this way the 
meaning of humanity is disclosed in this unique event and therefore human 
history, to the extent that it is a search for human meaning, is also disclosed in 
this unique event.  
 At this point it becomes helpful to say that when God enters history he 
enters it ‘an-historically’ in the same way that he takes up humanity an-
hypostatically. This proposal would affirm that he takes up the meaning of all 
human history as he takes up humanity and in that act he locates it in the one 
‘en-historical’ (because en-hypostatic) person of Jesus, the Messiah of Israel. 
Furthermore, it is ‘an-historical’ in the same sense that the an-hypostatic 
                                                
495 Ibid., 96. 
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union is not determined by an existing person but rather determines the 
humanity to which he comes according to the pre-existing person of the Son. 
The ‘an-historical’ movement means that the coming of God is not 
determined by a history in such a way that the history to which he comes 
would determine his own history, but he comes freely to history as the 
ground and meaning—the norm—of all human history in himself.  
 To be clear, the language of ‘an-historical’ does not function here in 
analogical correspondence to the language of ‘an-hypostatic’. Rather, it is a 
deeper movement into the logic of what it means for the Son to take humanity 
to himself, and not a particular, pre-existing human person. In our ontological 
descriptions of humanity, however we conceive of the 
physical/spiritual/psychic composition of the human person, we must 
include in that description the aspect of temporality. But to include the 
consideration of the unity of the human being in temporal endurance means 
that we enter the realm of the historical, the meaning that can be given to a 
person as that person endures through time. Human nature can never be 
abstracted from the historical dimension, but to the extent that Jesus takes up 
humanity, he necessarily takes up its historical dimension. So, to speak of the 
an-hypostatic movement is also, at a more specific level, to speak of an an-
historical movement. 
 It should also be clear that in this formulation the concept ‘history’ is not 
an ontological concept that refers to history as an existence of the sort found 
in Hegel’s philosophy of history. Rather, history is the meaningful 
interpretation of events and the identification of that meaning in narrative 
form, or in shorthand narrative referents (e.g. “The Reformation”, or “The 
Roman Empire”). Therefore, if the Son takes humanity to himself and 
recapitulates it in his own existence as the God-man, then we must say that 
our search for meaning in human history necessarily looks to the God-man as 
well. In other words, to ask about humanity is to ask about history. Jesus of 
Nazareth is the theological ground for anthropology and, therefore, history. 
 This move does not negate the ‘en-historical’ movement; when the Son 
becomes human he does so by becoming a particular human person. So too, 
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when the Son becomes the human Jesus, he ‘becomes’ a particular history. 
This movement to ‘become’ a particular history is a significant part of what it 
means to become human. However there is a slight but significant difference 
between the way we speak of him being human and the way we speak of him 
having a history of his own. Without the historical piece it is easy to think of 
his becoming human apart from the addition of a human hypostasis to his 
being, but it is difficult to think of his movement into history in the same way. 
This is because we imagine history in such a way that it is an ongoing process 
into which a human enters simply by being born. By entering the world as the 
person of Jesus, the Son enters a history, namely, the history of Israel. The 
problem with this sort of thinking is that Jesus as the Son is not determined by 
this history but rather determines that history. This is the same dynamic that 
occurs when his personhood comes to determine the identity of the person of 
Jesus of Nazareth. Because he is the norm of history, history is entirely 
determined by his own life history. In the en-historical dynamic the history of 
Israel is elected again as the location for the ground of the meaning of history, 
but it is done so according to the new Messianic norm for Israel revealed in 
Jesus. In other words, the Incarnation is the divine electing, once again, to be 
in covenant with people, through Israel, for the world.496 God, therefore, 
centres the meaning of all human history in this one particular history, just as 
the en-hypostatic movement of the Son centres all of human identity in the 
one person, the Son of Israel, Jesus of Nazareth.  
 Nevertheless, if we follow Kierkegaard’s reasoning, we must affirm that 
in this ‘an-historic’—‘en-historic’ movement of the Son he remains incognito as 
the Son of God. His history is knowable as a human history. He is a 
crucifiable, first-century Jew. In this particularity, in this one man and this one 
history all of humanity and the entire history of the world is gathered up and 
taken to its judgment is inconceivable for the very reason that it is a particular 
human being’s history. Such a thing is inconceivable unless this is God with 
                                                
496 Rom. 11.17-24. I take this text and the whole thrust of Romans 9-11 to be 
affirming the priority of Israel through God’s gracious election, in continuity 
with the prior covenant, but now revealed in Jesus.  
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us. But that it is God with us is the scandal, the offense, and this means that in 
Jesus of Nazareth and his history is the whole of history incognito. 
 The cross stands at the end of Jesus’ history and so it also stands as the 
end of human history. It is the telos toward which all things move. All human 
events that might find meaning or be given meaning through human 
practices of storytelling or narration—the work of the historian or the work of 
the preacher—move toward the cross. The theological move here should be 
evident: the same identification that is at work in baptism, where the 
individual identifies her life with the life of Christ and so dies with Christ, is 
also at work in the believer for whom perception has been shaped by the gift 
of the Spirit, i.e., given the condition to see. This new perception must see 
history according to the humanity taken up by the Son, particularized in the 
Messiah of Israel, and ended at the cross. The identification of the individual 
in baptism is simply extrapolated to the identification of the collective history 
of all people. There is no telos, no teleology that can escape the gravitational 
pull of the cross of Christ.  
 What then of the question of continuity? Is there any sense left to 
speaking of historical continuity between the time before the crucifixion and 
the time after? For world history continuity is not an issue for it continues 
along the same trajectory, toward the same end, the end revealed in 
crucifixion. History remains condemned by its own judgment when it judged 
the one who is the norm of history, which was epitomised in the cry of the 
crowd, “crucify him!” and in the indifference or political expediency of the 
court of Pilate. But what of history redeemed? History on the other side of the 
cross? Is there a continuity that can be affirmed there? Yes. But the continuity 
is preserved according to the ‘en-historic’ and en-hypostatic union; history is 
preserved in continuity only in the divine hypostasis who is the Son of God. 
Historical continuity is only preserved this way in the person of the Son 
because he remains as he has become, human. History is, in this view, out of 
the hands of the various world-historical forces—economies, nations, 
corporations, regimes, etc.—and is in the hands of the Lamb who was slain.  
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Then I saw in the right hand of the one seated on the throne a scroll 
written on the inside and on the back, sealed with seven seals; and I 
saw a mighty angel proclaiming with a loud voice, “Who is worthy to 
open the scroll and break its seals?” And no one in heaven or on earth 
was able to open the scroll or to look into it….Then I saw between the 
throne and the four living creatures and among the elders a Lamb 
standing as if it had been slaughtered….He went and took the scroll 
from the right hand of the one who was seated on the throne. When he 
had taken the scroll, the four living creatures and the twenty-four 
elders fell before the Lamb, each holding a harp and golden bowls of 
incense, which are the prayers of the saints. They sing a new song: You 
are worthy to take the scroll and to open its seals, for you were 
slaughtered and by your blood you ransomed for God saints from 
every tribe and language and people and nation: you have made them 
to be a kingdom and priests serving our God, and they will reign on 
earth. (Rev. 5.1-10, NRSV)  
 
 If the scroll in this text from the book of Revelation is taken to be the 
outcome, or the future of human history, it supports the case being made here 
that Jesus is the one to whom we look for the meaning of history since he is 
the only one able to open the scroll.497 Furthermore, the end of history appears 
to be death and destruction as each of the seven seals is opened. Yet in the 
midst of the opening of the seals the reader of the apocalypse sees in the fifth 
seal “the souls of those who had been slaughtered for the word of God” (Rev. 
6.9). They cry out to God for vengeance on the inhabitants of the earth. In the 
final seal, whose opening begins chapter 8, there is silence in heaven for half 
an hour. Then we see a great quantity of incense offered, the smoke of which 
rose “with the prayers of the saints” Once this is done the censer is filled with 
fire from the altar and thrown to the earth in a great show of thunder, 
lightning, and an earthquake.  
 The point of this excursus into the vision of John is to show that the 
history of the world, depicted in the definitive Christian apocalyptic text, is 
                                                
497 See, for example the discussion in G. K. Beale, The Book of Revelation: A 
Commentary on the Greek Text, The New International Greek Testament 
Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 337-42. 
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thoroughly consistent with the dogmatic account that I am providing. It is 
grounded in the person of Jesus, and its end is consistent with the end 
revealed in the crucifixion. For the saints who wait and pray, their hope for 
history, their sense of continuity, is revealed by their prayers, their hope in the 
one who holds history in his hands because he entered history, and entered 
into the judgment of history.  
 The implication of this for the relationship between theology and the 
other ‘scientific’ disciplines is stated with clarity by Hans Urs von Balthasar:  
 
“There are three things we cannot do: we cannot carry on with natural 
metaphysics, natural ethics, natural jurisprudence, natural study of 
history, acting as though Christ were not, in the concrete, the norm of 
everything. Nor can we lay down an unrelated ‘double truth’, with the 
secular scholar and scientist on the one hand and the theologian on the 
other studying the same object without any encounter or intersection 
between their two methods. Nor, finally, can we allow the secular 
disciplines to be absorbed by theology as though it alone were 
competent in all cases because Christ alone is the norm. Precisely 
because Christ is the absolute he remains incommensurate with the 
norms of this world; and no final accord between theology and the 
other disciplines is possible within the limits of this world.”498 
   
If Christ is the norm of everything, his cross stands central as that which 
spells out the limits of both the human qua human, and of the totality of 
human history. 
 
3. Historiography According to Theology: Three Theses 
 
 The question now arises, What has all this to do with the historian? To 
be clear, the issue before us is not the issue of secular historiography. 
Whatever the metaphysical commitments of the secular historian, the 
arguments presented thus far have only to do with the historian who 
understands herself to be working from within the Christian tradition. In 
                                                
498 Balthasar, A Theology of History, 18-19. 
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order to focus the discussion I have taken the work of N. T. Wright as an 
example of the sort of historian/believer that I have in mind. That Wright has 
undertaken to think through and articulate carefully and repeatedly his 
historical and theological method makes his work especially suited to be 
examined with the purpose of furthering a theological understanding of 
historiography. Indeed, Wright himself has on several occasions hinted that 
the conversation on method is either lacking or that it needs more reflection. 
 
It is history as well as faith which enables us to say “he loved me and 
gave himself for me.” It will not do to shun history, to declare it off 
limits, just because there is such a thing as skeptical historiography—
any more than we should shun the use of money because there is a god 
called Mammon….There is a proper history and there is an improper 
history, and though they may sometimes look alike they need to be 
distinguished, and the former not rejected because of the existence of 
the latter. There is a large task still waiting here, namely, the fresh 
articulation of a historical method which will not be dictated to from 
within the shrunken world of post-Enlightenment epistemology but 
rather be open to genuine knowledge of the past….When faith says, 
“he loved me and gave himself for me,” it can properly look to history 
to back it up. Otherwise we lay ourselves open once more to the 
obvious charge of fantasy….499 
  
 Wright has given us an account of historiography that can engage 
serious history in a variety of forums, from the seminar rooms of academia to 
the fellowship halls of almost every Christian denomination. What Wright 
calls “sceptical historiography” is that historiography which rules a priori that 
the world of historical events is a world closed to the agency of God so that 
the biblical narratives must be examined methodologically to explain, based 
on immanent relations of cause and effect, events that would otherwise be 
understood by the biblical writers to be “miraculous” or “supernatural.” 
Wright takes the biblical writers on their own terms, attempting to enter their 
thinking as the sort of thing Collingwood articulated, “to ‘rethink’ or 
                                                
499 Wright in, JPPG, 155-56. 
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inwardly re-enact the deliberations of past agents, thereby rendering their 
behavior intelligible.”500 Collingwood puts it like this: “But how does the 
historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only 
one way in which it can be done: by rethinking them in his own mind….The 
history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past 
thought in the historian’s own mind.“501 The importance of this way of doing 
history, of thinking the thoughts of the past, is that it comes as close as 
possible to giving us a genuine encounter with the past:502 we come into a 
certain type of contact with it and thus can benefit from it. “If these systems 
[of thought] remain valuable to posterity, that is not in spite of their strictly 
historical character but because of it. To us, the ideas expressed in them are 
ideas belonging to the past; but it is not a dead past; by understanding it 
historically we incorporate it into our present thought, and enable ourselves 
by developing and criticizing it to use that heritage for our own 
advancement.”503 Wright is unashamedly attempting to rethink the thoughts 
and intentions of the people and world of the Bible. The question with respect 
to Wright is simply this: Is his method adequate to the question of God? For 
Christian historiography in general the question of God as an object of inquiry 
remains the significant question. 
 The conclusion of this thesis will be developed according to three basic 
theses: 
 
 1. The limitation of theology to worldviews is a form of methodological 
naturalism, even if it allows for theological questions.  
2. For a Christian theological epistemology, Christian theology determines 
epistemology, and not the other way around.  
                                                
500 Cf. Wright, “In Grateful Dialogue: A Response” in JRI. 
501 Collingwood, The Idea of History, 215. 
502 This is similar to D. Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, trans. Louise 
Pettibone Smith, and Erminie Huntress Lantero (London: Charles Scribner’s 
Son’s, 1958), 13. 
503 Collingwood, The Idea of History, 230. 
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3. Theological historiography will be shaped by a theology of history for 
which the cross is the hermeneutical centre.  
 
To the above theses more could be added by way of a positive development 
of a Christian historiography, but this work is intended only as a theological 
corrective to Wright’s historical and theological method and not as a 
development of an entirely new historiographical method.  
  
a. The Limitation of Theology to Worldviews is a Form of Methodological 
Naturalism: Critical Realism Reconsidered 
 
 In an essay written in response to Wright’s second volume, Jesus and the 
Victory of God, C. Stephen Evans questions whether or not Wright’s method is 
a form of “methodological naturalism.”504 Evans introduces methodological 
naturalism as the approach to history, advocated by Troeltsch, which can be 
articulated according to three principles: the principle of criticism, the 
principle of analogy, and the principle of correlation.505 In very brief form, the 
principle of criticism commits the historian to a reliance on evidence, and that 
evidence is always regarded with suspicion and therefore conclusions are 
always open to revision. The second principle is a commitment to the 
“uniformity of natural causes”506 such that the only causes which are allowed 
to be considered are the sorts of causes known to be operative in the natural 
world. Third, the principle of correlation is similar to the second in that it is a 
causal principle, but this one places the event in question within a “causal 
nexus,” that is, a closed continuum of cause and effect in which are not 
allowed any causes that transcend the closed system.507 “The sole task of 
                                                
504 In Newman, JRI, 180-205. See Wright’s brief response in the same volume, 
pp. 248-252. 
505 Ibid., 183. Evans is here following the three principles attributed to 
Troeltsch laid out in Van Austin Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The 
Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief (London: SCM Press, 1967), 
14-15. The page numbers in Evans’s citation are incorrect. 
506 Newman, JRI, 183. 
507 Ibid. 
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history in its specifically theoretical aspect is to explain every movement, 
process, state, and nexus of things by reference to its web of its causal 
relations.”508 Evans makes the further distinction between two types of 
methodological naturalism, one being characterised by a commitment to it as 
obligatory for doing history, and the other which sees it simply as a tool of the 
historian, one of several possible methodological approaches. Evans makes 
the claim that Wright is this second type of methodological naturalist.509 For 
Evans, this is not a problem if it is not seen as the only possibility for the good 
historian. The problem with what Wright does is that he does not 
acknowledge the limits of his naturalistic approach. 
 Evans finds evidence of this in Wright’s rejection of a “‘supernaturalist’ 
worldview” in JVG.510 The difference for Wright is that when an appeal is 
made to a supernaturalist worldview a sort of methodological trump card is 
played making the work of the historian irrelevant because it is unregulated 
by any but the most permissive or abstract standard. The effect of this for 
Jesus studies is that attention is directed away from the actual message of 
Jesus (e.g., Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom) and onto the apologetic 
question of whether or not we ought to believe the Bible. Evans’s critique of 
Wright is to show that the supernaturalist worldview (and here the 
conversation is regarding miracles) is in fact the Christian worldview with 
respect to the question of the nature of the agency of God. But this is not to be 
oversimplified as a Deist worldview, since the Christian framework affirms at 
the same time both the transcendence of God and his immanence. Evans 
clarifies that, “Wright…does not wish to be committed to a metaphysical 
naturalism. However, one can reject a dogmatic form of metaphysical 
naturalism and still be committed in practice to a methodological naturalism 
as the proper stance for historians to take….”511  
                                                
508 Ernst Troeltsch, “Historiography,” in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. 
James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1914), 718. 
509 Newman, JRI, 188. 
510 Ibid., 189. Cf. JVG, 187. 
511 Ibid., 190. Wright’s response, p. 264, agrees with Evans, yet he wants to 
distance himself from the language of “supernatural” for the reason that this 
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 Wright’s brief response to Evans’s critique, found in the same volume, 
focuses on the accusation that his method appears to be committed to a 
“causal nexus” limited to natural events.512 In response, Wright appeals to the 
fact that his work has attempted to follow, with Ben F. Meyer, Collingwood’s 
method, described above, i.e., to enter into the thoughts and intentions of past 
agents. This approach opens the door to the ‘supernatural’ since the 
worldviews of past agents are open to the ‘supernatural’. Wright affirms a 
metaphysical commitment to the active agency of God, but wants to see such 
agency occurring within and according to the observable within history, “that 
it is in the ‘ordinary’ events of Jesus’ life, just as much as the ‘extraordinary’ 
events, that we should recognise the presence of the true God.”513 The 
question is whether or not Wright allows knowledge of the ‘extraordinary’ to 
enter the historian’s consideration outside of the consideration of the various 
worldviews of past agents. The difference that Wright sees between 
methodological naturalism and his own method, is that he allows the 
‘supernatural’ as part of the worldview of the people who claim such an event 
to have happened. Was it likely that Jesus could have predicted his second 
coming? Is that something that could have been part of his worldview? Could 
Paul have believed such and such? If MN limits the possibilities of history to 
the worldview of the Enlightenment, Wright’s version limits the possibilities 
of history to that which was allowed by the worldviews of the people 
experiencing the events in question. This is a leap forward in gaining the 
meaning of a text since it genuinely asks and thinks in the framework of the 
subject-matter. Yet, allowing the ‘supernatural’ or ‘extraordinary’ to be 
considered within the worldview of objects of study, nevertheless, still 
subjects the historian’s method to a sociology of knowledge, and therefore, 
maintains a naturalistic framework. It might be a departure from the 
                                                                                                                                       
language in contemporary usage is too closely associated with a Deistic 
worldview. New ways of speaking of the relation between God and the world 
need to be developed to avoid confusion. I will continue to use the language 
of supernatural but will include the word in scare quotes (‘) to signal this 
nuance. 
512 For Wright’s response see Ibid., 250-52.; 263-264 
513 Wright in JRI, 264. 
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Enlightenment framework, but it also might be seen only as an expansion of 
that framework—a development but not a departure. 
 If Wright’s method remains within a naturalistic frame, then here is the 
heart of the question. Did something new happen in the arrival of Jesus the 
Messiah that, although present enough in time and space to be interpreted in 
terms of first century Judaism, nevertheless required an acceptance of 
something, or the gift of perception, which challenged that worldview from 
outside any conceivable worldview? And if so, how does such an event enter 
into the work of the historian? In the terms that Kierkegaard’s Climacus gave 
us, can the truth be learned?  
 The entire thrust of this thesis has been to press the question of the 
reality of God—both in his immanence and his transcendence. If Wright’s 
critical realism is committed to external reality, and if that reality is 
encountered in contact, then the Christian faith is committed to an encounter 
with the reality of God as its epistemological ground. This does not mean, 
however that God is part of the world, the reality that we describe when we 
speak ontologically, except as he has made himself known through his words 
and acts and, in a special and qualitatively unique way, in the person of Jesus 
of Nazareth. Wright certainly recognises this point: “There is of course no 
commonly agreed upon conceptuality, still less is there language to express it, 
to talk about the ways in which the God we know in Jesus Christ and by the 
Spirit does act in relation to the world to which he is in so many senses 
always present and from which he nevertheless remains mysteriously 
distinct.”514 Yet this is the crucial question! How does God relate to this 
world? How can we know when and where he does? It is how this question is 
answered with respect to Wright’s work that makes the difference for 
understanding my particular critique of his historical method—and for 
understanding a theological approach to historiography in general.  
 The way that I have gone about answering these questions can be 
focused in the following two points. First, God’s act is primary in his self-
revelation. There is no way to move from contact with the reality 
                                                
514 Ibid. 
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ontologically immanent to the cosmos and thereby transcend to the 
knowledge of God on our own. The distance between us and God is, from our 
standpoint, qualitatively infinite. Again, this is not according to a continuum 
of being that moves along the same ontological scale from finite to infinite, 
but the difference is qualitatively absolute; God is wholly other. The account 
that I have given of theological epistemology rules out any transcendental 
method that would move along a path of being to the reality of God. 
Nevertheless, God acts and God reveals himself. Any critical realism that 
would investigate God, or the things of God, must take into account this as 
theologically basic. That must at least mean, for Wright’s work, that the 
question of God which frames his entire project is open to the self-revelatory act 
of God. Put more directly, Wright’s historiography needs to show that it is 
methodologically committed to the reality of the priority of God’s act to 
reveal himself. 
 If this is so, then to bracket out the question of Jesus’ divinity at the 
outset of JVG is problematic. On the one hand, it can be a genuinely legitimate 
move if we are asking the question of the purely immanent perspective of the 
people around Jesus who would have him crucified. Wright’s commitment to 
work within the limits of worldviews, and to make the epistemological 
grounding of theology limited to a sociological account of knowing within 
worldviews, allows for a thorough and holistic approach to the way humans 
know things. What were those who crucified Jesus thinking, how did they 
interpret his life and ministry, what would they lose and gain were they to let 
him live or have him killed? In what sense was he, in their eyes, a crucifiable 
first century Jew?515 Yet the question about how Jesus saw himself is, from the 
perspective of Christian theology, a complex theological question that cannot 
be definitively answered according to a method grounded in naturalism. That 
                                                
515 Admittedly there are theological questions here, too, but for the moment it 
seems such questions are valid on one level for one purpose, namely, 
understanding the purely human reactions to Jesus’ ministry. In 
Kierkegaard’s perspective this might be said to be an examination of the 
nature of the offence. But of course, to say that, implies the theological side of 
the picture, which I am arguing is completely legitimate. 
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is, if we limit the investigation of Jesus to purely naturalistic criteria (by 
holding aside the question of his divinity) our result will not be docetic,516 but 
it is doubtful if it will be useful for an understanding of who Jesus is. At the 
extreme end it might be said to be methodologically Arian.517 Another way of 
saying this is to say that a naturalistic portrayal of Jesus helps us understand 
the context of his life, the world into which he came, and the questions that 
people were addressing to him, etc. These are of course key aspects of doing 
exegesis. But the distinction can be seen if we recall the comment by Barth in 
his Table Talk: “I do not like books trying to prove the rightness of the Bible by 
archaeological research, but the results of this research are an important help 
in understanding the biblical witness to Christ. However, no historical 
research can help us prove God’s revelation as reality. Historical research will 
never be an approach to the Word of God.”518 I think Wright would agree, but I 
also want to argue that Wright’s method still does not provide us with an 
“approach” to the Word of God. Evans’ simple argument that Christians have 
for two thousand years claimed to know God in and through history apart 
from the work of critical historiography suggests that for faith, there is an 
approach that is legitimate and useful for the church and that can be claimed 
as knowledge—even historical knowledge. 
 Perhaps it would be helpful to picture the act of God in self-revelation 
through the Spirit as a direct line moving forward, perhaps as a sort of river 
of God’s revelatory act. As the believer is caught up in that movement 
through the gift of faith, there are moments where it is useful and helpful, 
even necessary, to look sideways and understand a cross section of that 
movement, to compare it with the world around, and take stock of where one 
is relative to the landscape. Such a move helps to understand the flow of the 
river and is essential in providing necessary perspective—both for those 
                                                
516 Cf. JVG, 653. 
517 Whether or not this is equally as damaging as being fully Arian remains to 
be seen, but I am only here putting the emphasis on the qualifier, 
“methodologically.” I am not saying that Wright is a heretic! Nevertheless it is 
the appropriate corollary to his somewhat frequent appeals to ‘docetism.’ 
518 Godsey, Karl Barth’s Table Talk, 69. 
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inside and those outside of the moving river. Nevertheless, such glances are 
not an approach to the movement of the river, but only a helpful 
understanding of where one is in the flow. One might even attempt to see the 
river from the perspective of someone on the bank of the river by 
methodologically blocking one’s own view from consideration, but such an 
exercise will only be an exercise, from the perspective of those in the river, of 
not seeing clearly, that is if the view from the river is the definitive view on all 
the world. The metaphor, of course, breaks down pressed too far, but it might 
help to express the distinction Barth is making with respect to historical 
research, that it is not an “approach to the Word of God.” The approach always 
happens within the movement of the Word of God. 
 The second point that needs to be made is that if one is trying to be 
critically realist and brackets out one aspect of that reality for methodological 
reasons, those reasons need to be explicit and they need to be justified by the 
reality that is being set aside. Otherwise, the method is not realistic. The 
critical realist necessarily is bound to the phenomena that presents itself in 
reality. For the believer this is the act of God in Jesus Christ, known through 
the work of the Spirit. I have already suggested some reasons for approaching 
history from a perspective outside of faith, but these reasons are all 
determined by faith, and find their ultimate grounding in faith. This leads us 
to the next of our theses, namely that Christian theology determines 
epistemology. 
 
b. For a Christian Theological Epistemology, Christian Theology 
Determines Epistemology 
 
 I have attempted to show that Christian theology has a distinct 
epistemological position that is determined by its unique object of knowledge: 
God revealed to us in Jesus Christ and God active in that knowledge. 
Through appeal to the “theological science” of T. F. Torrance, the reality of 
this revelatory event and its continuing reality has been presented in such a 
way so as to show how it is determinative for theological knowledge. If this is 
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the case, then theology needs to determine epistemology. The important 
aspect of this is the continuing agency of God for the Christian way of 
knowing. This is a corrective to the epistemology of Wright for whom 
Christian theology, to which he turns in NTPG after providing a more general 
account of theology and worldviews, operates according to his “analysis…of 
worldviews and how they work.”519 “Christian theology only does what all 
other worldviews and their ancillary belief-systems do: it claims to be talking 
about reality as a whole.”520 This is a corrective to Wright’s epistemology, not 
a wholesale rejection of it. His account of worldviews, to the extent that it 
reflects accurately the way in which humans know things, is exactly right as 
far as it goes. The corrective comes when he wants to speak of God. As I have 
shown in the previous section, to speak of the Christian God is to speak of a 
reality who makes himself known.  
 The core of this critique then is grounded in the actuality of the 
relationship between our words about God and God’s self-revelation, his 
acting in and through those words. At the heart of the church’s proclamation, 
a proclamation out of which the Christian scriptures emerged, is the actual 
relation between the event of God’s self-revelation in and as521 the person of 
Jesus and the church’s witness to this event. Or, we might say the ground of 
Christian knowledge is the personal relationship between Jesus and the 
disciple who bears witness to him, a relationship grounded in the work of the 
Spirit. Of crucial importance here is the fact that this relationship is not an 
abstraction away from the actual relation, but is rather the relation itself and 
theological reflection on it is a deeper penetration into its concrete particularity. 
The actual knowing relation can be modeled on Peter’s confession of Jesus 
(Matt. 16.13-17) or in the personal call of Jesus for Peter to follow him (Mk. 
1.17; Jn 21.22). This latter example is given in Bonhoeffer’s Discipleship and 
locates the disciple’s obedience in the personal call to follow given by Jesus.522 
These two examples directly apply to the present subject since the grounding 
                                                
519 NTPG, 132. 
520 Ibid., 131f, cf. 471. 
521 Wright correctly notes this important “as” in Ibid., 474. 
522 Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 46. 
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of the disciple’s knowledge about who Jesus is and the obedient call to follow 
him are not rooted in Peter’s worldview (although the events could certainly 
be interpreted that way) but rather in the personal reality of the questioner and 
the call. This is because the relation introduces something new, brought to it 
from the outside, as it were, by the one who is God with us. A sociology of 
knowledge could explain these texts but it could only do so if it refused to 
believe them, subjecting them to the precondition of an existent or possible 
worldview. By ‘possible’ I mean all those worldviews that are so just because 
they are grounded in available perceptions of reality. The Incarnation is not 
one of these possibilities. In a way analogous to Bonhoeffer’s analysis of the 
difference between grace and works, that which unites the past event of God’s 
revelation and the knowledge of that event—whether for the contemporary of 
Jesus or the present day believer523—is the personal relationship between the 
knower and the known. Where is this continuing personal presence of Jesus 
in Wright’s historiography? 
 Torrance locates the place of theological knowledge in the doxological 
event of the church’s communion in which it interprets the scriptures “in 
accordance with their inner and real meaning.” The inner and real meaning of 
the scriptures is determined by the actual relation between God and the 
church in Jesus Christ through the work of the Spirit. This actual relation has 
its centre in the theological affirmation of the homoousion. The story that 
makes sense of this follows the church’s refusal of the Valentinian and Arian 
insistence that there is a category of being between humanity and God that 
serves as a bridge or mediating presence. The refusal that grounded 
orthodoxy in the homoousion was not a speculative abstraction, but a faithful 
insistence that the church’s encounter with Jesus was an encounter with God 
himself. In this way, Nicene orthodoxy centred theological knowledge at this 
precise point, where the “mysteriously distinct”524 God, the God who is 
qualitatively other, has definitively transgressed the ontological ‘distance’ and 
bound himself to his creation in a new and surprising way. It is the church’s 
                                                
523 Cf. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. 
524 Wright, “In Grateful Dialogue,” in JRI, 264.  
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insistence on its encounter with Jesus as the normative point of reference that 
allows it to navigate and faithfully refuse the ‘possibilities’ that resolve this 
central paradox of the God-man.525 This insistence is not an abstraction but a 
pressing in to the very heart of the church’s confession. This means that the 
Incarnation—in all its theological significance—is the hard core of Christian 
theological epistemology.  
 
The epistemological significance of the [homoousion] lies in the rejection 
of the Valentinian and Arian dichotomy that made the Logos in the last 
resort a creature of God and so recast theological statements into 
statements with only this-worldly reference, and lies in the insistence 
that in Jesus Christ we have a Logos that is not of man’s devising but 
One who goes back into the eternal Being of God for he proceeded 
from the eternal Being of God.526  
 
 The central epistemological event, the Incarnation of the Logos, the Son 
of God, is the revelation, the apocalypse, of Jesus the Messiah. That he is the 
Messiah, a word that Wright has taught us is loaded with religious, cultural, 
and theological significance, hermeneutically grounded in a specific time and 
place, is not rejected or diminished in this insistence, but is affirmed precisely 
because it is God himself who takes on this identity. But that this is God with 
us is precisely not to limit the identity of Jesus to the available pre-
understandings and possibilities that this concept carried. Wright is exactly 
right to insist that what was being reworked and reimagined in the 
proclamation of Jesus the Messiah is the very conception of God himself. But 
this conception of God that is being reworked is, in the Incarnation, given 
over to God himself in the knowledge that the Son has of the Father, and into 
which, through the Spirit we are given to participate.  
 
                                                
525 “Knowledge of new realities or events calls for correspondingly new ways 
of thinking and speaking, in which new concepts and terms need to be coined, 
or in which ordinary forms of thought and speech have to be stretched 
adapted and refined to make them appropriate to the realities to which they 
are intended to refer.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 20.  
526 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 36. 
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As we learn in the gospels, this is what had already happened to the 
disciples and apostles of Christ as he became disclosed to them in his 
revealing and saving activity and they were enabled through the gift of 
his Spirit, by whom God bears witness to himself, to be opened to his 
intrinsic truth and believe in him. The mighty acts of God in the 
astonishingly new and utterly unique events of the birth, life, death 
and resurrection of Christ staked out the ground on which alone they 
were to be approached, apprehended and understood. No one ever 
spoke and acted as Jesus did with his divine self-authenticating 
authority. What he said and did brought about a radically new 
conception of God and a complete inversion and transformation of 
man’s outlook in terms of the new divine order, the Kingdom of God 
that had suddenly irrupted into history with the coming and presence 
of Jesus Christ, and established itself finally in human existence and 
destiny through his cross and resurrection.527  
 
 It is telling that when Wright does appeal to theological reasons to 
ground his epistemology he turns to the created order. This move is not a 
strong move within the development of his epistemology so care should be 
taken to not make more of this than is warranted. However, it is still a 
theologically significant move. In concluding the second chapter of NTPG, in 
which he introduces his variation of critical realism, Wright pauses to 
“assum[e] for the moment a Christian worldview.”528 In this brief paragraph 
Wright argues that “the interrelation of humans and the created world” and 
the belief that humans are created in the image of the creator obligates them 
to be stewards of that order through their activity of knowing. This move is 
important and makes a genuine stride toward overcoming the radical 
bifurcation of the subject and object in modern epistemology. Furthermore, it 
makes sense to the extent that Wright is speaking about historical knowledge 
and not theological knowledge. The worry comes when the move is made 
from the created order and its implied epistemology to theological knowledge. 
Theological knowledge is not grounded in the nature of knowledge in the 
created world, but rather in the reconciling act of God toward that order.  
                                                
527 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 20. 
528 NTPG, 45.  
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 It is time to return to a consideration of some brief comments Wright 
made with respect to the place of the resurrection as the basis for a Christian 
epistemology. In the previous chapter I briefly showed how Wright, even 
while appealing to the epistemic significance of the resurrection, nevertheless 
uses it to turn back to an argument for naturalistic epistemologies based on 
the creation order, referencing the work of Oliver O’Donovan. Yet in this 
essay Wright still leaves room for the resurrection to be the unique, central, 
epistemological event for the Christian faith; in fact, he seems to prefer it: 
 
I thus cautiously agree with those theologians who have insisted that 
the resurrection, if true, must become not only the corner-stone of what 
we now know but also the key to how we know things, the foundation 
of all our knowing, the starting point for a Christian 
epistemology….Precisely because it is the resurrection of the crucified 
Jesus that might now form the staring-point for our thinking and 
knowing, it will affirm the proper place and power of other 
epistemologies, as the resurrection affirms the goodness of…God’s 
present creation.529  
 
The second half of this quote turns back to affirm naturalistic epistemologies, 
even though the resurrection still has the place of priority. It would be 
interesting if Wright then went on to address the way the resurrection might 
change the methodological considerations of historical knowledge, but 
unfortunately he does not. What we are given is the following scenario: 
 
History raises the question, ‘Granted that only an empty tomb and 
appearances of Jesus will explain the rise of Christian faith, what will 
in turn explain these two satisfactorily?’ When Christian faith, arising 
from the whole gospel story, says, ‘the bodily resurrection of Jesus 
from the dead,” history may reply, ‘Well, I couldn’t have come up with 
that myself; but now that you say it, it makes a lot of sense.’ And 
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perhaps at that point history itself—the mode of our knowing—
undergoes some kind of redemptive transformation.530 
 
It would be helpful at this point were Wright to go on and explain how the 
mode of our knowing—history itself—undergoes a redemptive 
transformation. However, this transformation turns out to be, by the end of 
the essay, little more that an affirmation of Thomas’ classic formulation of 
grace perfecting nature: “As grace does not destroy but perfects nature, it is 
right that natural reason should serve faith just as the natural loving tendency 
of the will serves charity.”531 In Wright’s discussion, the affirmation of the 
resurrection is likened to the observation of two ancient columns, available 
for all to see, and the missing arch that they suggest is that which faith brings, 
in this case, the resurrection. Now Wright’s entire project comes into clarity. 
Wright is doing the work of reason, limited as it is, but nevertheless a reason 
that gets us just to the point where the picture is almost complete, but not 
quite. At this point, what is left is for faith to fill in the picture, close the gaps, 
and do so in such a way that we see the result and are validated all the way 
along as the hard, steady, work of the historian is affirmed by the final 
capstone of faith.  
 There are many problems with the grace perfecting nature paradigm, as 
well as many defenders, not the least of which is the great Thomistic tradition 
in Roman Catholicism. To enter the fray at this point would be a dangerous 
venture and might risk overextension. Rather, what I will do is show how the 
Christological affirmation of the an-hypostatic/en-hypostatic movement will 
challenge Wright’s use of this argument.  
 I take it that Wright has methodologically limited his rational 
exploration of the resurrection to those arguments which reason alone, 
unaided by faith, can deliver. This includes his consideration of worldviews 
even as they include theological beliefs. As argued above, his historical 
method even if it takes theological beliefs into account, nevertheless does not 
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531 Ibid., 210. See St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, I, Q. I. Art. 8, 
ad.2. 
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avail itself of theological arguments, but limits itself to those arguments which 
reason can deliver (and these may be reasons about theological beliefs).  
 One way of addressing this is to press the question of what would 
change if the resurrection were admitted—would the epistemological 
situation change?532 It appears that, for Wright, it would not even though he 
seems to admit that it would. All it seems to do is turn us back and affirm the 
deliverances of reason that led us up to the point where faith was needed to 
bridge the gap, as it were. What really changes, with our way of knowing, 
with the resurrection? At first it would seem that if we were to reject the 
‘grace perfects nature’ paradigm we are left with the rejection of human 
reason, or the reasoning ability of humanity to know true things about the 
world. At a very basic level this would seem to be absurd: humans use their 
reasoning ability successfully in every area of life. If the resurrection is the 
starting point for Christian epistemology, it must not be a rejection of human 
reason, but must allow human reason a place within the purview of an 
epistemological situation determined by the historical event of the 
resurrection of Jesus from the dead. I propose that the model of the 
anhypostatic/enhypostatic movement of the Incarnation is a helpful place to 
orient this Christologically and is fully consistent with the sort of 
epistemology I have been articulating throughout this thesis. 
 If the gift of faith convinces us of the resurrection, then we have, at once, 
the reality of a situation where the full import of the Incarnation is granted for 
epistemology. Here, again, T. F. Torrance is helpful: 
 
We must approach Jesus Christ simultaneously on both the empirical 
and theoretical levels in the space-time field in which he and we 
encounter each other. From the very start of our theological 
interpretation, therefore, we must learn to think conjunctively of him 
as God and man in the one indivisible fact of Jesus Christ. It is only as 
we treat the historical events in Jesus’ life as empirical correlates of 
                                                
532 This is Hays’s question to Wright in Richard B. Hays, “Story, History and 
the Question of Truth,” in JPPG, 61. Wright’s response seems to back away 
from the implications of the resurrection for epistemology, or at least from 
any perceivable difference in method (p. 64). 
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divine acts in an inter-level synthesis, that we can do justice to their 
intrinsic organisation and their inner form even as empirical and 
historical realities, that is, without the artificial manipulation of the 
observationalist and phenomenalist approach.533  
 
If we grant the resurrection epistemic priority, it seems that we would at least 
be forced to consider the reality that we are confronted with in Jesus Christ 
“conjunctively” as “God and man.” This would certainly influence the way in 
which we approach our knowledge of him, not the least of which would be 
the credibility we would give to the possibility—even probability—of the 
miraculous. For Torrance this is simply determining the method of 
investigation according to the nature of that which is being investigating. If 
the resurrection is the key, then the method necessarily changes into 
conformity with the reality of the resurrection. The old naturalistic methods of 
reasoning are subject to revision and even rejection according to not only the 
form (the miraculous) of the resurrection, but to the content and meaning of 
that event (theology).  
 The resurrection is integral for the theological event of the self-revelation 
of God in Jesus of Nazareth. If, as I have argued, the Son comes to all 
humanity in his an-hypostatic movement and in the same way, with the same 
movement, takes all history to himself, then we can also say, by virtue of the 
fact that human reason is part of what it means to be human, in this 
movement he takes human reason to himself. Because the en-hypostatic 
movement is not separable from the cross, death and burial of Jesus, we can 
make the further dogmatic claim that all of these things are judged and ended, 
‘put to death’ in and through Jesus’ willing movement to the cross. Yet what 
is en-hypostasized in the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth (including the history 
of Israel and the reasoning ability of humanity) are together redeemed and 
restored through his faithfulness with them to the point of death, and they are 
given back to him as his life is given back in the resurrection. These things—
                                                
533 Thomas F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of 
Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise 
(Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984), 93. 
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humanity, history, reason—are given new life and new purpose in Christ. 
Human reason is grounded in the reality of the resurrection, but not without 
first being judged at the cross. What returns to us in affirmation, i.e., the 
affirmation that our reason is good and true, remains to be so only to the 
extent that it is found in Christ.  
 If, with Bonhoeffer, we affirm that the continuity between the dead 
Christ and the Resurrected Lord is the God who creates ex nihilo, then the 
resurrection, as the ground of our Christian epistemology, would introduce a 
discontinuity into the functioning of human reason. This does not mean that 
reality changes, or that that to which our words refer changes, but rather that 
the human capacity is re-structured, died and risen, but in Christ. This is why 
in our thinking about Christ we must first come under the corrective of the 
mind of Christ. Only after we have given ourselves to the priority of his mind, 
his thought, can we, as a matter of thinking with fallen human reason, think 
with the non-believing historian. Yet to know the truth and to see Christ as he 
is, is only to see him according to the unity of who he is as God and a man, 
consubstantial, homoousion. In this unity is the reconciliation of our minds, a 
reconciliation we are not yet given to possess except in the Spirit. So, to see 
with reconciled minds the truth of the world, is to see in the Spirit—to 
perceive the world as a gift, grounded in the reconciliation of the world with 
God in Jesus (Col. 1.15-23). This is seeing the world, as an object of knowledge, 
according to its nature as judged and reconciled in Christ. To see it truly is to 
see it through the mind of Christ. I think this is just the sort of thing that 
Wright describes when he brings Paul into dialogue with the philosophers in 
PFG: 
 
 …the problem of true knowledge is not merely that appearances 
deceive, or that people make wrong inferences, but rather that human 
rebellion against the one god has resulted in a distortion and a 
darkening of the knowledge that humans have, or still ought to have. 
Paul would want to say to the philosophers that wisdom is not simply 
a matter of learning to see, like the owls, in ordinary darkness. It is a 
matter of the one God piercing the darkness and bringing new light, 
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the light of new creation, and at the same time opening the eyes that 
have been blinded by the ‘god of this world’ so that they can see that 
light.534  
 
This, I think, is in full agreement with what I have been arguing. Reason is 
affirmed in the resurrection as the renewing of our minds in Christ, but it is 
not affirmed except as renewed in Christ. Rather, human reason is judged at 
the cross—perhaps not for its ability to refer, but to its direction away from 
God. That Wright uses the language of new creation here hints that the 
human mind, and human knowing, are redeemed in the new and fresh act of 
God, thereby making resurrection, the resurrection, the beginning point for a 
new epistemology. 
 But this would then mean that we would indeed look back at the life of 
Christ, from the vantage point of the resurrection, in a new way, with new 
minds (in Christ), and see him not as simply a crucifiable first-century Jew, 
but a crucifiable first century Jew who was, and indeed, still is, God with us.  
 
  
c. Theological Historiography Will Be Shaped by a Theology of History for 
Which the Cross is the Hermeneutical Centre 
 
 Finally, the grand narrative, the story that conditions true historical 
knowledge, to the extent that historical knowledge would be a Christian 
knowledge, is a story that has the cross as its end. To the extent that the end is 
hermeneutically significant for any story, the Christian story can only be told 
as a story of death and resurrection, but that resurrection is grounded in the 
same freedom of God that began the world ex nihilo. This means that history 
remains oriented toward death, toward its end, but that the possibility of a 
future and a hope are grounded in the freedom of God shown in the 
resurrection of Jesus from the dead. It is the resurrection that grounds any 
hope for history, but this is a hope that only comes after death through the free 
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gracious act of God. Life on this side of death can be free from the 
constraining logic of death, but only in the reality of the personal and 
continued life of the resurrected Lord. The implications of this for 
historiography are significant. 
 First, historians are limited in the sorts of progressive narratives they can 
tell. Whether it is a story of the church or a story of a nation, the possibilities 
that are grounded in human action are bounded at the end in the finality of 
death. This is so of individuals and is, in the same way, true of the great 
sweeping narratives of history. There is no room here for any ontologising of 
history in any possible way other than as a whole that has for its ending the 
cross.535 History finds its telos at the death of the Messiah. It is limited and just 
as transient as the lives of those who make up history.  
 Second, this means that history is not the sort of thing one can take up 
and attempt to move in one direction or another. John Howard Yoder writes: 
 
One way to think about social ethics in our time is to say that 
Christians in our age are obsessed with the meaning and direction of 
history. Social ethical concern is moved by a deep desire to make 
things right and move them in the right direction. Whether a given 
action is right or not seems to be inseparable from the question of what 
effects it will cause. Thus part if not all of social concern has to do with 
looking for the right “handle” by which one can “get a hold on” the 
course of history and move it in the right direction.536  
 
By using this sort of language, Yoder is, among other things, rejecting the 
assumption that there is a greater meaning to history that has yet to be 
achieved. The Christian historian that is trying to make sense of the whole, to 
tell the story that links events to one another through the various forces of 
cause and effect, always comes up against the cross. It is the Lamb who was 
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slain that holds the key to history.537 Yoder understands this to mean that it is 
“the cross and not the sword, suffering and not brute power”538 that 
determine the meaning of history. Yet, rather than ethicising the meaning of 
history, giving it over to a principle of non-violence as if ‘non-violence’ were 
an idea that could carry history, the crucial point is that “the obedience of 
God’s people and the triumph of God’s cause is not a relationship of cause 
and effect, but one of cross and resurrection.”539 Cross and resurrection, again, 
are not stand-ins for an ethical principle, reproducible in varying situations, 
but rather the reality of the meaning of history. That resurrection is the 
movement beyond the cross means that the history that moves forward for 
which there is a future and a hope is the history of Jesus Christ, in actuality. 
Here, a theologian like Bonhoeffer would point to the church as the body of 
Christ, as his actual presence in the world. But if this is so, it is not a 
competitive presence in history, but rather an excessive presence, a presence 
grounded in the resurrection and mediated by the Spirit. World history 
stands judged. There is no moving it one way or another. There is only 
resurrection, God’s act in freedom that, because of his ontological non-
competitiveness with the world, and the nature of his presence in history as 
the lamb who was slain, does not move history according to a progressive 
teleology, but peacefully transforms the lives of disciples freed from the logic 
of death. This does not rule out human action for justice or liberation in 
history, but rather qualifies such action within a baptismal logic of death and 
resurrection. 
 Finally, this challenges the faithfulness of metaphors that would depict a 
Christian understanding of history—the Christian story—in terms of the 
dramatic. This Christian story functions in Wright’s work as the normative 
grounding for the Christian subject’s orientation to the good; it is definitive 
for the Christian’s worldview. The normative function of the Christian story is 
imaginatively appropriated by articulating in word and praxis, a biblical view 
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of history according to the model of a five-act drama. Christians find 
themselves living in the unwritten fifth act of a five act play. Such a play 
“would consist in the fact of an as yet unfinished drama, containing its own 
impetus and forward movement, which demanded to be concluded in an 
appropriate manner.”540 This corresponds nicely to Taylor’s argument in 
Sources of the Self where he writes, “Since we cannot do without an orientation 
to the good, and since we cannot be indifferent to our place relative to this 
good, and since this place is something that must always change and become, 
the issue of the direction of our lives must arise for us.”541 The biblical 
narrative, imagined as a drama with an unfinished final act, becomes the 
story that provides us with the context and norms that determine the 
direction of our lives within history. The epistemological and hermeneutical 
concept of worldview provides the theoretical apparatus for this imaginative 
exercise. Wright’s primary concern is to account for the way in which biblical 
authority functions, yet the implications this has for Christian ethics should be 
clear, both as we take into consideration the role of the Bible in moral 
deliberation and formation, and also the way in which the Christian imagines 
her own place as an actor in the world.  
For Wright, the moral concern that points us to the discipline of history 
as a theological corrective and as a way to articulate the whole of history is 
teleologically ordered according to his reading of the moral direction of 
history: “history and justice belong together, as humans are called to bring the 
divinely intended order to birth through their speech-acts.”542 In the final 
chapter of PFG, Wright brings together the centrality of the new creation for 
Paul together with the language of that new creation as a project that Paul’s 
mission was supposed to help realise. Paul “was not just a spectator. He was 
called to do and say things through which new creation was happening already: 
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each personal ‘new creation’, through Messiah-faith and baptism, was 
another signpost to the larger ‘new creation’ of which the Psalms and the 
prophets had spoken.”543 After quoting 2 Cor. 11.2f. he continues, “Paul could 
only write like that if he really did believe that his apostolic work was an 
advance project for the ultimate new creation itself.”544 Earlier in the chapter 
he writes of Paul, “Since Paul believed that this new creation had already 
begun in the resurrection of the Messiah, this could not, by definition, remain 
a mere idea. If it was true, it had to become what we might call a historical 
reality.”545 If Wright’s account of Paul’s “project” is to bring about the new 
creation, I think he oversteps the actual possibilities for human agency in that 
project. If new creation is what God brings about—in the Messiah through 
resurrection—then there are implications for human agency with respect to its 
realisation. These are not easy implications to work out in the normal 
accounts of human agency since they are grounded in Christ and in the gifts 
he gives in the Spirit. The history that is the new creation is not, therefore, 
part of the same history that went on before, and that still moves forward 
toward its judgement, but is something new.  
Wright’s fear of such a position is that it throws out all the history that 
has gone before, significantly the history of Israel. This is his critique of the 
new ‘apocalyptic’ theology that for him is represented by Martyn’s 
commentary on Galatians, a theology he characterises as a “present fad for a 
supposedly…’apocalyptic’ of sheer negativity towards the past.”546 I hope 
that the arguments in this thesis do not present such a negativity, but rather 
that they put forward a new reading of the relationship between the new 
creation and the old way of thinking of historical continuity. The resurrection 
does not simply lead to a “new creation mode of knowing” that is a “deeper, 
truer, richer mode of knowing about the old creation as well.”547 Of course, if the 
“as well” in this statement means that a new creation mode of knowing has 
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the added benefit of giving us a truer knowledge of the old creation, then this 
implies that the primary benefit of this new epistemology is located elsewhere. 
But this would mean that, as our earlier discussion suggested, the 
resurrection really would change the way we see the history of Jesus and 
God’s revelation in his word and deeds in history, through the history of 
Israel, in the covenants with his people. The point is that this new mode of 
knowing goes through death and resurrection, and finds itself located outside 
of us in the knowing of the one—the only one, so far—to be resurrected.  
The point that needs to be made here is that history, with the cross as 
its telos, is not continued except as it moves toward that end. It is not a project 
to be improvised nor a drama to be acted. Rather it is a tragic tale that has been 
told, one that has been ended at the cross. All that is to now be done (and here 
is the crucial point) is done according to the life that comes to us in Christ. 
Because history is now located in Jesus Christ and his ongoing historicity, it is 
from Christ in his en-hypostatic, en-historic, reality that we find the validation 
of a historical trajectory, one of God’s covenant faithfulness to his people, 
Israel. This story is brought to its end with the arrival of the Messiah. This end 
looks like death and resurrection, the end of history and new creation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 236 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The question of history is the question of eschatology. It is not only a 
question of the past, but a question of the future and the human relationship 
to the forward movement of history in time. By affirming an account of the 
end of history, an end that somewhat paradoxically comes in the middle of 
history, we raise the question of hope: If history is ended at the cross in the 
sense that the telos of human historical meaning is revealed in the crucifixion 
of the Son of God, what then are we left to do with respect to the future 
direction of history? Is there no hope? Does the long arc of history not bend in 
the direction of justice? Is there any reason to work to make things better? Are 
we left with a pessimism that defunds action for social justice? Is liberation 
not a theological theme?  
 From the outset the issue has been the reality of God and the 
theoretical implications of that Reality for the work of historiography—
historiography, that is, in the service of theology. A theology of 
historiography, as I have argued, is not divorced from a theology of history 
because historiography must assume a narrative, a story, in order to make 
sense of historical ‘data’. Bare facts do not exist outside of the complex webs 
of human interpretation. The stories that make up history are never 
metaphysically or theologically neutral. Therefore, it is methodologically 
dishonest not to begin with a theology of history, even if that theology is 
informed, to a large extent by historical events. There is no way out of this 
circularity, nor should there be. But there is a way into this circularity. This is 
what is referred to (perhaps ambiguously) as the ‘apocalyptic event’, the 
breaking-in from outside that both sets anew the agenda for the story and also 
maintains at all times a transcendent corrective/critique. This somewhat 
abstract and theoretical way of speaking of the theology of history is only a 
conceptualization of the concrete reality of the Incarnation and the 
relationship of the Father’s action in sending the Son, becoming Jesus of 
Nazareth, living, bearing witness to the Kingdom, dying, rising, and 
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ascending. This is the reality of God that is given in history but cannot be 
contained by any one prior telling of history, except to say that the final 
meaning of all history is revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of this 
same Jesus of Nazareth.  
 It is the death of Jesus that ends history. This is not history in the sense 
that calls to mind concrete ‘historical’ reality: the world of actual happenings 
in time and space. Time did not stop at the crucifixion. It is history in the 
sense that history has a direction, a trajectory, a narrative that makes sense of 
all things; it is history in the sense that history has meaning in the relationship 
and continuity of human actions and intentions. History is the story that 
humans tell of the relationship through time of human events, and it is a story 
that imagines both a past and a future. To the extent that that future is taken 
up in the Incarnation, as the Son en-hypostatically takes up the life of Jesus of 
Nazareth as his life and so takes up this particular history as his history, it is a 
future that necessarily conforms to the singular event that is Jesus’ cross and 
resurrection.  
 If this is the case—and I have sought to present a coherent case for 
recognizing that this is indeed so—then the historiographical practice, for the 
Christian historian, is determined by this end; the historian cannot rule out 
the question of Jesus’ identity as the Son, the second person of the Triune 
Godhead. This is the interpretative key to the whole story. History and 
theology are thus integrally connected. For Wright to rule out the theological 
claim until the history has been done is to be disingenuous with respect to 
this relationship. His attempt to include theology in the conversation as a part 
of the worldview of both the subject and object of historical investigation—the 
historian and the historical object—is helpful but neglects the reality of God, 
the actual personal agency of the one who holds history in his hands. To 
borrow his analogy of the prodigal son and the older brother, in Wright’s 
account it is the Father who is left out of the picture. Rather, the historian and 
the theologian are reconciled, peacefully, in the loving embrace of the Father. 
For the methodological question of the historian, this means that naturalistic 
accounts will never do. For the theologian, this means that theology is never 
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finished, for theology is always engaged in thoughtful reflection on the 
continuation of a new history located in the continuing personal existence of 
Jesus, the risen and ascended Lord. For both, the reality of God means that 
doxology and prayer are the ground out of which each practice springs. 
Unsettled from their naturalistic soil, the historian and the theologian find 
themselves replanted in the living soil of the Triune God’s new creation, and 
therefore new history.  
 Indeed, there is hope. It is a hope of liberation and justice. But it is a 
hope that is also cruciform and so realistic about the trajectory of history. But 
in this cruciformity it is open to the reality of God’s action in the midst of a 
fallen and falling world. As history arcs to the cross, the good news is that in 
the darkest hour that arc will break free—it has broken free—into a world 
made new, into the new creation that lives according to the life of the Lamb 
who was slain. 
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